IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC ORDER EMERGENCY COMMISSION

ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE

INSTITUTIONAL REPORT

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PART A – THE OPP: OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND

Overview of the OPP

Under the Ontario *Police Services Act*, the OPP has a unique dual mandate – providing frontline policing services to 328 municipalities across the province as well as providing assistance and/or specialized support for individual municipal police services at their request, in which instance, the police service of jurisdiction may remain the lead on the overall policing approach and response.

The Commissioner is the highest-ranking member of the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and is responsible for overseeing all aspects of OPP service. The organization is divided into four commands: Corporate Services, Traffic Safety and Operational Support, Investigations and Organized Crime, and Field Operations. Each area is led by a Provincial Commander.

In addition to the four commands noted above, the Office of the Adjudicator, Corporate Communications and Strategy Management Bureau as well as the Office of Professionalism, Respect, Inclusion and Leadership also report directly to the Commissioner.



The Four Provincial Commands under the Commissioner are:

- Corporate Services – Provincial Commander Mary Silverthorn
- Traffic Safety and Operational Support – Deputy Commissioner Rose DiMarco
- Investigations and Organized Crime – Deputy Commissioner Charles (Chuck) Cox
- Field Operations – Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins

Each of these are commanded by a Provincial Commander and are largely comprised of varied and distinct policing units/functions.

The Commissioner & the four Provincial Commanders comprise the OPP Commissioner's Command Team.

1.1 OPP Front-line focus and primary areas of responsibility

From a front-line policing perspective, OPP Detachments are led by Detachment Commanders and fall within Regions (North West, North East, West, Central, East), or the Highway Safety Division.

A Detachment Commander is accountable to a Regional/Divisional Command Team within the OPP structure, as well as accountable to the community through reports to local police services board. A Detachment Commander is responsible for providing leadership to detachment personnel to ensure excellence, professionalism, and carriage of the OPP Values in the delivery of policing services through a staff complement of detachment and regional specialists.

[1]

1.1.1. Ottawa Detachment

The City of Ottawa is the fourth largest City in Canada with an area of 2,760 square kilometers. The Ottawa Detachment is located adjacent to Highway 417 at Eagleson Road and March Road, in the City of Ottawa.

[1] OPP00004575: OPP - Regions and Detachments



[2]

The Detachment's policing responsibilities include traffic safety on the provincial highways running throughout the City of Ottawa as well as providing policing duties to Fitzroy Provincial Park. In total, the detachment is responsible for 275 kilometers of highway within the City of Ottawa. The Ottawa Police Service is the Police Service of jurisdiction for the City of Ottawa.

The OPP Ottawa Detachment works collaboratively with community partners to develop co-response models that focus on prevention, harm reduction and risk intervention in conjunction with its core responsibility for traffic and highways.

As its core and primary function, Ottawa Detachment remains committed to traffic safety, focusing on eliminating driver behaviors responsible for injuries and deaths. The Detachment targets aggressive driving, inattentive driving, impaired driving and the lack of occupant restraints as they remain the "Big Four" causal factors of tragedies on our roadways. They also regularly participate in the following enforcement initiatives: Distracted Driving Campaigns, Seatbelt Campaigns, Canada Road Safety Week, Operation Corridor, Operation Impact, Long holiday weekend initiatives and Festive Reduce Impaired Driving Everywhere (RIDE).

1.1.2. East Region Headquarters

The Ottawa Detachment is one of 16 Detachments that fall within the East Region catchment area and report directly to OPP East Region Headquarters.

East Region encompasses a diverse territory, from Algonquin Park, with trails and waterways including, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

[2] OPP00004576: Ottawa Jurisdiction

(UNESCO) designated World Heritage Rideau Canal, to the heavy traffic surrounding the Nation's capital. This Region includes three international border crossings with the United States, numerous inter-provincial border crossings with Quebec, and a vast shoreline along Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River.

One of North America's busiest transportation routes, Highway 401, runs the entire width of the Region. Highway 401 presents policing challenges not only in traffic safety and enforcement, but also in the area of investigation and enforcement of criminal offences.

[3]

The OPP may receive requests to provide assistance from other police services in East Region or elsewhere in Ontario. Requests that come into a Detachment within East Region are conveyed up to the Regional Headquarters to ensure the strategic coordination and the efficient/effective utilization of finite regional resources.

If the scope, size and/or duration of the requested resources is beyond the ability of the Region to provide, that request is forwarded to OPP Field Support Bureau for provincial level coordination.

Formal requests for police assistance are typically made directly to the OPP Commissioner from a Police Chief.

[3] OPP00004572: East Region Map

1.1.2.1. Field Operations Command

All OPP Regions report directly to Chris Harkins, Deputy Commissioner, Field Operations Command

1.1.3. Field Support Bureau

If a provincial level coordination is required, Field Support Bureau through the OPP General Headquarters Emergency Operations Centre ("EOC") implements an OPP member and resource mobilization strategy in support of the requesting Regional Headquarters. This strategy draws on the entirety of the OPP from all Regions, Bureaus and Teams to fulfill the operational need.

All effort is made at this level to prioritize resources from the provincial perspective, mindful of the requirement to maintain adequate and effective policing in over 320 local municipalities, as well as to provide appropriate resources to other events, operations and other competing resource priorities. The Bureau's role includes ensuring that ensure that the OPP's finite resources are applied strategically and effectively, and in a manner that prioritizes the lives and safety of all Ontarians.

If required, the EOC can also liaise with and coordinate resourcing/staffing from other police services, as required.

1.1.3.1. Incident Command

OPP Field Support Bureau is also responsible for the OPP Incident Command Program outlined in section 1.5 below.

1.1.4. Traffic Safety Division

The OPPs Highway Safety Division is responsible for traffic enforcement, patrolling highways, responding to calls for service and traffic initiatives. The OPP is responsible for investigating motor vehicle collisions, including complex, serious and fatal injury collisions. The OPP is responsible for highways even where parts of those highways may fall within the boundaries of municipal police service jurisdictions.

1.1.4.1. Traffic Safety and Operational Support Command

Commander, Field Support Bureau and Commander, Highway Safety Division, both report directly to Deputy Commissioner Rose DiMarco, Traffic Safety and Operational Support.

1.2. OPP – Policing Responsibility under the *Police Services Act*

In accordance with the Police Services Act (RSO 1990, c. P.15): Responsibilities of the OPP.

19 (1) The Ontario Provincial Police have the following responsibilities:

1. Providing police services in respect of the parts of Ontario that do not have municipal police forces other than municipal law enforcement officers.
2. Providing police services in respect of all navigable bodies and courses of water in Ontario, except those that lie within municipalities designated by the Solicitor General.
3. Maintaining a traffic patrol on the King's Highway, except the parts designated by the Solicitor General.
4. Maintaining a traffic patrol on the connecting links within the meaning of section 21 of the *Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act* that are designated by the Solicitor General.
5. Maintaining investigative services to assist municipal police forces on the Solicitor General's direction or at the Crown Attorney's request. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, s. 19 (1); 1997, c. 8, s. 14 (1).

As set out in the *Police Services Act*, municipalities can choose a municipal police service or the OPP to provide policing services to their community. Section 4 of that *Act* requires that municipalities provide adequate and effective police services in accordance with its needs.

Adequate and effective police services must include, at a minimum, all of the following police services:

- crime prevention
- law enforcement
- assistance to victims of crime
- public order maintenance
- emergency response 1997, c. 8, s. 3.

Standards for all Ontario Police Services are further defined within O. Reg. 3/99: Adequacy and Effectiveness of Police Services under the *Police Services Act*.

1.3. Mobilization & Engagement Model of Community Policing

The OPP follows Ontario's Mobilization & Engagement Model of Community Policing, which helps to ensure that front-line police officers and community partners have the skills and tactics for effective community policing.[4]

The Mobilization and Engagement Model and the Diagram are at **APPENDIX A.**

1.4. Incident Command

The responsibility for Major Incident Command falls within Field Support Bureau (FSB), which is responsible for specialized major incident command services provided at the regional level via a trained Incident Commander who manages the planning, response and recovery aspects of a major incident.

The goal of major incident command is to successfully conclude a major incident through the overall command/control and efficient management of resources and services, either alone or in concert with other emergency management agencies, e.g. fire, ambulance and other police agencies, thereby minimizing/eliminating loss of life, injury to any person or damage to property, providing support to victims and, where applicable, support the investigation and prosecution of individuals where a crime has occurred.

To be effective, an Incident Commander must have autonomy to carry out his or her duties in accordance with best practices within the context of the incident as it evolves. Senior Command provides a clear and concise expression of the task, purpose, limitations, conditions and expected conclusion of operations. The Incident Commander, through training and experience and with the collaboration of his or her team, is responsible for developing a responsive strategy and implementing an appropriate plan. A major incident is an occurrence that, by circumstance, requires the mobilization of OPP employees, equipment and other resources beyond those required for normal police service delivery, e.g. airplane crash.

There are three types of Major Incident Command in the OPP:

- Incident Command (IC)
- Critical Incident Command (CIC)
- Major Critical Incident Command (MCIC)

[4] OPP00004574: Mobilization and Engagement Models
OPP00004573: Mobilization and Engagement Models Diagram

1.4.1. Policies

Policies for all levels of Incident Command are defined in section 5 of Ontario Provincial Police Orders, set out in **APPENDIX B.**[5]

Incident Commander

A uniform member shall possess the following qualifications before performing incident commander duties:

- have a minimum rank of Sergeant
- attended and successfully completed the OPP Incident Command course
- maintain required mandatory annual maintenance training

An incident commander shall be conversant with the Incident Command Standard Operational Procedure Manual.

An incident commander shall:

- take command/control of the major incident
- retain command/control until the situation is resolved/relieved
- if the incident is a critical incident:
    - remain at the scene until arrival/handover to a critical incident commander
    - update the critical incident commander on any actions/developments
    - if requested, be a resource to the critical incident commander for local information on circumstances that may have a bearing on the outcome and provide advice on best course of action
    - any other relevant duty as required

Critical Incident Commander

A uniform member shall possess the following qualifications before performing critical incident commander duties:

- have a minimum rank of Staff Sergeant
- attended and successfully completed the OPP critical incident commander course
- be recommended by their bureau/regional commander
- maintain required mandatory annual maintenance training

[5] OPP00004568: OPP Orders - Chapter 5 Major Incident Command

- be designated as a critical incident commander by the Commander, Field Support Bureau

A critical incident commander shall:

- be conversant with the Incident Command Standard Operational Procedure Manual
- comply with procedures/instructions contained therein

The critical incident commander shall:

- take command/control of a critical incident
- activate Emergency Response Team (ERT) / Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU) simultaneously
- be responsible for all actions taken during the incident by deployed personnel, including, but not limited to:
    - scribe
    - crisis negotiator(s) (CN)
    - investigators
    - technical support
    - other perimeter uniform members
    - communications advisor
    - logistics member(s)
    - Forensic Identification Services (FIS)
    - Community Safety Officer (CSO)
    - Provincial Liaison Team
- if the incident relates to a major crime and requires Criminal Investigation Services, Investigation & Support Bureau (ISB) will transfer investigation responsibility to the assigned Criminal Investigation Services
- authorize *all* tactics used by emergency response personnel, including the use of explosive forced entry by the Tactics and Rescue Unit
- where there is a hostage taking/barricaded person(s), activate the services of the Crisis Negotiations regional team through the Crisis Negotiations regional co-ordinator

Major Critical Incident Commander

A major critical incident commander shall:

- be a trained and active critical incident commander

- be designated as a critical incident commander by the Commander, Field Support Bureau
- provide expertise in managing and resolving occupations, protests and high-risk incidents occurring on First Nation Territories or involving an Indigenous community member

Shall be responsible for commanding:

- non-conventional tactical responses (e.g. acts of terrorism, mass shootings and bombings)
- OPP resources in multi-agency responses involving other police tactical/hostage-rescue units and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM); and
- lengthy, complex, or high-profile major incidents including:
    - naturally occurring or man-made disasters (e.g. tornados, train derailments)
    - Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Explosive events
    - Urban Search and Rescue events
    - large searches
    - acts of terrorism
    - security events
    - others as deemed appropriate

1.4.1.1. Public Order

Public Order Incident Commander

Public Order Unit Commanders require specialized training. One must be an IC to be a POU Commander though being a CIC is not a prerequisite. POU Commander training is separate with a focus on very specialized skills.
A uniform member shall possess the following qualifications before performing Public Order Incident Commander duties:

- hold a minimum rank of Staff Sergeant
- maintain a current Ontario Police Fitness Award
- maintain required mandatory annual maintenance training
- designated as a Public Order Incident Commander by the Commander, Field Support Bureau
- attended and successfully completed the following courses:
    - Emergency Response Team / Public Order Unit (POU) basic training
    - the OPP Public Order Incident Command course
    - OPP Incident Commander course

The Public Order Incident Commander shall be responsible for all actions taken by the Public Order Unit, including, but not limited to:

- personnel
- tactics
- arrests, charges
- authorizing the use of force options to engage a crowd, if warranted

A Public Order Incident Commander shall be:

- prepared to be deployed nationally
- responsible for attending OPP Public Order Incident Commander training

1.4.2. Directives

The Major/Critical Incident Command Standard Operation Procedure Manual at **APPENDIX C**[6]) provides the strategic and operational direction for the program.

1.4.3. Training

Incident Command Course

The purpose of this course is to provide officers with the required skills and knowledge to fulfill the role of Incident Commander at a major occurrence (with the exception of barricaded person, hostage taking or other high-risk incidents).

Course candidates will develop the necessary capabilities to perform the diverse duties required. Practical training exercise simulate the realities of an occurrence requiring an Incident Commander, providing the course candidate with the opportunity to integrated theoretical knowledge with actual skill application

Course candidates must be a minimum rank of Sergeant. Maximum candidates per course is 16 students and the course duration is 10 days.

Critical Incident Command Course

The purpose of this course is to provide officers with he required skills and knowledge to fulfill the role of Incident Commander at a major occurrence, including barricaded person, hostage taking or other high-risk incidents.

[6] OPP00004567: OPP - Major Incident Command Standard Operating Procedure Manual

Course candidates must be a minimum rank of Staff Sergeant. Maximum candidates per course is 10 students and the course duration is 20 days.

Public Order Unit Commander Course

The purpose of the course is to provide students with the skills and knowledge to be able to function in the roll of Public Order Unit Commander at all public order incidents. Through the use of case studies and selected guest speakers, students will learn to draw on prior public order incidents to guide them in their decision-making. In addition, students will participate in practical scenarios, providing them with the opportunity to practice making appropriate decision when faced with public order situations.

It is recommended that students have public order training (Emergency Response Team, phase 6 or equivalent), have Incident Command Training, have completed provincial Incident Management System training, and are assigned members in a public order unit.

Course candidates must be a minimum rank of Sergeant. The maximum class size is 16 students, and the course duration is one week.

Major Incident Command – Major Critical Incident Commanders

The OPP Major Critical Incident Commanders provide expertise in managing and resolving occupations, protests and high-risk incidents including multi-jurisdictional events and those occurring on First Nation territories and/or involving Indigenous community member(s). Every Major Critical Incident Commander is a qualified Critical Incident Commander and Public Order Unit Commander who has demonstrated an understanding of the unique challenges associated with these incidents.

1.5. Provincial Liaison Team Role

The Provincial Liaison Team (PLT) and the Framework for Police Preparedness for Indigenous Critical Incidents were both formed in response to the Ipperwash Inquiry Recommendations. The Ipperwash Inquiry was a public inquiry that examined the events surrounding the death of Dudley George who was fatally shot by an OPP officer at an Indigenous Critical Incident at the Ipperwash Provincial Park in September of 1995. The Ipperwash Recommendations relating to police services relate to concepts such as:

- Developing communication strategies
- No political influence from any level of government
- Seeking the assistance of First Nation mediators
- Building trusting relationships with stakeholders
- Provide verified information to the media in news release

1.5.1. A Framework for Police Preparedness for Indigenous Critical Incidents

The Framework for Police Preparedness for Indigenous Critical Incidents (the Framework) provides a guideline for police response to conflict and is applicable to both Indigenous and non-Indigenous issue-related conflict and is set out at **APPENDIX D**[7]**.** There are hundreds of OPP policies that cover all areas of policing. Nineteen of those policies are considered critical policies. The Framework is one of those critical policies. It is critical to public safety. The Framework is recognized as a best practice for police response to an Indigenous Critical Incident (ICI).

The Framework outlines a flexible response to each stage of the conflict cycle; pre, during and post. Its focus on negotiation and mediation applies to police-related matters during a conflict.

Critical incidents are often avoidable. The benefits of the Framework are maximized if utilized before an issue becomes a critical incident. Identifying, establishing and maintaining open and transparent lines of communication with all stakeholders are vital to maximize public safety.

It is the role of the OPP and its employees to make every effort prior to a critical incident to understand the issues and to protect the rights of all involved parties throughout the cycle of conflict. The policing objective is to preserve the peace, prevent offences and enforce the law in a manner that respects the rights of all involved parties.

The purpose of the Framework is to:

- promote an operationally sound, informed and flexible approach to resolving conflict and managing crises in a consistent manner
- offer a framework that demonstrates accommodation and mutual respect of differences, positions and interests of involved Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities and the OPP
- promote and develop strategies that minimize the use of force to the fullest extent possible

The OPP recognizes and respects the fundamental freedoms of opinion, expression and peaceful assembly enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A safe and secure environment for all participants and communities exercising these constitutionally protected rights is always a significant consideration in responding to situations.

[7] OPP00004566: A Framework for Police Preparedness for Indigenous Critical Incidents

OPP members have a statutory and common law duty to preserve the peace (PSA s. 42(1)(a)). The principles of peacekeeping are aimed at minimizing violence, keeping and restoring public order, maintaining neutrality, facilitating rights and establishing trusting relationships. This is consistent with the purpose of the Framework and its methodology.

The OPP investigates and takes appropriate action with respect to civil disobedience and other unlawful acts. The OPP uses discretion and a carefully measured approach, employing only the level of force necessary to:

- ensure the safety of all citizens
- enforce the law
- enforce court orders/warrants
- maintain/restore peace
- to provide order and security

The Provincial Liaison Team has a significant role to play with respect to the above. PLT is responsible for:

- providing specialized support and assistance to establish and maintain open and transparent lines of communication with all stakeholders who may be affected, directly or indirectly by a critical incident or an Indigenous Critical Incident
- providing specialized support to build relationships of trust, mutual understanding and respect between police and all stakeholders
- undertaking its responsibilities in keeping with the procedures and best practices documented in the Provincial Liaison Team Standard Operating Procedures

1.5.2. Application of the Framework

Conflicts cycle through recognized incident stages: pre-critical incident, critical incident and post-critical incident. The Framework provides an overview of signs, behaviours and cues that may be present at each stage and suggests resolution techniques to avoid, de-escalate or appropriately manage the situation. It is strongly recommended that the Framework be applied early in the pre-critical stage and continue throughout the post-critical stage. See **APPENDIX D**.

The mandate of the Provincial Liaison Team (PLT) program is to establish and maintain open and transparent lines of communication with all stakeholders who may be affected, directly or indirectly, by major events or critical incidents. The PLT members work to build relationships of trust, mutual understanding and respect between police and members of the public.

- PLT members are specially trained and experienced officers who provide proactive communication and informed liaison between police and involved parties as part of police response to major events or critical incidents
- PLT members are familiar with relevant issues in their regions and work towards building relationships of trust, mutual understanding and respect
- PLT members develop and maintain existing relationships with key parties, particularly Indigenous leaders and their communities, and other involved stakeholders and activist groups
- PLT works with all involved parties in attempt to facilitate a safe and lawful environment for free speech and peaceful assembly

PART B – THE FREEDOM CONVOY: THE OPP ROLE IN THE POLICE RESPONSE TO BLOCKADES AND DISRUPTIONS

1. Early Freedom Convoy Information – OPP Intelligence

OPP Intelligence – Early Reporting and Wide Dissemination of Information on the "Freedom Convoy" to Policing and Public Safety Partners

The OPP's Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau ("POIB") first reported on the Freedom Convoy in its January 13, 2022 report to its intelligence partners in the Ontario and federal policing and public safety community, who were part of "Project Hendon".[8] During the weeks leading up and then during to the intensification of convoy activities and the blockades in Ottawa, Windsor and elsewhere in the province, Project Hendon reports and then regular teleconferences were a critical and essential source of information and intelligence to police services in Ontario.

Project Hendon: Background and an Expansion of Scope to Address Movements Opposing COVID-19 Public Health Measures

The OPP's POIB leads Project Hendon, which was created in around February of 2020 as an OPP joint intelligence operation to communicate with partners and stakeholders, collect information relevant to criminal activity or illegal activity that may present a threat to public safety, produce intelligence, and to disseminate intelligence products to identified stakeholders. The initiative originated in response to POIB's observations of indicators of an increase in dissent and protest resulting in criminal activity at public order events. These public order threats were significantly impacting public safety, critical infrastructure and economic security. At the height of organizing, experiences included Wet'suwet'en solidarity events in Ontario, the protracted Tyendinaga rail

[8] "Hendon" is a randomly generated project name.

blockade, the Six Nations and Caledonia blockades, and a number of rail sabotage incidents. POIB responded to these events by organizing and hosting teleconferences with intelligence members from partner agencies and affected stakeholders, as well producing daily strategic intelligence reports. Given the longevity and impact of these events - targeting rail lines, highways, rolling blockades, and the included use of heavy equipment to threaten pipelines – POIB formalized information sharing and collaboration with its intelligence partners with the creation of Project Hendon.

With the COVID-19 pandemic, and the corresponding public health restrictions imposed by governments at all levels beginning in March of 2020, POIB observed that the public threat environment changed with an increase in dissent and protest activity regarding government public health measures. Project Hendon pivoted to address that change and to continue to fulfil its mandate to provide situational awareness of ideologically driven social protest and public order events. Throughout the spring of 2021, POIB identified indicators of extremist elements within the anti-lockdown, anti-mask, and anti-government movement.[9]

By April of 2021, POIB observed activity of the "Patriot Movement" and broad-based anti-government sentiment and so it became a focus of Project Hendon. At that stage, minimal criminal activity was reported by POIB, and into the autumn of 2021, POIB reported that the dissent persisted, with escalation in rhetoric, though still there were no specific threats to public safety identified and very low criminality reported. This activity, and the associated trends and possibilities, were covered in the Hendon reporting to all stakeholders. By August of 2021, the collection plan for the project was adjusted and expanded to reflect the evolution of the project's focus.

By January 2022, the Freedom Convoy 2022 had crystallized as a development that may have impact nationally – and particularly in Ottawa. Beginning January 13th, Freedom Convoy reporting was disseminated to all partners – as a focus for further collection to assist in a more precise intelligence assessment of this development. Reports outlined available information on the size of the convoy headed towards Ottawa, the demands and objectives of the convoy participants and included intelligence assessments that the theoretical demands of some of the protestors were not achievable, and that there was no indication of the exit plan.

Project Hendon Report Distribution - Hendon partners and Ontario Police Chiefs

From the beginning of Project Hendon, reports and other intelligence products were distributed to partner agencies including the Vancouver Police Service, le Service de

[9] OPP00003442: 2021-08-26_OPP PROJECT HENDON Intelligence Collection Plan_HCEU
OPP00001783: 21 March 2022 – Provincial Operational Intelligence Bureau Timeline for Ottawa Occupation and Border Disruptions

police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) representatives, the major municipal police services in Ontario, the Ontario Provincial Security Advisor, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Department of National Defence Intelligence. RCMP representation from the outset included members of INSET (Integrated National Security Enforcement Team), FPNS (Federal Policing and National Security teams), and Criminal Operations O Division (Ontario). Critical infrastructure stakeholders on the distribution list included CN Police Service and CP Police Service. Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) representatives were later added to the Hendon distribution list.

To ensure that police leaders were directly receiving information, the OPP Commissioner requested that distribution of Project Hendon reports be expanded to include the Chiefs of Police at the major Ontario police services. As of **January 21, 2021,** a full year in advance of the Freedom Convoy**,** Hendon reports were also distributed directly to Chiefs of Police, including the Chiefs at the Toronto Police Service, the Ottawa Police Service, and the Windsor Police Service.[10]

Teleconferences and Reports

On January 13th, 2022 POIB first reported on the Freedom Convoy in a Hendon report.[11]

The January 13th report stated that "[i]ndividuals within the Patriot Movement have undertaken to organize through closed communication channels and in-person networking toward large scale protest actions. … Information shared through social media networks indicates some of the participants of this action may be mobilizing from across the country to arrive in Ottawa for a mass anti-government protest calling for an end to all COVID-19 mandates."[12] In addition, the report noted that "[t]he information coming out through social media pertaining to a nationwide campaign of 'truckers' to stage a work-stoppage, highway slow-down and convoy to Ottawa appears to have benefited from semi-clandestine organizing that had been underway for some time."13

The next Hendon report a week later, on January 20, 2022, specifically noted that the Freedom Convoy had the potential to raise *significant public safety concerns – particularly in Ottawa*. The report states that "other individuals appear to be advocating aggressive tactics, including potentially blocking Parliament once they reach Ottawa or "locking down" government buildings by parking their trucks outside provincial

[10] OPP00004563: OPP - POIB - Project HENDON - PROTECTED B_ Strategic Intelligence Overview for January 21 2021
[11] OPP00001600: 2022-01-13 - POIB - PROJECT HENDON 008-2022 - STRATEGIC OVERVIEW_FINAL
[12] OPP0001600 at page 1: 2022-01-13 - POIB - PROJECT HENDON 008-2022 - STRATEGIC OVERVIEW_FINAL
[13] OPP00001600 at page 5: 2022-01-13 - POIB - PROJECT HENDON 008-2022 - STRATEGIC OVERVIEW_FINAL

government buildings for extended periods of time."[14] In addition, the report noted that there "*did not yet appear to be an exit strategy for departing Ottawa*, and that *the convoy organizers' intent appeared to be to remain in Ottawa until all COVID-19-related mandates and restrictions are lifted*." [15]

On 21 January 2022, POIB determined that the significance of the Freedom Convoy warranted a Hendon teleconference with all partners, to raise awareness and stimulate more collection and better intelligence production. By this time, the Hendon distribution list for intelligence products and teleconference invites exceeded 200 members.[16]

From the first report on January 13, 2022, continuing until February 20, 2022, POIB provided 29 Strategic Intelligence Reports to its partner agencies regarding the Freedom Convoy and blockades. Teleconferences about the convoy were hosted starting January 21, 2022, and then daily starting January 24, 2022.[17]

On January 26, 2022, two Officer Safety Bulletins were also disseminated.[18] One stated that "organizers have stated an intent to remain at Parliament Hill until the Federal government concedes to repeal all COVID-19 public health restrictions and mandates. Organizers have indicated they are planning to stage disruptions that may gridlock areas around Parliament buildings and parts of Ottawa. There is no expressed departure date for when the participants will disperse or the action will end."[19]

POIB also disseminated a number of other reports, including three Situation Reports that included "Tactical Considerations". Two Intelligence Reports that had tactical information and reported on the leadership of the organization were created on January 21, 2022 and January 22, 2022. These were disseminated internally and to the OPS on January 24, 2022[20]and another report on operational security concerns was conveyed to the OPS on February 9, 2022.[21]

- Three Operational Intelligence Reports focused on eight (8) locations and specific individuals.[22]

[14] OPP00001028 at page 2: 2022-01-20 - POIB - PROJECT HENDON - PROTEST C
[15] OPP00001024 at page 3: 2022-01-20 - POIB - PROJECT HENDON - PROTEST C
[16] OPP00004571: List of Hendon Teleconferences and reports for Freedom Convoy 2022
[17] OPP00004571: List of Hendon Teleconferences and reports for Freedom Convoy 2022
[18] OPP00001612: 2022-01-27 - POIB - SA BULLETIN - Freedom Convoy 2022_PRO A
OPP00001644: 2022-01-26 - POIB - E22084931 - OFFICER SAFETY BULLETIN - Weapons
[19] OPP00001644 at page 1: 2022-01-26 - POIB - E22084931 - OFFICER SAFETY BULLETIN - Weapons
[20] OPP00001666: Protected B.
OPP00001667: Protected B.
[21] OPP00003729: 2022-FEB-09_Operational Intelligence Assessment
[22] OPP00003562: 2022-FEB-17_Operational Intelligence Assessment - Operation BearHug2.0
OPP00003729: 2022-FEB-09_Operational Intelligence Assesment
OPP00001819: 2022-FEB-14_Operational Intelligence Assessment - Operation BearHug2.0
OPP00002179: 2022-FEB-11_Operational Intelligence Assessment - Operation BearHug2.0

- Two Frontline Bulletins – one general for officer safety and awareness and one specific to an individual – disseminated to all partners on January 26, 2022.[23]
- Numerous Person of Interest (POI) profiles of individuals, groups, etc, which were distributed to the National Capital Region Command Centre -Combined Intelligence Group[24]

A list of Project Hendon reports and POI Profiles disseminated throughout the Freedom Convoy is at **APPENDIX E** and see also **OPP00004571**: List of Hendon Teleconferences and reports for Freedom Convoy 2022.

Distribution lists for Project Hendon reports are found in **OPP00004577.**

Intelligence Bureau Presentations to Police Chiefs and Senior Officers

The Director of POIB provided frequent updates directly to senior police leaders, at critical dates throughout the Freedom Convoy actions and blockades, through regular intelligence briefings to entities that included key police leaders and decision-makers:

- Ontario Chiefs of Police – February 7th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 16th, 18th
- Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) Operational Planning Committee – February 7th, 10th, 11th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 22nd, 23rd
- The Integrated Planning Cell in Ottawa – 17 February 2022[25]

2. OPP Provincial Liaison Team – Provincial Engagement and Key Events

Inspector Marcel Beaudin is responsible for the oversight of four program areas, namely the Provincial Liaison Team, Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG) Team, Ontario First Nations Policing Agreement (OFNPA), and the Indigenous Awareness Training Unit (IAT). Staff Sergeant Giselle Walker's core function is direct oversight of the PLT as the Provincial Coordinator and both were in those roles at all times relevant to the Freedom Convoy.

Members of the PLT first became aware of the potential for individuals to travel to Ottawa for demonstrations in opposition to COVID-19 mandates on January 10, 2022.

[23] OPP00001424: Potential of Violent Threats - COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001644: 2022-01-26 - POIB - E22084931 - OFFICER SAFETY BULLETIN - Weapons
[24] At APPENDIX E
[25] OPP00000766: Critical Meetings regarding The Freedom Convoy

As set out below, PLT members remained engaged and provided proactive policing throughout Ontario in response to the Freedom Convoy through to March 14, 2022 (when the last convoy exited Ontario). Related to the Freedom Convoy were 222 events of varying scope and size that took place in OPP policing jurisdiction and many more in this period of time that took place within areas policed by municipal police services. Prior to each event within OPP jurisdiction, PLT members conducted outreach to known event organizers and convoy leaders to learn more about the planned event(s) and to provide messaging on safe, lawful, and peaceful demonstrations. They also reached out to convoy leaders who were travelling from British Columbia and Eastern Canada for the same purpose. When necessary, PLT warned Freedom Convoy leaders and participants about behavior that could result in violations of provincial law such as the *Highway Traffic Act (HTA)* or criminal charges.

PLT members ensured that all relevant OPP and municipal police stakeholders were aware of the upcoming events in their respective jurisdictions, convoy locations and number of participants.

During this time, members of POIB, as set out above, were actively monitoring for intelligence on any new events. Relevant intelligence was passed along to the PLT Provincial Coordinator and Program Analyst for further distribution to PLT regional coordinators. The Program Analyst added further information if available to assist PLT in discharging its duties.

Throughout all events, the PLT maintained daily communication and provided updates to OPP Command updates on each unique event and situation.

PLT continued to attend events and engage with local organizers across the province after everyone departed from the Ottawa.

2.1. PLT - Ottawa Events

Specific key dates are provided in the chronology of events in Ottawa, below.

From the outset, PLT faced significant challenges in its deployment to Ottawa. PLT was there to support OPS, the police service of jurisdiction. OPP members observed that during the Freedom Convoy, there was a lack of understanding by OPS of the role of OPS PLT and a lack of awareness of the effectiveness of the PLT model and framework approach. That impacted the ability of PLT to successfully carry out its duties in a manner consistent with typical OPP practice or policy. Those constraints impacted the effectiveness of PLT in Ottawa.

2.2. PLT and Toronto Demonstration – February 5, 2022

On February 5, 2022, convoys from across the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) departed from their staging locations headed for Queens Park, where they held a one-day demonstration. PLT had been in communication with some convoy leaders and provided messaging before, during and after they arrived in Toronto Police Service (TPS) jurisdiction. Once TPS engaged with the group, PLT departed.[26]

2.3. PLT and Highway 402 and Ambassador Bridge Blockade

On February 7, 2022, access to the Windsor Ambassador Bridge was blocked by demonstrators. PLT provided messaging to all attendees regarding safe, lawful, and peaceful demonstrations, ensuring a lane was left open for emergency vehicles, information on the injunction once enacted and repercussions should they continue to block access. Public Order Units were deployed on February 13, 2022, and all individuals were cleared by February 14, 2022. Before, during and after Public Order Unit enforcement, PLT remained in the area to liaise with demonstrators and impacted stakeholders and community stakeholders. After all demonstrators had departed, PLT remained in the area for a several days to outreach to affected businesses and monitor for any new demonstrations.

On February 9, 2022, a group staged on Highway 402 near Sarnia, blocking one lane of traffic. OPP was required to block access entirely due to safety concerns. Through PLT mediation, the road was reopened, and all vehicles had cleared by February 14, 2022. PLT was able to use the enforcement action at the Ambassador Bridge as a deterrent to continue blocking the 402.

3. Blockades and Operations – OPP Role

The OPP has a Provincial Highway Blockade Strategy and Standard Operation Procedures[27] , attached at **APPENDIX F**, that:

- acknowledges and respects the right to peaceful and lawful expressions of dissent, where such a protest involves the blockade of a highway, that right must be balanced against the right of all Ontarians to free and uninhibited passage within the Province of Ontario
- differentiates between circumstances of non-immediate or non-imminent threat to public safety and security vs. immediate or imminent threat to public safety

[26] OPP00001975 or OPP00000896
[27] OPP00004569: OPP Provincial Highway Blockade Strategy

- allows for flexibility in responding to traffic blockades under a variety of circumstances, and should be viewed as a guideline, which can be altered to accommodate the situation. The key principle is to use the minimum police intervention required to restore the situation to a peaceful state. This plan is intended to support detachment operational plans when responding to highway blockade events

“The Provincial Highway Blockade Strategy is based on previous police responses to protests, including slow moving vehicles and blockades. It builds on previous experiences and recognizes the need for flexibility in response. The operational response should be thought in terms of an escalation in police response that is minimal and proportional to any increase in resistance by the protestors. Events associated with highway blockades shall be addressed at the lowest competent level in an effort to effect a peaceful resolution adhering to the principles of a measured response. Officers managing a highway protest must be flexible and astute to recognize when there is a need for de-escalation in police response.

The use of the OPP Provincial Highway Blockade Strategy is to promote consistency in OPP response to highway blockades, throughout the province.

4. OPP Role in the Windsor – Ambassador Bridge Blockade

February 7, 2022

Protesters assembled and blocked the Windsor entrance to the Ambassador Bridge, an international border crossing that spans the Detroit River between Windsor and Detroit, Michigan. The bridge's southern entrance is within the boundaries of the City of Windsor, and as such, is in an area policed by the Windsor Police Service (WPS). As there is no direct provincial highway connection to the bridge, once the Highway 401 ends outside of Windsor city limits, traffic moves through local roads within Windsor for approximately 14 kilometres, before reaching the Canadian entrance to the bridge. The WPS reached out requesting traffic management assistance from the OPP.

Given the OPP's responsibility for provincial highways, the OPP had been dealing with Freedom Convoy-related protests and blockades on provincial highways beginning in January, 2022, and that included protest activity taking place in the OPP's Western Region. The OPP PLT had been engaged with the numerous "slow roll" protests that had been taking place in Essex County. Due to traffic congestion along Highway 401 in the Western Region, an OPP Critical Incident Commander (Inspector Paul Richardson) and Incident Commander (Staff Sergeant Jamie Smith) were assigned. OPP Media officers were engaged to ensure traffic and public safety. Waterloo Regional Police Service and London Police Service Public Order Units were placed on standby[28]

OPP PLT began assisting the Windsor Police Service ("WPS") PLT with negotiation efforts. Approximately four OPP PLT officers assist the WPS[29]

February 8, 2022

The OPP planning was focussed on traffic management. One of the many "slow roll" events that the OPP was dealing with in the region was on the 401 approaching Windsor, then continuing onto Huron Church towards the Ambassador Bridge, and back out towards the 401. Each detachment was responsible for any slowdown activity in their area, and as Essex County OPP Detachment is responsible for the area surrounding the city of Windsor, Essex County OPP was dealing with that event, and was coordinating with the WPS.[30]

[28] OPP00000094: 08 Feb 2022 0800hrs Unvaccinated Trucker Protest Situational Report
[29] OPP00000094: 08 Feb 2022 0800hrs Unvaccinated Trucker Protest Situational Report
[30] OPP00000094: 08 Feb 2022 0800hrs Unvaccinated Trucker Protest Situational Report

February 9, **2022**

WPS requested provincial and federal assistance in responding to the event. An Operational Plan was drafted by OPP Inspector Wendy Burrows. The plan included the mission statement.

"The OPP and our policing partners will keep the peace, enforce, legislation establish and maintain the safe flow of traffic and respecting individuals Charter Rights of peaceful assembly, freedom of speech, and public and officer safety being paramount".[31]

The following command structure was implemented: Superintendent Dana Earley was the CIC making all operational decisions, with Superintendent Derek Needham as her partner CIC on the overnight shift. Superintendent Earley reported directly to Chief Superintendent Dwight Thib and Deputy Commissioner Harkins. WPS provided five senior officers who served as Incident Commanders, reporting to Superintendent Earley and Superintendent Needham for all incident related matters.

OPP General Headquarters began identifying vehicles, equipment, canvassed staff for availability and also deployed eight OPP Emergency Response Team ("ERT") members from North-West Region in support of potential Windsor operations.

February 10

The OPP engaged with Deputy Minister Public Safety Canada as a stakeholder. Opportunities for a peaceful resolution of the incident through potential government engagement were explored.

February 10-12, 2022

Eighteen OPP frontline officers began to assist WPS. Future deployment of 131 OPP officers was coordinated, with shifts beginning on February 11th.[32]

OPP Command Staff determined that the operational priority was the Ambassador Bridge. Frontline support consisted of 24/7 coverage. Specialty units including Public Order Unit ("POU"), PLT Team and Aviation were also deployed.

WPS was identified as the sole police agency media contact.

Direction to all deployed officers from WPS, RCMP and OPP was provided daily, prior to the beginning of each shift through joint briefings to ensure consistency. Content

[31] OPP00004557: Ambassador Bridge Operations Plan
[32] OPP00004558 at page 25: FastFacts

presented included the mission statement, active closures, authorities, and public climate. Major updates were disseminated as needed through radio communications.

February 11 Resolution Efforts

On the afternoon of February 11, an OPP officer informed Superintendent Earley that one of the protest leaders, Mr. Neufeld, had advised him that the protestors would leave if they received a letter from the provincial government inviting them to a meeting. the OPP Commissioner connected with the Ministry of the Solicitor General and later that evening, a letter from the Solicitor General was received 8:00 p.m. on the evening of February 11, Superintendent Earley received a letter signed by Ontario Solicitor General Sylvia Jones, offering protestors a meeting with provincial representatives if protestors immediately left the blockade site. [33]

PLT provided the letter to Mr. Neufeld who shared it with other protesters. Mr. Neufeld thanked PLT for the letter but stated that the protestors would not leave immediately as the letter requested.

February 12, 2022 – Operation to Clear Blockade of the Ambassador Bridge

The operation to clear the Bridge started at 7:00 am on February 12, 2022. At that time, it was estimated that 500 protestors were on site with 100 vehicles participating.

The following police resources were assigned: [34]

OPP and other police service resources assigned in Windsor at the time of the Positive Action		
Resource Type	**# OPP members**	**# other Agency members (where available)**
Critical Incident Commander / Incident Commander	3	
Frontline Members	170 (Between Day / Night Shift)	
Public Order Unit	45	34 (Waterloo), 45 (RCMP)
Provincial Liaison Team	7	
Aviation	2	

The POU for the Ambassador Bridge operation was comprised of police officers from a number of police services, including the OPP, the RCMP, Waterloo Regional Police

[33] OPP00000131: Letter to OPP Commissioner Carrique_SG Outgoing
[34] OPP00001555: 12 Feb 2022 1800hrs Unvaccinated Trucker Protest Situational Report

Service ("WRPS"), and also the Hamilton Police Service ("HPS") and the London Police Service ("LPS").[35]

February 13, 2022

Ambassador Bridge obstructions were removed through police operations. Both United States and Canadian bound lanes remained closed. The area cleared of protesters was secured through the use of barriers, that included vehicles and cement barriers.[36]

A total of 46 arrests were made, 37 vehicles were towed, and 90 charges were laid by the WPS. No injuries and no property damage were reported.[37]

February 14, 2022

The Ambassador Bridge was fully reopened.[38] Police resources remained deployed and, in the area, to prevent further obstructions of the roadway. OPP resources were gradually reduced after the re-opening of Huron-Church Road, leading to the Ambassador Bridge. On February 28th, all OPP resources were clear of the WPS staging location and the OPP's assistance to the WPS came to an end, and WPS assumed full responsibility to lead and provide all officer resources.

In total, the OPP deployed 410 members to assist Windsor Police Service. The minimum number of members deployed in a 24-hour period was 38 and the maximum was 263.

[35] OPP00001555: 12 Feb 2022 1800hrs Unvaccinated Trucker Protest Situational Report
[36] OPP00004558 at page 41: FastFacts
[37] OPP00004559 at page 12: Media Legal Letter
OPP00004558 at page 39: FastFacts
https://windsorstar.com/news/local-news/bridge-protest-arrests-swell-to-46-90-charges-laid
[38] OPP00002406: 15 Feb 2022 0800hrs Unvaccinated Trucker Protest Situational Report

5. OPP Role in the Police Response to the Ottawa Blockade

January 10, 2022

PLT notified of a possible commercial motor vehicle convoy to Ontario to protest COVID-19 mandates

January 12, 2022

PLT commenced outreach to coordinators of the Freedom Convoy and other police agencies

January 13, 2022

POIB began to gather intelligence information on Freedom Convoy through Project Hendon and communicating that information to partner agencies[39]

January 13-25, 2022

PLT maintained communication with Freedom Convoy participants as they travelled towards Ontario

January 22, 2022

OPP developed communication plan[40]

January 24, 2022

OPP finalized its Operational Plan with the following mission statement:

"The OPP will keep the peace, enforce legislation while maintaining the safe flow of traffic and respecting individuals Charter Rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of speech. Public safety and Officer safety is paramount".[41]

Further to that Operational Plan, OPP units were not assigned to escort the convoy; instead, they were strategically deployed to provide a rapid response along their planned route. Cruisers were positioned at the rear of the convoy with active lights to ensure faster moving vehicles approaching were aware of the slower moving convoy ahead. Other units were stationed in advance of the convoy should ramp or highway closures be necessitated.

[39] OPP00001600: 2022-01-13 - POIB - PROJECT HENDON 008-2022 - STRATEGIC OVERVIEW_FINAL
[40] OPP00000207: 2022-02-16 COMM PLAN VERSION-final
[41] OPP00004364: Freedom Convoy DRAFT 4_1

January 24, 2022

OPP East Region – EOC was activated to assist with operational planning focused on traffic management, public order and any subsequent enforcement to be undertaken. An OPP Critical Incident Commander, Inspector Dawn Ferguson, was deployed to the National Capital Region Coordination Centre (NCRCC) to assist with coordinating the deployment of integrated police resources with Ottawa Police Service and other policing partners. MTO was also at the NCRCC, which facilitated the ability of different agencies to work together, for example, to close ramps to and from highways. Inspector Ferguson also provided information to the OPP MCIC and Strategic Commander

Superintendent Craig Abrams was assigned as the Strategic Commander to assist the OPS in responding to incidents and events in and around Ottawa arising from the Freedom Convoy . In that capacity, Superintendent Abrams was responsible to act as a liaison between the OPP Critical Incident Commander and OPP senior leadership, as well as other police services, in particular the OPS. Deputy Chief Bell was Superintendent Abrams' primary contact with the OPS.

January 25, 2022

Freedom Convoy entered Ontario. PLT ensured participants were aware of the laws and expectations governing their conduct in Ontario as well as general road safety. In the following days, groups of vehicles from other sites of origin, including but not limited to Niagara, Windsor, Toronto and Quebec, moved towards Ottawa. OPP members ensured public safety by successfully following the OPP's Highway Blockade Strategy and established Operational Plans due to the risk of "slow-rolls" creating dangerous highway conditions.[42]

OPP Commissioner Carrique spoke with OPS Chief Peter Sloly to make sure the OPS had everything it needed to respond to the Freedom Convoy. Chief Sloly asked the OPP to continue to provide intelligence but indicated that no further assistance was needed.

January 27, 2022

Convoys from Windsor, Fort Erie, Vaughan, and Woodstock departed towards Ottawa - these groups were in communication with PLT from before their departure until their arrival in Ottawa.

[42] OPP00000805: Potential of Violent Threats - COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old

January 28, 2022

Freedom Convoy protesters began to arrive in Ottawa[43]

PLT members provided Freedom Convoy leaders and participants with contact information of the PLT for OPS. PLT remained in contact with Freedom Convoy leaders and participants and remained engaged in matters concerning areas within OPP jurisdiction, such as Freedom Convoy staging locations in Renfrew, Embrum and other locations. PLT members remained engaged with OPS PLT to assist their efforts within the City of Ottawa.

At the request of the Parliamentary Protective Service (PPS), coordinated by the NCRCC and authorized by the OPP Field Support Bureau, 92 OPP Public Order Unit members arrived in Ottawa to support the PPS[44]

January 29, 2022

At the request of the NCRCC and authorized by the OPP Field Support Bureau, the OPP Urban Search and Rescue / Chemical, Biological, Nuclear & Explosive Response Team (UCRT) and an OPP aviation asset (C-GOXY) were deployed to Ottawa[45.]

In support of OPS, East Region OPP commenced planning for a protracted event and mobilized a logistics section to support operations (timeline).

OPP Incident Commander within the National Capital Region Coordination Centre offered Ottawa Police Service the assistance of OPP Public Order Units and 18 frontline officers if required. These resources were declined at the time.

January 30, 2022

50 East Region OPP officers were prepared for rapid deployment. Two requests for frontline assistance were subsequently made by Ottawa Police Service. 10 officers from the Ottawa OPP Detachment were immediately provided. Members were paired with Ottawa Police Service traffic members to staff traffic points within the downtown core. OPP members were issued Ottawa Police Service radios for dispatch. An additional 29 members were provided to Ottawa Police Service to assist with traffic and minor calls for service.[46]

[43] OPP00001847: 2022.02.13 RCMP Integrated Planning Cell - Mobilization Convoy for Freedom Ottawa OP v3
[44] OPP00001847: 2022.02.13 RCMP Integrated Planning Cell - Mobilization Convoy for Freedom Ottawa OP v3
[45]OPP00001215: Potential of Violent Threats - COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
[46] OPP00000817: Potential of Violent Threats - COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old

January 31, 2022

OPS formally requested six PLT members to be embedded with OPS PLT.

Commissioner Carrique spoke with Chief Sloly. Thirty officers per day were assigned to traffic control and 6 PLT members were to assist Ottawa Police Service's – PLT.

February 2, 2022

Chief Sloly requested 60 frontline officers per day, as well as PLT, Public Order Unit support and dispatchers. One OPP Inspector and one Staff Sergeant were assigned to assist Ottawa Police Service in forming action plans. OPP East Region no longer considered this protest to be a traffic event. As a result, the OPP East Region EOC was stood down and an OPP Command Post was established within Ottawa. OPP frontline members continued to assist with static traffic posts. Briefings were provided to OPP officers prior to the commencement of each shift by the OPP, not OPS.The content of the briefings included a mission statement, authorities and roles.

February 5, 2022

PLT successfully negotiated the clearing of Confederation Park**.**

February 6, 2022

OPS POU engaged in enforcement action at Coventry Road despite PLT's progress in reaching an agreement with organizers.

February 7, 2022

The Mayor of Ottawa requested 1800 police officers and civilians to provide assistance.[47]

February 8, 2022

The OPP started work on developing an Integrated Planning Cell (IPC) with the assistance of the RCMP. OPP Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy was the OPP lead on this project. As the police service of jurisdiction, the OPS remained the agency in charge of the police response but had no initial involvement in the integrated planning cell.

The purpose of the IPC was to bring together resources and expertise from different police services to more effectively assist the OPS. Officers from OPP, the RCMP, York Regional Police Service (**YRP**), Peel Regional Police Service (**PRP**), and Toronto Police

[47] OPP00001575: Ltr to Prem Ford and Min Jones RE Enforcement Resources Request - Feb 7 2022

Service (**TPS**) served on the IPC. The IPC brought a lot of expertise, flexibility in decision-making and subject matter experts supporting an operational plan to end the protests.

The OPP, working with other police services, created Public Order Unit hubs in order to coordinate and manage effective deployment of public order units across Ontario.

February 12, 2022

An integrated command center was announced by Ottawa Police Service; formally moving the OPP and the RCMP to planning partners, as opposed to supporting agencies.

With the launch of the Integrated Command structure, more operational direction, support and specific tasking was provided to PLT.[48]

February 13, 2022

After obtaining agreement with the OPS, the OPP, OPS and RCMP approved a Response Plan.[49] OPS provided a mission statement for its PLT and establishes its Major Critical Incident Command.

February 14, 2022

Emergencies Act invoked.

February 15, 2022

Ottawa Police Service, OPP and RCMP planning sections were physically integrated at the RCMP – National Operations Centre (NOC) with the goal of improving planning and communications.

Following the reopening of the Ambassador Bridge, 400 additional OPP members were rapidly deployed from across the province.

OPS Chief Peter Sloly resigned his position.

February 16, 2022

PLT members began issuing notices to protesters, forewarning them of upcoming police action to remove them from the downtown core.

[48] Prior to this, PLT was functioning only in a support capacity to OPS PLT. While working with the OPS, PLT often lacked operational direction and little to no specific tasking was provided.
[49] OPP00001847: 2022.02.13 RCMP Integrated Planning Cell - Mobilization Convoy for Freedom Ottawa OP v3

February 18-20, 2022

OPP, along with numerous other police services, assisted OPS in enforcement action. Public Order Unit members cleared protestors and vehicles that were not willfully driven away.

February 20, 2022

OPP began reducing staffing levels in Ottawa.

February 28, 2022

OPP removed remaining resources from Ottawa.

OPP Frontline Officers Provided to Ottawa Police Service[50]	
Date	**# OPP Frontline Officers Assigned**
Jan 30th	39
Jan 31st	30
Feb 2nd	60
Feb 14th	76
Feb 16th	254
Feb 18th	463
Feb 23rd	250
Feb 24th	220
Feb 25th	132
Feb 26th	108
Feb 27th	23
Feb 28th	7

In total, 1075 individual frontline members were deployed, at various times, to Ottawa. The maximum number of officers deployed within a 24-hour period was 463 and the minimum was 39.

Police Resources Assigned in Ottawa At time of Positive Action in Windsor[51]	
Resource Type	**# OPP**
CIC / IC	3
Frontline	131
POU	41
PLT	10

[50] These numbers only refer to frontline officers. It does not refer to the large number of OPP members in OPP POU, OPP Logistics Support Team members, OPP PLT, POIB members, OPP Auxiliary and Special Constables and Aviation Services members.

[51] OPP00001628:12 Feb 2022 1000hrs Situational Report: These figures represent the number of officers which were working in Ottawa while the Ambassador Bridge was being cleared of obstructions.

Although the OPP was not the police service of jurisdiction in Ottawa, Windsor or Toronto, the OPP provided consistent support to the OPS, WPS and TPS in the police response to the Freedom Convoy's disruptions and blockades in those cities. From the day the Freedom Convoy entered Ontario, the OPP proactively engaged with police services across Ontario providing intelligence, resources and expertise to assist the police services of jurisdiction in response to the challenges associated with policing simultaneously concurring multi-jurisdictional events of this magnitude. The OPP POIB commenced reporting intelligence on the Freedom Convoy to its policing and public safety partners on January 13, 2022. As the Freedom Convoy activity intensified across the province, the POIB provided regular reports and then convened daily teleconferences. In response to requests for assistance from Windsor and Ottawa, the OPP ultimately assumed critical leadership roles, working in collaboration with its municipal police service partners and the RCMP to plan operations, and then engage and provide the necessary police resources to bring an end to the blockades and disruptions.

Existing legal authorities provided police with a variety of measures to deal with the illegal activity and public order events that presented throughout the period of the Freedom Convoy actions and blockade. The *Emergencies Act* was not required to formulate an effective police response to this situation. The additional measures that became available to police following the Ontario government declaration of emergency under the *Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act* and then the federal government declaration of a public order emergency under the *Emergencies Act* provided supplementary tools for police, to protect critical infrastructure, ensure the continuous and safe delivery of essential goods and services, and also maintain and restore public safety and security. The EMCPA in particular provided useful authorities for the OPP.

October 6, 2022

APPENDIX A
The Mobilization and Engagement Model and the Diagram[52]



[52] OPP00004574: Mobilization and Engagement Models
OPP00004573: Mobilization and Engagement Models Diagram

Enforcement & Crime Suppression
Generally, people are less safe and secure where police respond most often. Therefore crime management is the first priority for effective community policing. Front-line officers need to consider such tactics as:
Analyzing crime
Targeting enforcement
Monitoring crime reduction
Initiating problem-solving
Only after crime is reduced can police start effective mobilization and prevention strategies.
Community Mobilization & Crime Prevention
Personal, social and economic wellbeing are the cornerstones of a safe and secure community. Where any of these are deficient, people are more vulnerable to crime, anti-social behaviour and victimization. There, we need police to consider such tactics as
Mobilizing community partners
Problem-oriented policing
Monitoring crime prevention
Crime prevention through social development will reduce the demand for police assistance.
Community Engagement & Liaison
In the safest neighbourhoods people can overlook potential threats to safety and security. Here it's a good idea for police to use such tactics as:
Liaising with neighbourhoods and groups
Public education on risks and prevention
Monitoring special, at-risk groups
Partnering in early intervention
Situational crime prevention measures work best in these neighbourhoods because people have the time, resources and abilities to implement them.
Community Safety & Consultation
Where people are relatively safe and police are rarely called for assistance, people usually have the skills and abilities to keep it that way. Therefore police are rarely required to do much more than point out potential risks to community security and encourage community people to deal with them. Police can consider such tactics as:
Engaging community leaders
Consulting with community groups
Monitoring hazards
Community safety is everyone's business.


ONTARIO'S MOBILIZATION & ENGAGEMENT MODEL OF COMMUNITY POLICING
RED
Enforcement & Crime Suppression
Community Engagement & Liaison
GREEN
Community Mobilization
Enforcement is an integral component of Community Policing where there are threats to community safety and security.
Crime Prevention through Social Development: addresses the precursors to crime, like: poverty, sub-standard housing, addictions and negative parenting.
In the beginning police lead community members into safety and community-building initiatives - always looking for community members who can take over the leadership role.
Communities which have the greatest capacity to resolve issues that threaten their safety, security and well-being, require the least police assistance.
Situational Crime Prevention Measures: focus on specific forms of crime - like double-cylinder, dual bolt locks that prevent some forms of break and enter.
Police may have to find the natural community leaders and engage them to help community members increase their own safety, security and well-being.
Community Engagement
High Need for Police Assistance
Low Need for Police Assistance
Co-ordinated Police Response:
• Enforcement
• High Impact Patrol
• Intelligence Gathering
Social Development Measures
Police-Led Safety Initiatives
Community-Led Problem Solving Initiatives
Situational Measures
Community-Led Safety Initiatives
ASSESS
PLAN
ACT
Community & Police
Crime Prevention
Toward Safer Communities
AMBER
BLUE
Community Mobilization & Crime Prevention
Community Safety & Consultation
COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION
Actions and initiatives that police officers take to motivate and support neighbours to deal more effectively with the root causes of crime and insecurity in their neighbourhoods.
COMMUNITY
Community includes every person or organization that is affected by any real or anticipated threat to peace, safety, security and well-being.
COMMUNITY POLICING
Community Policing is the process by which police and other community members partner to improve community wellbeing, safety and security through joint problem identification, analysis, response and evaluation.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
Police actions that encourage participation of neighbours and citizens in increasing their own and others safety, security and well-being.
OACP
Ontario

APPENDIX B
Ontario Provincial Police Orders - Chapter 5: Major Incident Command[53]

[53] OPP00004568

5.1: MAJOR INCIDENT COMMAND

5.1.1: INTRODUCTION

Major incident command is part of Field Support Bureau (FSB) and is responsible for specialized major incident command services provided at the regional level via a trained incident commander who manages the planning, response and *recovery aspects of a major incident.

**Recovery aspects are post incident actions taken by the incident commander to return the scene to normalcy.*

Goal

The goal of major incident command is to successfully conclude a major incident through the overall command/control and efficient management of resources and services, either alone or in concert with other emergency management agencies, e.g. fire, ambulance and other police agencies, thereby minimizing/eliminating further loss of life, injury to any person or damage to property, providing support to victims and, where applicable, support the investigation and prosecution of individuals where a crime has occurred.

Bureau/Regional Commander

A bureau/regional commander shall be responsible for:

- designating a regional CO to be the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) liaison during a critical incident; and
- when requested, identifying a critical incident commander to be a member of the Critical Incident Command Review Committee.

Note: The Critical Incident Command Review Committee is a group of incident command subject matter experts, as selected by the Chair and the Commander, FSB. The committee consists of the Director of Operations, FSB, a senior critical incident commander and a major critical incident commander.

Provincial Highway Blockade Strategy

When a demonstration occurs on or near a provincial highway, further information pertaining to the Provincial Highway Blockade Strategy can be obtained by contacting the Commander, FSB.

Commander, FSB

The Commander, FSB shall:

Major Incident Command Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)

- be responsible for establishing and maintaining a Major Incident Command Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) manual that includes/addresses major incident command specific procedures, including:
  - critical incident commander/incident commander responsibilities/functions/reporting relationships;
  - major critical incident commander/critical incident commander/incident commander selection process;
  - major incident command planning;
  - command/control;
  - site management;
  - access to command posts;
  - internal call-out/activation procedures;
  - communications protocols;
  - incident assessment;
  - operational procedures, including mobilization/demobilization;
  - operational linkages between incident command and other emergency response and public order services;
  - recording/reporting of major incidents;
  - operational review process, including briefing/debriefing;
  - provision/use of equipment;

- operational training including the role/responsibilities of the Provincial Police Academy's (PPA) incident commander training co-ordinator;
- training requirements and supports, where applicable, for incident command team positions including scribe/logistics/media/ communications/administration;
- hand-off/relief of a critical incident commander/incident commander and other members of the incident command team;
- internal reporting requirements and approved forms; and
- use of training, operational and equipment logs.

- ensure the content of the Incident Command SOP manual is audited for relevancy on an annual basis and updated where required.
- establish and chair a Critical Incident Commander Review Committee, the mandate of which shall include making recommendations respecting incident command procedures set out in the Incident Command SOP manual and conducting operational reviews of critical incident commanders/incident commanders.When conducting an operational review of a critical incident, FSB may request a copy of the incident commander/critical incident commander notes.

Director, PPA The Director, PPA shall be responsible for the development/maintenance/ distribution of any course training standard (CTS) required by the Incident Command SOP manual.

5.1.2: INCIDENT CLASSIFICATIONS

Major Incident A major incident is an occurrence that, by circumstance, requires the mobilization of OPP employees, equipment and other resources beyond those required for normal police service delivery. A major incident may include, but may not be limited to:

- terrorism incident;
- natural disaster;
- weather event;
- fire;
- security event;
- search and rescue;
- structural collapse;
- explosion;
- mass transportation event (rail, air, water); and
- any occurrence that has resulted in multiple fatalities where external resources are required.

A major incident shall be managed by a trained incident commander.

Mass Fatality Incident For reference to mass fatality incident response, uniform members shall refer to the Major Incident Command SOP - OPP Mass Fatality Strategy.

Critical Incident A critical incident is a high risk incident requiring the mobilization of the OPP Integrated Response, e.g. hostage taking. A critical incident may include, but may not be limited to:

- a tactics and rescue unit (TRU);
- an emergency response team (ERT); or
- crisis negotiator(s) (CN).

A critical incident shall be managed by a critical incident commander.

Public Order Incident (POI)

A public order incident is a major incident related to the management of crowds, at any level of order, and shall be accomplished with the deployment of public order trained uniform members.

A public order incident shall be managed by a public order incident commander (POIC).

Indigenous Critical Incident (ICI)

Any critical or major incident where the source of conflict may stem from assertions associated with inherent, Indigenous or treaty rights. Any critical or major incident on a First Nation Territory or involving an Indigenous person(s) assessed to have a significant impact and where the potential for violence may require activation of the OPP Integrated Response.

An ICI shall be managed by a major critical incident commander or a critical incident commander.

5.1.3: COMMANDER CLASSIFICATIONS & RESPONSIBILITIES

Incident Commander

A uniform member shall possess the following qualifications before performing incident commander duties:

- have a minimum rank of sergeant;
- attended and successfully completed the OPP Incident Command course; and
- maintain required mandatory annual maintenance training.

Incident Command SOP

An incident commander shall be conversant with the Incident Command SOP manual.

Responsibilities

An incident commander shall:

- take command/control of the major incident;
- retain command/control until the situation is resolved/relieved;
- if the incident is a critical incident:
  - remain at the scene until arrival/handover to a critical incident commander;
  - update the critical incident commander on any actions/ developments; and
  - if requested, be a resource to the critical incident commander for local information on circumstances that may have a bearing on the outcome and provide advice on best course of action; and
- any other relevant duty as required.

Critical Incident Commander

A uniform member shall possess the following qualifications before performing critical incident commander duties:

- have a minimum rank of staff sergeant;
- attended and successfully completed the OPP critical incident commander course;
- be recommended by their bureau/regional commander;
- maintain required mandatory annual maintenance training; and
- be designated as a critical incident commander by the Commander, FSB.

Incident Command SOP

A critical incident commander shall:

- be conversant with the Incident Command SOP manual; and
- comply with procedures/instructions contained therein.

Responsibilities

The critical incident commander shall:

- take command/control of a critical incident;
- activate ERT/TRU simultaneously;
- be responsible for all actions taken during the incident by deployed personnel, including, but not limited to:
  - scribe;
  - crisis negotiator(s) (CN);
  - investigators;
  - technical support;
  - other perimeter uniform members;
  - communications advisor;
  - logistics member(s);
  - Forensic Identification Services (FIS);
  - community safety officer (CSO); and
  - Provincial Liaison Team.
- if the incident relates to a major crime and requires Criminal Investigation Services, Investigation & Support Bureau (ISB) in accordance with Police Orders, Chapter 2, Law Enforcement, Criminal Investigation Management/Procedures, transfer investigation responsibility to the assigned Criminal Investigation Services;
- authorize ***all*** tactics used by emergency response personnel, including the use of explosive forced entry by TRU; and
- where there is a hostage taking/barricaded person(s), activate the services of the CN regional team through the CN regional co-ordinator.

*Note: A **CN regional co-ordinator** is a CN team member who is a trained and experienced CN negotiator, and co-ordinates a regional CN team's response to calls, training, and report submissions.*

*Note: A crisis negotiation **CN negotiator** is CN team member who has successfully completed an approved CN course and has been assigned to a regional CN team.*

*Note: A **CN regional team** is a group of regionally-deployed, crisis negotiators, working under the direction of a CN regional co-ordinator.*

*Note: A **scribe** is an employee specifically trained to perform this function who reports directly to the incident commander and records incident commander notes on their exclusive behalf. For the purposes of an SIU investigation, such notes are the personal notes of the incident commander, not a corporate record.*

Major Critical Incident Commander

A major critical incident commander shall:

- be a trained and active critical incident commander;
- be designated as a critical incident commander by the Commander, FSB;
- provide expertise in managing and resolving occupations, protests and high-risk incidents occurring on First Nation Territories or involving an Indigenous community member; and

Shall be responsible for commanding:

- non-conventional tactical responses (e.g. acts of terrorism, mass shootings and bombings);
- OPP resources in multi-agency responses involving other police tactical/hostage-rescue units and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM); and
- lengthy, complex or high profile major incidents including:
  - naturally occurring or man-made disasters (e.g. tornados, train derailments);

- CBRNE events;
- USAR events;
- large searches;
- acts of terrorism;
- security events; and
- others as deemed appropriate.

Public Order Incident Commander (POIC)

Qualifications

A uniform member shall possess the following qualifications before performing POIC duties:

- hold a minimum rank of staff sergeant;
- maintain a current Ontario Police Fitness Award;
- maintain required mandatory annual maintenance training;
- designated as a POIC by the Commander, FSB; and
- attended and successfully completed the following courses:
  - ERT POU basic training;
  - the OPP POIC course; and
  - OPP Incident Commander course.

Responsibilities

The POIC shall be responsible for all actions taken by the POU, including, but not limited to:

- personnel;
- tactics;
- arrests, charges; and
- authorizing the use of force options to engage a crowd, if warranted.

A POIC shall be:

- prepared to be deployed nationally; and
- responsible for attending OPP POIC training.

5.1.4: CALL OUT/ACTIVATION

Internal Emergent Request

A uniform member requiring the services of an incident commander/critical incident commander/POIC in response to an occurrence that constitutes a major incident shall immediately notify their supervisor/detachment commander via the Provincial Communications Centre (PCC). The PCC will notify the Provincial Operations Centre (POC).

Detachment Commander

The detachment commander, upon confirmation of a major incident, shall forward the request to the Provincial Operations Centre (POC).

POC

The POC will complete notifications and authorize resources as required.

Critical Incident

A uniform member requiring the services of a critical incident commander/ POIC in response to an occurrence that constitutes a critical incident shall immediately notify their supervisor/detachment commander.

Detachment Commander

The detachment commander, upon confirmation of a critical incident shall expediently request a critical incident commander through the POC via the PCC.

POC

The POC, upon confirmation that a critical incident commander is required shall:

- assign a local critical incident commander and request the POC to notify the Commander, Tactical Response; or
- when a critical incident commander is not available locally:
  - request the Commander, Tactical Response to assign one; and
  - activate a local incident commander to take command of the critical incident until arrival of a critical incident commander;
- activate ERT and TRU ***simultaneously*** through the PCC, and
- advise the regional contact officer.

Public Order Incident

A request respecting a public order incident, whether actual or pending, shall be forwarded to the POC.

POC

The POC requiring a POIC shall:

- contact the Commander, Emergency Response Team; and
- advise the regional contact officer.

Commander, Emergency Response Team

The Commander, Emergency Response Team, upon confirmation of a POU incident, shall assign a POIC.

Call-out

When a POIC is unavailable in the region from which the request originates, the Commander, Emergency Response Team shall, by the most expedient means, contact the POC to locate a region having an available POIC.

External Emergent Request

A police agency request for an incident commander shall be directed through the PCC. The PCC shall contact the POC which shall approve or deny the request.

Critical Incident

A regional command staff member assessing an external emergent request to be a critical incident shall direct the request to the POC.

Approval Granted

- ensure the detachment commander of jurisdiction is aware; and
- authorize resources required.

Approval Denied

- advise the requesting police agency of the reasons and rationale for denial.

5.1.5: RESPONSIBILITIES

First Uniform Member at Scene

The first uniform member at the scene of a major incident shall:

- assess/confirm the incident;
- update their supervisor/detachment commander, including the current status of the incident/safe access routes and staging areas/necessary assistance being requested;
- assume command of the scene until relieved;
- unless necessary to preserve a life, avoid any non-essential manoeuvre that may cause the status of the occurrence to deteriorate;
- secure the area to the extent possible, including:
  - evacuating the immediate vicinity, where applicable;

- establishing perimeter control in accordance with Police Orders, Chapter 5, Emergency Response, Preliminary Perimeter Control; and
- confirm the availability of witnesses and their contact co-ordinates;
- re-direct traffic where necessary; and
- maintain a chronological log until relieved of this specific duty.

Note: Safety is foremost in planning any response.

Investigating Uniform Member

The investigating uniform member shall provide the following major incident details to the incident commander/critical incident commander/POIC or Provincial Operations Centre (POC) as soon as possible:

- type of incident;
- current/anticipated status;
- exact location;
- safe approach route details to the incident;
- location of perimeter boundaries;
- time/date;
- number of apparent victims;
- nature of apparent injuries;
- actual/potential size of incident;
- name/contact number of other emergency agency(s) responding;
- urgency of response;
- status of notifications made and pending; and
- name/rank of uniform member currently commanding the incident.

Detachment Commander

The detachment commander shall, during a major incident, be responsible for:

- attending and assessing the incident;
- preparing an immediate action plan (a contingency plan that remains in effect until a detailed main action plan is formulated);
- assuming command until relieved by the required level of incident commander/critical incident commander/POIC;
- completing notification requirements;
- establishing a command post and assume on-site command until relieved;
- requesting assistance as per the OPP Integrated Response policy for critical incidents from specialized personnel such as:
  - ERT;
  - TRU;
  - crisis negotiator(s) (CN);
  - USAR CBRNE Response Team (UCRT);
  - Explosives Disposal Unit (EDU);
  - canine;
  - Forensic Identification Services (FIS);
  - media, telecommunications;
  - investigators, intelligence, peer support; and
  - outside agencies;
- establishing an inner perimeter/outer perimeter;

- assigning duties to arriving personnel; and
- supervising the maintenance of a chronological log.

POC The POC shall, during a major incident, be responsible for:

- authorizing resources to be deployed if needed; and
- completing notifications as required.

Major Incident Support

Scribe The scribe of a major incident shall be responsible for:

- remaining with and reporting directly to the incident commander/critical incident commander;
- attending regular command post briefings/debriefings/meetings;
- recording legibly and accurately, the following in chronological order:
  - all orders, instructions issued/received by the critical incident commander/incident commander;
  - all decisions made by the critical incident commander/incident commander; and
  - other information as directed by the critical incident commander/ incident commander;
- not relinquishing critical incident commander/incident commander notes until directed by the critical incident commander/incident commander to do so;
- delivering notes to critical incident commander/incident commander upon conclusion of occurrence;
- maintaining a task list and updating the critical incident commander/ incident commander accordingly; and
- completing ER048—Incident Planning SMEAC.

Note: For the purposes of a SIU investigation, such notes are the personal notes of the critical incident commander/incident commander and not a corporate record.

Crisis Negotiation During a critical incident a CN team leader shall:

- report directly to the critical incident commander/incident commander;
- be responsible for:
  - performing liaison duties between the critical incident commander/ incident commander and the CN team;
  - ensuring that a three-person crisis negotiation team consists of primary negotiator, secondary negotiator, and a crisis negotiation team leader;
  - determining the suspect's situation, e.g. instrumental/expressive;
  - consulting with a health-care professional, e.g. a psychologist, to determine/confirm and establish the best strategies/ recommendations;
  - ensuring that an operational crisis negotiation log is maintained;
  - co-ordinating the crisis negotiation function;
  - making recommendations to the critical incident commander/ incident commander regarding negotiation strategies;
  - ensuring the ***approval*** by the critical incident commander/incident commander of ***all*** agreements with subjects;
  - conducting an incident debriefing with the crisis negotiators at the earliest opportunity;

- attending ***all*** regular briefings and debriefings; and
- maintaining an operational crisis negotiation kit and ensure the proper maintenance/use of equipment by the crisis negotiation team.

*Note: The **CN team leader** is a CN team member responsible for the management of a CN team who liaises between the CN team and the incident commander during an operation call or training scenario.*

*Note: The **primary negotiator** is the CN team member responsible for communicating with the subject/ hostage.*

*Note: A **secondary negotiator** is a uniform member of a CN team who:*

- *monitors communications;*
- *provides support to the primary negotiator;*
- *completes logs/situation boards; and*
- *provides other supports to the CN team.*

Logistics ***Lead Logistics Member***

The lead logistics member of a major incident shall:

- be of sergeant rank, where possible; and
- be responsible for:
  - reporting directly to the critical incident commander/incident commander;
  - ensuring a compliment of logistics members are available on a 24/7 basis;
  - ensuring procuring/maintaining of OPP personnel/equipment/ resources;
  - establishing/maintaining/marshalling staging area to receive/direct incoming personnel/equipment; and
  - accurately assessing the required logistical workload.

Logistics Member

The logistics member shall manage the following resources:

Personnel

- initial procurement of personnel;
- subsequent acquisition of relief personnel and, if necessary, co-ordinate the transportation of relief personnel to and from duty locations;
- shift scheduling;
- accommodations/meals for all involved personnel; and
- inventory of participating personnel including name/rank/badge number/ detachment of origin and current accommodation location, e.g. name/ room number;

Support Resources

- flashlights, batteries, sunscreen/insect repellent, portable toilets, rainwear, footwear/gloves/parkas, etc.;

Communications

- in conjunction with communication advisor, procurement of adequate supply of portable radios for employees; and
- an accurate inventory of quantity of portable radios, sufficient portable radio batteries/charging units, power bars for multiple unit charging, carriers, detachment of origin, accessories, and their commensurate serial numbers for subsequent accounting purposes;

Transport

- ensure transportation needs are sufficient;

- ensure vehicle maintenance, e.g. fuel, repairs, tires;
- initiate and maintain vehicle inventory location/security;
- establish key control system for all vehicle(s) arriving; and
- arrange for 24-hour fuel access, towing, and mobile repair;

Armament

- ensure armament needs are sufficient;
- ensure an accurate inventory is maintained that includes, where appropriate, serial numbers, types, and detachment of origin, of all long guns, ammunition and non-issue use of force options and accessories, e.g. slings, case, conducted energy weapons (CEW), magazines; and
- arrange for secure storage of unused use of force options and ammunition and accessories;

Note: Upon conclusion of a major incident, ensures all property is returned to detachment of origin.

Finance/Administration

- ensure continued adequate supply of administrative statistical forms;
- processing of submitted statistical returns; and
- collect/process/arrange payment of invoices attributable to the incident.

Media The CSO shall, during a major incident:

- report directly to the critical incident commander/incident commander;
- ***ensure all media releases are approved by the incident commander/critical incident commander prior to release*** in accordance with Police Orders, Chapter 6, Administration & Infrastructure, Information Release To Media;
- be the media liaison spokesperson for the critical incident commander/ incident commander;
- establish a Media Information Centre, for security and media safety reasons, that is not to be attached to the command post;
- perform as the exclusive media liaison person for the OPP regarding the particular incident;

No other employees are to respond to questions from the media and all inquires are to be referred to the Media Information Centre.

- exercise caution and avoid the release of information sensitive to the operation/investigation such as logistical data, personnel deployment, and location where billeted, unless specifically authorized with the signature of the critical incident commander/incident commander;
- retain original copy of every media release issued, showing the date, time and location of release;
- conduct an incident assessment with all CSOs assigned to the incident;
- attend ***all*** regular briefings and debriefings; and
- liaise with the local community and respond to queries from them accordingly.

Communications The communications advisor, during a major incident, shall report directly to the critical incident commander/incident commander and be responsible for:

- preparing/submitting a written communication plan based on information received and logistical circumstances;
- establishing/maintaining the communication function and telecommunications centre, including phone requirements/radio channels/towers and numbering system of vehicles;
- ensuring that all required avenues of communications are available;

- ensuring that impediments to continuous command post communication ability are brought to the immediate attention of the critical incident commander/incident commander;
- providing main and alternate communication contingency plans to the critical incident commander/incident commander for approval;
- supervising the communications technologist and radio operators on-site;
- acquiring an initial supply of radio equipment, batteries, portables, etc. and any additional required communications equipment in liaison with the logistics member;
- if required, setting-up and maintaining the mobile command unit including fuel/hydro/generators/consoles/personnel/maps of incident area;
- conducting an incident assessment with all communications staff at the earliest opportunity; and
- attending ***all*** regular briefings and debriefings.

UCRT/ERT A UCRT/ERT team leader, during a major incident, shall report directly to the critical incident commander/incident commander and be responsible for:

- remaining with the critical incident commander/incident commander in the command post throughout the occurrence;
- completing plans/actions approved by the critical incident commander/ incident commander;
- providing intelligence information from their respective UCRT/ ERT members to the critical incident commander/incident commander;
- participating in developing an immediate action plan, main action plan and alternate action plan in conjunction with the critical incident commander/incident commander and based upon current available intelligence information;
- briefing their respective UCRT/ERT members/arrest teams on the immediate action plan, main action plan, and alternate action plan;
- considering the need to establish tactical operations centre within or adjacent to the command post for UCRT/ERT assistant team leader;
- ***remaining at command post*** for ongoing liaison with the critical incident commander/incident commander, crisis negotiator, and other command post representatives as required;
- conducting an incident assessment with the UCRT/ERT at the earliest opportunity; and
- attending ***all*** regular briefings and debriefings.

TRU The TRU commander during a major incident shall report directly to the critical incident commander/incident commander and be responsible for:

- remaining with the critical incident commander/incident commander in the command post throughout the occurrence;
- completing plans/actions approved by the critical incident commander/ incident commander;
- providing incident scene information from TRU members to the critical incident commander/incident commander;
- providing expert knowledge as to tactics;
- advising regarding tactical options, i.e. containment, arrest plan, gas use, stronghold considerations, open air tactics, and/or vehicular interventions;

- in conjunction with the critical incident commander/incident commander, and based upon current available intelligence information, participating in developing an immediate action plan, main action plan and alternate action plan;
- briefing TRU members on the immediate action plan, main action plan and alternate action plan;
- establishing a tactical operations centre within or adjacent to the command post for TRU assistant commander;
- ***remaining at command post*** for ongoing liaison with the critical incident commander/incident commander, crisis negotiator, and other command post representatives as required;
- conducting an incident debriefing with TRU at the earliest opportunity; and
- attending ***all*** regular briefings and debriefings.

Investigations

The investigation supervisor, including a Criminal Investigations Branch major case manager, shall during a major incident report directly to the critical incident commander/incident commander and be responsible for:

- co-ordinating the investigation;
- following Ontario Major Case Management (OMCM) Manual requirements;
- representing intelligence/investigative uniform members;

  May require a secondary person depending on circumstances.
- assigning/supervising all investigators;
- ensuring that all related criminal occurrences are investigated;
- ensuring intelligence gathering;
- ensuring collection/analysis/dissemination of information relating to criminal suspect capabilities;
- studying the environment in which the threat operates/intends to operate;
- maintaining a list of agencies/individuals that may aid the intelligence function such as:
  - social services;
  - other police agencies;
  - military intelligence units;
  - medical facilities/practitioners for medical records;
  - family/relatives/associates/co-workers/employers/neighbours of suspect(s);
  - weapons registration, e.g. RCMP, Provincial Weapons Enforcement Unit (PWEU);
  - Behavioural Sciences and Analysis Services, ISB;
  - credit bureau financial history and records;
  - local land registry office;
  - Canada Employment Insurance Commission records;
  - Niche RMS and CPIC queries;
  - Canada Post Corporation—Investigations;
  - Bell Canada—Security;
  - Interpol; and

- Canada Revenue Agency;
- preparing a suspect psychological profile and threat assessment, e.g. address history/next of kin/physical description/criminal convictions;
- preparing a hostage psychological profile;
- being cognizant of counter-intelligence capabilities, if applicable, e.g. police radio channel monitoring;
- ensuring witnesses are interviewed and relevant information obtained is conveyed to the critical incident commander/incident commander;
- operationally reviewing recent incident details with personnel coming off-duty;
- liaising with critical incident commander/incident commander and command post representatives;
- establishing a prisoner processing centre in a multiple arrest situation;
- liaising with local judiciary in multiple arrest situation, e.g. arranges for special court sittings if necessary;
- overseeing subsequent prosecutions and court brief preparation;
- conducting an incident assessment with identification personnel, investigators and intelligence officers at the earliest opportunity; and
- attending ***all*** regular briefings and debriefings.

Forensic Identification Services

Forensic Identification Services (FIS) employee assigned to assist a major incident shall:

- be responsible to the critical incident commander/incident commander;
- report to the investigation supervisor; and
- be responsible for:
  - ensuring photography of incident scene/ensuing events;
  - ensuring the collection/packaging/continuity and submission of exhibits for expert examination;
  - ensuring a thorough examination of the incident scene at conclusion of operation;
  - co-ordinating/documenting the removal/subsequent identification of victims in a major disaster;
  - attending an incident assessment with the investigators at the earliest opportunity; and
  - attending ***all*** regular briefings and debriefings.

Traffic Supervisor

A traffic supervisor assigned to assist a major incident shall report directly to the critical incident commander/incident commander and be responsible for:

- securing the outer perimeter, e.g. roadblocks;
- supervising roadblocks/checkpoints in accordance with the plan that is in effect;
- attending ***all*** regular briefings and debriefings; and
- at conclusion of operation, ensuring that scene is secure until FIS procedures are completed.

Traffic-Related Major Incident

If an incident is traffic-related, the traffic supervisor shall be responsible for:

- interviewing witnesses; and
- conducting an incident assessment with traffic personnel once removed from inner perimeter at the earliest opportunity.

Tactical Flight Member

The tactical flight member shall:

- report to the critical incident commander/incident commander; and
- ensure any and all aerial thermal/video surveillance is done only under authority of the critical incident commander/incident commander and respective legislative requirements.

5.1.6: POST INCIDENT REPORTING

Following the completion of a critical incident/major incident, the scribe working directly for the critical incident commander shall be responsible for:

- completing the required critical incident commander/incident commander portions of the Major Incident Report and forward the draft report to the critical incident commander/incident commander for perusal;
- obtaining a copy of the unit report from each team/unit leader/ commander involved in the incident;
- collecting/collating all respectively completed reports and providing a final consolidated version of the report to the critical incident commander/incident commander; and
- forwarding the final report to the Commander, Emergency Management if the critical incident commander/incident commander is satisfied with the final report.

Note: In the case of more than one critical incident commander/incident commander responding to a call, the last deployed incident commander/critical incident commander shall be responsible for submitting the final report.

APPENDIX C
Ontario Provincial Police -
Major Incident Command Standard Operating Procedure Manual[54]

[54] OPP00004567

2014

MAJOR/CRITICAL INCIDENT COMMAND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL

FIELD SUPPORT BUREAU

INTRODUCTION

This Incident Command SOP Manual includes procedures for the use of Public Order Unit Command (POUC), Incident Command (IC), Critical Incident Command (CIC) and Major Critical Incident Command (MCIC) resources further to policy set out in Police Orders, Chapter 5 - Major Incident Command. All references to a CIC in this SOP manual apply equally to a MCIC.

REVISIONS/UPDATES

Commander, FSB The Commander, Field Support Bureau (FSB) is the accountable executive for the Critical Incident Command SOP Manual and is responsible for ensuring ongoing review, updating and communication of the Manual consistent with requirements set out in Police Orders, Chapter 5 - Major Incident Command.

CONTENTS

The Major Incident Command SOP Manual includes:

- Appendix 1: Hand-over Certificate; IC Hand-back Certificate;
- Appendix 2: Incident Debriefing Template
- Appendix 3: CIC Training Report;
- Appendix 4: Major Incident Report;
- Appendix 5: Incident Planning SMEAC;
- Appendix 6: Scribe SOP Handbook; Equipment & Supports;
- Appendix 7: OPP Multiple Fatality Strategy

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

The Commander, FSB or the Director of Operations/Support in his absence may authorize temporary variance from provisions of this Manual when exigent circumstances present themselves.

Emergent Variance Given that each emergency situation presents different variables and commensurate responses, it is understood that any CIC has latitude to vary from the procedures set out in this Manual as necessitated by the exigencies of the incident in order to bring it to a safe and peaceful resolution.

Documentation

Emergent variances shall be clearly articulated in the CIC's notes as recorded by the Scribe, clearly stating the rationale for such variance given all the prevailing circumstances.

PLANNING

Planning is a systematic step-by-step preparatory activity to ensure tasks are completed in an efficient manner and to avoid confusion in a crisis situation — documented action plans are particularly important.

The key to successful planning is thoughtful preparation.

With this in mind:

- plan a response to situations which may arise;
- consider all possibilities and decide in advance how to react;
- continue regular training to assist in future planning; and
- share experiences, lesson's learned and operational reviews.

Plans

Effective plans are based on timely, credible information and should adhere to the following:

- should be detailed, but not complex - ***remember the KISS principle – "keep it simple"***
- commit plans to writing;
- keep as a record to show chronological progression;
- investigate the situation;
- collect/record all available information/intelligence;
- evaluate the overall situation;
- analyze/assess the threat, risks involved and potential consequences;
- develop a basic strategy/goal for the incident;
- consider environmental conditions;
- evaluate alternatives and select the ***best*** one;
- implement and monitor the decision;
- determine resources required, e.g. personnel, equipment, relief; and
- prepare an Immediate Action Plan (IAP), a Main Action Plan (MAP) and an Alternate Action Plan (AAP) using the SMEAC (Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, Command/Communications) format.

Note: It is unlikely that you will ever have all of the information that you want. Operations often dictate that you will need to make decisions having only 40-70 % of the information available to you. Utilizing your prior knowledge, training and experience and exercising sound judgment will be critical to your success.

Action Plans

IAP

The Immediate Action Plan (IAP) must be prepared as soon as possible in the event of an emergent situation. All Commanders should be prepared to authorize implementation of an IAP by on scene personnel when appropriate and necessary. Examples include citizen/officer rescue, suspect flight, Immediate Rapid Deployment (IRD), etc.

MAP

The Main Action Plan (MAP) involves the main strategy to be implemented to resolve the incident; any changes ***must*** be approved by the IC.

AAP

Alternate Action Plans (AAP) are developed to deal with contingencies should tactics or methods fail to achieve the desired results/objective. The AAP is developed once the MAP is in place, and is approved and implemented by the IC.

Planning

The initial response will be comprised of resources immediately available at the incident.

First Operational Period
Commences upon arrival of initial responders

Subsequent Operational Periods
Second and subsequent operational periods will usually run on a 12 hour cycle and occur when initial response personnel require relief and changes occur.

Sample

An example of a 12 hour planning clock:

- 06:00–07:00, conduct debriefing with personnel ending shift;
- 07:00–08:00, brief new command post (CP) personnel;
- 08:00 CP, shift change;
- 08:00–10:00, update/revise plans;
- 10:00–11:00, CP Meeting—develop strategy/alternatives;
- 11:00–14:00, prepare and finalize plan;
- 14:00–17:00, prepare briefing;
- 17:00–18:00, brief personnel beginning shift;
- 18:00–shift change field personnel; and
- repeat for each subsequent 12-hour period.

SITE MANAGEMENT

Objective

Isolate

The primary objective is to ***isolate*** the incident and protect the public. An outer perimeter is established to isolate the problem area. This physically separates the incident from members of the public at risk.

Officer and public safety is paramount.

Control

Establishing ***containment*** of the threat to prevent expansion is crucial. Containment assists with stabilizing the situation and helping defuse the problem. Physical containment is established by an inner perimeter.

Evacuate

For safety, always consider evacuating those at risk. Where not practicable or achievable consider ***shelter in place or hold & secure strategy***.

Containment Phase

The purpose of containment is to keep the incident area as small as possible.

Benefit

Advantages Include:

- protects general public reducing risk of death/injury;
- limits the resources required to deal with the situation;
- prevents interference from external sources, e.g. media, relatives, accomplices, curious/spectators; and
- assists personnel/specialty teams in achieving situational dominance of a crisis area, e.g. control before management.

Intervention

Objectives include:

- to prevent loss of life or injury to public, police, emergency personnel and subject(s) involved;
- determine motivation when incident suspect driven; engage crime, POIB, psychological services/mental health professionals, etc.; and
- to prevent damage to property.

Establish Containment

The containment phase is a defensive action. Anticipate all the probabilities that may arise and devise a strategy to combat

them. A perimeter must have full 360-degree coverage. There are two perimeters of defence, an inner and outer perimeter, with a buffer zone in between.

Inner Perimeter

The inner perimeter is focused inward and secures the threat by demarcating the smallest possible area that the threat can be contained within without unduly exposing officers to danger. Officers are responsible for securing the inner perimeter, containing anyone moving within the defined area and advising the IC of potential breaches. If this occurs, the outer perimeter shall be immediately notified and act as a second line of defense.

Responsibilities

- Excepting active-shooter or other dynamic active-threat incidents that warrant immediate intervention (such as Immediate Rapid Deployment (IRD) tactics), containment should be the first priority of responding officers and should be in place as soon as possible.
- Emergency Response Team (ERT) members have sole responsibility and control of the inner perimeter after relieving front-line patrol members.
- Upon arrival of the Tactics & Rescue Unit (TRU), the commander of TRU shall coordinate replacement of ERT on the inner perimeter as necessary/appropriate.
- ERT members will be redeployed to other tasks/assignments as approved by the CIC; e.g. outer perimeter containment, additional cut-off teams, IRD teams, roving patrols, static posts to hold positions already cleared by TRU, etc.

Outer Perimeter

The outer perimeter is focused outward to protect members on the inner perimeter and the CP. If the suspect flees/escapes the inner perimeter, the outer perimeter members must contain the suspect.

Outer perimeter members must be advised of any real/suspected breach

Boundary

The outer perimeter is a boundary established outside the inner perimeter to:

- allow police involved in the operation a relatively safe work area;
- provide a buffer to keep persons out of the actual operation area; and
- act as a second line of defence to contain suspects.

Responsibility

The outer perimeter is under the control of front line patrol officers unless relieved by ERT and shall be established considering the following:

- ***must*** be made secure from a vehicular standpoint with roadblocks, spike belts, etc.;
- ***must*** be secure from an attempt to a breach on foot with strategically placed observation and cut-off points;
- perimeter officers be immediately advised of any attempted breach;
- CIC must keep all personnel advised of any changes to inner/outer perimeter; and
- ensure that outer perimeter personnel are out of view of the target area.

Frozen Zone The frozen zone is the area between the inner and outer perimeters, with the following controls:

- no admittance by anyone without prior authorization

  A secure outer perimeter ensures that inner perimeter members are confident that no one will approach from the rear, allowing for their full concentration on the threat.

- prior to personnel accessing, their intended movement and timing must be pre-authorized and communicated to other officers for safety reasons; i.e. to prevent potential "blue-on-blue" situations

COMMAND POST

Establishing The location and layout of the CP will vary greatly, due to availability of local facilities, incident type and location.

Must be a central location to effectively co-ordinate activities.

Characteristics The optimum CP should include at a minimum:

- three separate adjacent rooms/areas, e.g. incident command, communications, negotiations;
- suitable facilities for communications;
- within 1km of incident location (unless threat dictates otherwise) and free of radio coverage limitations;
- phone lines;
- sufficient space;

- security;
- operational display boards, and
- suitable parking/space for staging area.

Examples

Past experience has shown that the following are the most desirable:

- schools are usually the best because of the large number of rooms, phones, blackboards
- municipal buildings
- community centres or churches
- Mobile Support Unit (MSU).

Responsibility The CP is where the strategy is developed and operational decisions are made under the overall responsibility and control of the CIC.

Personnel Personnel within the CP should be kept to minimum by including no more than the following complement—as required:

- CIC and Scribe;
- inner perimeter control representative;
- outer perimeter control representative;
- local Detachment Commander;
- telecommunications advisor;
- intelligence representative;
- investigator representative; Crime Unit D/S/Sgt.
- technical support representative;
- specialized team representatives - Emergency Response Team (ERT), Urban Search and Rescue, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive Response Team (UCRT), Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU), Explosive Disposal Unit (EDU), and Crisis Negotiators (CN);
- Community Services Officer (CSO)/Media Officer for briefings only; and
- logistics member.

Admittance to Command Post

- Authorized police officers only.
- Local elected officials are normally not in attendance at police CP's, their attendance can create the perception (if not the reality,) of political influence over operational decisions.
- Where the incident arises out of an assertion of rights (such as a blockade, occupation or analogous protest), representatives of the

interested parties should not be permitted to attend the CP. This extends to both government and non-government representatives.
- Nothing in this policy is intended to eliminate the discretion conferred upon Commanders to regulate access to the CP, having regard to all the circumstances, including the desirability of communicating with non-police personnel on issues of importance, and the existence of practical alternative locations to do so.

Major Incident Command (MIC) Triangle

The Critical Incident Commander will liaise with the other aspects of the MIC triangle; TRU, crime unit and crisis negotiators, regarding progress of negotiations, strategies, and situational assessments.

BRIEFING

Briefings are conducted to ensure that integrated response personnel are aware of the overall ***plan, mission*** and their ***individual task responsibilities.***

Benefits

A thorough briefing results in:
- application of appropriate tactics;
- confirmation from the participants that the plan is understood;
- proper implementation of the plan;
- secure perimeters;
- enhanced officer/public safety;
- likelihood of a higher potential for success; and
- clear messaging to the public through the media/CSO.

Responsibilities

Critical Incident Commander

The CIC shall ensure everyone involved in responding to the incident is briefed and regularly updated.

Team/Unit Leader/ Commander

The respective Team/Unit Leader/Commander briefs their respective team.

Content

The briefing shall occur during personnel shift changes and be in written form whenever possible it should include the following:
- explanation of the SMEAC for the incident
- MAP, IAP, AAP

- maps, floor-plans, elevation views, overhead views, photos, etc.
- regular updates or due to a change in situation

INCIDENT ASSESSMENT

The respective unit leader or commander leads an incident assessment intended to identify the lessons learned from each exercise or incident.

Debriefing

Objective

The debriefing at the conclusion of the incident is as important to future operational success as the briefing provided at the outset of the original occurrence.

The debriefing (hot wash) involves a complete review of the mission from start to finish it is conducted soon after the mission is concluded to determine:

- why/how the incident occurred;
- whether preventable;
- assessment of the effectiveness of the entire operation (tactics, equipment, personnel, training, etc.);
- what went well; and
- what requires improvement?

It is not intended to be a venue for finger-pointing or laying blame

Elements

Note that incidents where the SIU has invoked their mandate are not to be debriefed until the SIU investigation and any resultant court proceedings are completed – except for information that would compromise officer/public safety if not immediately addressed such as counter-measures employed by a suspect, failure of police tactics, etc.

The debriefing should:

- include all available personnel involved in the incident;
- be convened as soon as practicable after the incident has ended;
- include suggestions to enhance future performance;
- provide recommendations; and
- cause the CIC to produce a written summary suggesting

corrections and improvements that is forwarded to the Director of Operations/Support, FSB

Considerations The CIC conducting a debriefing shall consider the following:

Select an assessment format and organize the presentation

1. Compile necessary information/statistics as follows:

- where will the assessment be held?
- who should be there?
- consider using maps, slides, photos;
- prepare a chronological log;
- assess positive/negative aspects on a step-by-step chronological basis;
- present a mission report;
- critically examine the plan;
- was the pre-planning effective?
- were the objectives appropriate?
- was the organization effective?
- did the strategy/tactics execution/procedures work?
- were the right equipment/resources available/used?
- were there any special problem/needs areas?
- were communications a problem?
- was the mission operation efficient/effective?
- were the CIC ***SOPs/strategies/tactics effective/complete?***
- review the incident to determine if any criminal/terrorist activity was indicated?
- if so, remember the necessity of collecting short-lived and other evidence
- if determined to be terrorist related, contact the Provincial Anti-Terrorism Section (PATS) for follow-up assistance.

2. Control the oral assessment:

- set the tone by saying what went right;
- be sure to assess critical issues;
- keep comments relevant to the incident;
- ensure that sufficient time is available to allow each participant to fully express their comments; and
- be forthright and honest.

3. Remember:

- remind participants of the elements to be included in a successful debrief; and
- sharing lesson's learned and after-action reports with other emergency response commanders and practitioners are critical in preventing failure and promoting future operational successes.

DEMOBILIZATION

Demobilization is not a mirror image of mobilization. At the outset, numerous required resources from a vast area are converging all at once. Upon conclusion all resources shall be rightfully returned to their points of origin in stages to ensure an orderly and informed return to normal.

Responsibility

The CIC is responsible to ensure that demobilization is completed in a prompt and effective manner.

Principles

Logistical Information

The logistics member should collect information regarding personnel at the time of their arrival, e.g. places of origin, methods of travel, equipment for resources.

Logistical Records

Records must be complete in order to manage resources during incident.

Capacity

Logistical capabilities must be assessed from time to time as additional record keeping personnel may be required to maintain the log.

Demobilization Plan

A written demobilization plan should indicate:

- release priorities;
- procedures;
- responsibilities; and
- a schedule.

Resource Control

Control over deployed resources at an incident is an absolute necessity, e.g. there may be concerns of unforeseen delays, or a sudden termination of the incident.

Safety/Cost Effectiveness

The CIC shall ensure adequate rest is provided to personnel prior to demobilization - especially when long travel times are anticipated. Do not sacrifice safety or cost effectiveness for speed.

Too often there is little or no planning for demobilization, or it comes too late, resulting in incomplete information, missing equipment and at times—unaccounted for human resources.

RESPONSIBILITIES

Director of Operations/Support, FSB

The FSB Emergency Response Manager is appointed by the Commander, FSB.

All Emergency Incidents

The Director of Operations/Support is responsible for the following aspects of the Major Incident Command Program:

- selection and supervision of MCICs;
- recommending the designation of a CIC to the Commander, FSB;
- monitoring/assessing the program;
- establishing operational priorities and procedures;
- maintaining relevant policy and SOPs;
- directing PPA representatives in developing/maintaining/delivering and updating any CIC course training standard (CTS);
- assisting in the coordination of CIC training courses and establishing criteria for future training courses/scenarios;
- liaising with other agencies to remain at the forefront of tactics, strategies, techniques, trends and new equipment;
- evaluating/recommending/consulting on innovations in CIC practices/ equipment;
- preparing budget submissions;
- program auditing;
- monitoring overall operational preparedness of CICs;
- ensuring the maintenance of a high degree of expertise among CICs;
- coordinating an annual CIC training seminar;
- chairing and maintaining a CIC Review Committee; and

- assessing the continued suitability of all CICs.

Best Practices

The Director of Operations/Support shall ensure that Major Incident lesson's learned are available for dissemination to commanders and practitioners of emergency response.

POU Incident Command

The Commander, Emergency Response Teams is responsible for Public Order Unit Command as follows:

- selection of POU Commanders
- actively monitoring/assessing the program;
- establishing operational priorities and procedures;
- maintaining relevant policy and SOPs;
- managing POU deployment;
- collecting, analyzing and disseminating relevant POU information to all POU Commanders and Regional ERT co-coordinators;
- directing PPA representatives in developing/maintaining/delivering and updating POU CTS;
- assisting in the co-ordination of training courses and establishing criteria for future training courses/scenarios;
- liaising with agencies to remain at the forefront of equipment, trends and techniques in POU Command;
- evaluating/recommending/consulting on innovations in POU practices/ equipment;
- preparing budget submissions;
- annual program auditing;
- monitoring overall operational preparedness of POU Commanders; and
- ensuring the maintenance of a high degree of expertise among POU Commanders.

Best Practices

The Commander, Emergency Response Teams shall ensure that lesson's learned are available for dissemination to commanders and practitioners of public order.

CIC Review Committee

The CIC Review Committee shall consist of the Director of Operations/Support and two CICs, at least one of which will be a MCIC.

The CIC Review Committee is responsible for:

- reviewing the development of CICs;
- assessing the continued suitability of all CICs;
- assessing ongoing operational, training, development or equipment; and
- providing subject matter expert (SME) advice to the Commander, FSB whenever required.

Critical Incident Commander

The CIC shall be responsible for:

- maintaining a reporting-back relationship with FSB with respect to the management of the local CIC program;
- maintaining a state of readiness, both physically and operationally;
- all aspects of command of a critical incident to which they are assigned;
- coordinating operational activities necessary during an incident;
- authorizing deployment of ERT and/or TRU upon notification of a high-risk canine track as appropriate in the situation, and determining whether the incident can be managed remotely or requires on-scene attendance;
- ensuring that liaison/communications are established and maintained with appropriate team/unit/agency police commanders or leaders affiliated with the response/management of a major incident;
- ensuring co-ordination of the deployment of all responding units;
- in conjunction with the respective team/unit leader/commander (e.g. TRU/ERT/UCRT/EDU/CN/Crime), developing an IAP, MAP and AAP;
- utilizing the SMEAC planning method;
- establishing a CP where police-specific response can be developed/led/implemented/monitored/coordinated;
- deployment and confirmation of appropriate resources;
- ensuring that a Scribe is assigned and records the CIC's notes;
- ensuring all officers have been adequately briefed on their assignment/position/role in the occurrence;
- as required, establishing:
  - inner perimeter/outer perimeter;
  - ingress/egress routes;
  - staging area;

  - triage;
  - media centre; and
  - mobile support unit (MSU);
- ensuring a communications advisor/supervisor is assigned to the incident;
- ensuring proper notifications have been completed;
- ensuring assignment of appropriate relief personnel for protracted incidents;
- ensuring all applicable laws are conformed with including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
- approving the release of information to the media;
- ensuring that a debriefing is convened as appropriate to the situation being mindful of related SIU issues;
- arranging for Employee Assistance Program (EAP) and other support services to be made available to all persons involved with the major incident;
- ensuring that Form, CIC Hand-over document is completed, where command/control of an incident is handed over to another police agency;
- making necessary notifications at the conclusion of an incident;
- maintaining a CIC log detailing training sessions and all incidents attended, as prescribed by the Program;
- reporting to FSB on major incidents for which they are in charge of; and
- in co-operation with FSB, assisting in delivering periodic scenario training with members of UCRT/ERT/TRU/EDU/CN/K9 teams.

Upon Arrival at Major / Critical Incident

- requesting a briefing by on-scene personnel;
- confirming situation, offence, authorities, etc.
- reviewing/confirming outer perimeter/inner perimeter locations;
- reviewing on-site inventory of personnel, resources and specialized equipment;
- securing additional personnel, resources, specialized equipment necessary to peacefully and successfully resolve the incident;
- approving implementation of appropriate tactics;
- evacuating inner perimeter as necessary;
- scheduling and attending all regular CP briefings, debriefings and meetings;
- approving all media releases by the CSO delivered at a

designated media area; and
- establishing liaison with external agencies/ministries.

Upon Conclusion of Major / Critical Incident

- protecting/securing the scene;
- notifying Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) if the incident meets the CIB mandate;
- preparing for the potential arrival of the Special Investigations Unit (SIU);
- holding a debriefing as soon as appropriate/practicable;
- submitting a comprehensive major incident report;
- ensuring that critical incident stress debriefings are held if warranted.

CIC is responsible for all aspects of the incident

Debriefing

The CIC shall as soon as possible convene and lead members who attended the scene in a debriefing which shall:

- assess the effectiveness of the actions taken/decisions made;
- assess the state of emergency preparedness of personnel/ equipment;
- evaluate the performance/effectiveness of the integrated response;
- discuss acceptable/unacceptable responses, observed deficiencies and recommend corrective actions; and
- document and share lessons learned.

CIC

In addition to generic responsibilities for an IC, a CIC shall be responsible for:

- being prepared to be deployed provincially;
- mentoring members considering a role in the CIC program;
- approving all tactical and technical procedures, action plans - initial, main and alternate using form ER048 - Incident Planning SMEAC;
- ensuring that forms ER033 - or Incident Report, and ER 048 - Incident Planning SMEAC are complete;
- reporting on critical incidents they are in charge of; and
- attending all required CIC training.

POU Incident

A POU Commander shall:

- be prepared to be deployed nationally; and
- attend all required training.

A POU Commander shall only stand down OPP resources in a manner that ensures that officer/ and public safety is not compromised.

Local Jurisdiction

Where OPP resources are stood down, and command and control of an incident is handed back to the local police agency, the Commander shall be responsible for:

- requesting the local police agency IC signs Form ER029 - IC Hand-back Certificate, which outlines the time, date and circumstances under which the control of that part of the incident is being returned to the local police agency.

IC/CIC Training Co-ordinator

The IC/CIC Training Co-ordinator shall be responsible for:

- developing/assessing IC/CIC courses;
- co-coordinating the development/review/maintenance of the CTS and other training documents with the respective FSB manager;
- researching/developing scenarios in accordance with the CTS;
- facilitating the delivery of regional IC/CIC training sessions;
- developing/distributing annual maintenance training reports to the Director - PPA; and
- reviewing annual maintenance training reports submitted by an IC/CIC, and where deficiencies are identified, reporting such to the respective FSB manager.

SELECTION PROCESS

IC

A prospective IC shall:

- be a minimum of NCO rank;
- be selected by the appropriate FSB Manager, in consultation with their Bureau / Regional Commander; and
- attend and pass an approved two-week IC course.

CIC

A candidate for CIC shall:

- normally be of commissioned officer rank however qualified members of Staff Sergeant rank may be considered when approved by their Bureau / Regional Commander;
- have successfully completed the 2 week OPP IC course;
- have attended First Nations Awareness training;
- be recommended by their Bureau / Regional Commander;
- participate in an appropriate period of mentoring with a CIC coach;
- participate/attend appropriate, approved pre-course training;
- participate in approved screening exercises which may include psychological evaluation and other approved criteria;
- be recommended by the Bureau Commander FSB; and
- attend and pass a four-week CIC course delivering through the Provincial Police Academy.

First Critical Incident

Oversight and Support:

- A newly trained ("non-designated") CIC upon deployment to their first critical incident will have an experienced CIC accompany them.
- The accompanying CIC will be responsible for coaching and evaluation of the new CIC.
- Where the new CIC is capable, competent and adequately prepared, the coaching CIC shall provide necessary oversight and allow the new CIC to assume command and control of the incident.
- The coaching CIC shall remain in the presence of the new CIC throughout and review the new CIC's actions/decisions/direction to ensure compliance with safe and approved procedures.
- The coaching CIC will confirm that strategy/tactics/objectives are sound and appropriate to the situation and mission.

Designation

Upon resolution of the incident, the coaching CIC will debrief performance with the new CIC and provide a written assessment to the Director of Operations/Support, FSB. Where the new CIC "consistently meets" standards as set out on the approved assessment tool, a recommendation may be made to the Bureau Commander, FSB to confer designation.

POU Incident Commander

A new POU Commander prior to exercising any POU duties shall possess the following qualifications:

- have a minimum rank of Staff Sergeant;
- maintain the POU task-specific standard;
- have attended and successfully completed the following training: IC course, ERT POU basic training week and the POU Commanders Course; and
- be certified as a POU Commander by FSB.

First POU Command Incident

Oversight and Support:

- A newly trained POU Commander upon deployment to their first operational incident will have an experienced POU Commander accompany them.
- The accompanying POU Commander will be responsible for coaching and evaluation of the new POU Commander.
- Where the new POU Commander is capable, competent and adequately prepared, the coaching POU Commander shall provide necessary oversight and allow the new POU Commander to assume command and control of the incident.
- The coaching POU Commander shall remain in the presence of the new POU Commander throughout and review their actions/decisions/direction to ensure compliance with safe and approved procedures.
- The coaching POU Commander will confirm that strategy/tactics/objectives are sound and appropriate to the situation and mission.

Upon completion of the incident the experienced POU Commander will provide a report of the new commander's performance to the Commander, Emergency Response Teams, recommending whether or not the member needs further development or is capable of operational deployments by themselves.

PERFORMANCE REVIEW

CIC Review Committee

The CIC Review Committee shall meet as required to discuss and evaluate program and individual CIC performance.

Designation Revocation

The CIC Review Committee may recommend the revocation of the respective designation to the Commander, FSB under - but not limited to - the following circumstances:

1. failure to achieve the maintenance training requirements within the preceding six months subsequent to being provided with an additional six month make-up period; or
2. failure to meet the operational requirements of the position.

Incident Review

Any matter brought forward to the attention of Field Support Bureau with respect to concerns involving strategy, tactics, methods, procedures, training or related critical incident/integrated response issues will be forwarded to the attention of the Director of Operations/Support who shall:

- convene a working group of CICs and relevant emergency response SMEs to review the matter;
- develop recommendations, and
- communicate implementation strategy once approved.

TRAINING

Director, PPA The Director - PPA shall be responsible for:

- developing/reviewing/updating the CIC course on an on-going basis, in consultation with the Director of Operations/Support, FSB and the IC Training Co-ordinator;
- delivering the IC and CIC course with the assistance of active CICs; and
- making a current copy of the respective IC / CIC CTS available to the respective ICs and CICs.

IC MAINTENANCE TRAINING

ICs shall complete the following training:

- two days annually, at least one of which will include a scenario involving elements of a major incident integrated response, e.g. detachment resources, regional resources (such as ERT, MSU), community emergency planning co-operative, local EMS/fire/public works, Ministry response partners (MNR, MOE), etc.

CIC MAINTENANCE TRAINING

CICs shall complete the following training:

- Attend and observe on TRU Level 3 (hostage rescue/explosive forced entry (EFE)) training week as soon as practicable after completion of the CIC course
- Attend four days training per year practicing different tactical options, one of which must involve hostage rescue
- Attend annual explosive forced entry (EFE) training
- Attend annual CBRNE Training
- Attend annual integrated response training exercise
- Attend annual Critical Incident Command seminar

CICs are recommended to attend the following training:

- crisis negotiation seminars/lectures/training
- joint training exercises that integrate OPP with other law enforcement partners and/or CANSOFCOM
- training with a Tactics & Rescue Unit not normally deployed with operationally (i.e. out of Region team)
- other relevant training (i.e. crisis intervention, mental health, etc.)

Training Reports:

CIC

Complete and submit semi-annual training reports on the "CIC Training Report" once every six months by the 30 of June and 30 of December, to the Director of Operations/Support, FSB.

POU Incident Commander

A POU Incident commander shall attend all mandatory POU training as directed by Field Support Bureau.

EQUIPMENT/SUPPORTS

MIC has a variety of equipment/supports available predicated on the incident level.

Regional Resource

Where the identified equipment/support is based/available in the region, it may be accessed through the PCC upon approval of the Regional Duty Officer, e.g. MSU, communications equipment, portable computers.

MIC Kit

IC/CICs shall be responsible for the maintenance of any equipment supplied to them for the purpose of performing their duties.

MSU A Mobile Support Unit is a command resource available within each region.

Movement An MSU shall only be moved by operators who have received training and are currently licensed / authorized to move the MSU in accordance with the MSU CTS.

Equipment Compliment

An MSU shall be equipped—at a minimum—with the following:

MSU Equipment	Quantity
satellite phone—fixed unit	1
satellite phone—portable unit	1
prolonged housing capability	10-person
TV antenna hookup to monitor media	1
hard-wired phone lines	3
computer workstations	2
dry-erase boards	10
separate/secure area for a CN team	1
separate/secure area for a communications technician	1
VICTRIX antenna	1

Provincial Resource Where the equipment/support is provincial in nature, the IC/CIC shall request the equipment/service through Regional Command Staff, to the GHQ Duty Office.

Emergency Operation Centre
Where an OPP Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) has been activated and an IC/CIC requires a provincial service or resource or service from another Ministry, Provincial or Federal department or first responder, the IC/CIC shall make the request through the EOC.

Transfer of Command and Control
Hand Over Certificate

To: _____ From: _____

(OPP Incident Commander) (Local Police Service Incident Commander)

1. I have determined that an incident is occurring at _____ in the Province of Ontario on the ____day of _____, 20___. I have, to date, deployed the following local resources in response to the circumstances presented to me:
   - ☐ Uniformed officers
   - ☐ Containment Team
   - ☐ Canine Team
   - ☐ Public Order Unit
   - ☐ Other (describe) _____

2. As Incident Commander, I have determined that I cannot effectively deal with this occurrence with the police resources available to me. Therefore, I have requested _____ (OPP Incident Commander) to provide police response assistance in order to achieve the following goal(s):
   - ☐ _____
   - ☐ _____
   - ☐ _____
   - ☐ _____

3. By this document, I transfer to the OPP Incident Commander authority to deal with this occurrence and request that the OPP Incident Commander take whatever lawful action is deemed appropriate in the circumstances and for the purpose of suppressing, preventing or otherwise dealing with this occurrence ("the Operation").

4. I understand that during the Operation, OPP personnel rendering assistance remain under the sole command and control of the OPP Incident Commander. I further understand that, once OPP resources are deployed to the inner perimeter, the OPP Incident Commander will assume command and control of both OPP and local police resources assigned this operation. I have been briefed on the OPP post-operations procedures and understand that only specified OPP personnel will be allowed in the operational site for the duration of the operation.

5. As soon as the OPP Incident Commander and I (the Incident Commander) are satisfied that the operation is complete and that local police resources are again sufficient to handle the effects of the occurrence, command and control of the operational site will be handed back to me.

Signed: _____
(Local Police Service Incident Commander)

Date: _____, 20___ Time: _____hrs

Return of Operational Site Authority
Hand Back Certificate

POLICE RESPONSE OPERATIONS COMPLETE

To: _____ From: _____

(Local Police Service Incident Commander) (OPP Incident Commander)

Having completed as far as possible the Operation requested of the OPP by _____ (Local Police Service Incident Commander) by the Hand Over Certificate dated _____, 20__ (Attached hereto) in relation to an occurrence for which the management of the effects exceeded local police response capabilities at _____ in the Province of Ontario on the _____, 20___ (date), I hereby hand back to _____ (Local Police Service Incident Commander) command and control of the operational site.

Signed: _____
(OPP Incident Commander)

Date: _____, 20___ Time: _____hrs

OPP Incident Commander Pre-Intervention Checklist

- ☐ Staging area identified for OPP personnel engaged in support of local police Service occurrence.

- ☐ Local police Service Incident Commander will be the liaison officer to the OPP Incident Commander.

- ☐ Outer perimeter checkpoints (staffed with local police Service officers) informed of OPP support personnel's impending arrival.

- ☐ Work station in the command post assigned for local police Service liaison officer.

- ☐ Local police Service Incident Commander prepared to brief OPP Incident Commander and OPP Element Leaders upon arrival on:
  - ☐ Local police and emergency services resources deployed to date
  - ☐ Actions taken to date by the local police Service and their status
  - ☐ Effects action taken have had on the occurrence
  - ☐ Expectations of the local police Service Incident Commander reference operational plan
  - ☐ Limitations as to police response options that exist

- ☐ Local police Service Commanding Officer and OPP Incident Commander agree upon hand back procedures.

- ☐ The local police Service Incident Commander, upon determining that the resources of the local police Service are unable to deal with the incident effectively, has requested that the OPP Incident Commander deal with the incident.

- ☐ The Transfer of Command and Control (Hand Over Certificate) has been completed and signed by the local police Service Incident Commander and the OPP Incident Commander.

- ☐ Local police Service personnel advised of the change of command and control to the OPP.

OPP Incident Commander Post Intervention Checklist

Securing the Site

- ☐ OPP personnel have secured the scene following the intervention and have secured the operational site.
- ☐ OPP Incident Commander has provided a verbal status report to the local police Service Incident Commander immediately upon securing the scene.
- ☐ Local police Service Incident Commander is aware that local police Service members shall process and investigate all law enforcement matters relating to the occurrence.
- ☐ Local police Service members are aware that command and control of the occurrence has been handed back to the local police Service Incident Commander.

Hand Back of Control and Control of Site

- ☐ The Return of Operational Site Authority (Hand back Certificate) has been completed.
- ☐ Local police have taken over and secured the scene from OPP personnel and taken control and responsibility for all individuals who have been removed from the scene.

Investigation

- ☐ Unless absolutely impractical/unable to do so, OPP personnel have left any deceased and/or evidence in the position found.
- ☐ Unless absolutely impractical/unable to do so, OPP personnel have left suspects' weapons untouched and where found.
- ☐ All involved OPP personnel have moved to a secure location and prepared notes concerning their actions for investigative and court purposes.
- ☐ All involved OPP personnel are available for preliminary debriefing by the OPP Incident Commander as soon as is feasible.
- ☐ OPP personnel are available for any subsequent investigation.

CIC:		Date:	
Post Incident Review Conducted by:			
Date and Location of Incident	*Situation*		
Resources	• TRU • CN • K9 • PERT • MCU • ISB – audio & visual • Helicopter/fixed wing • EMTT/Ambulance – need medical plan • Fire		
Perimeters/Containment **ICEN**	• Isolate • Control • Evacuate – safe, thorough & documented • Negotiate		
Criminal Investigation	• Offence/Grounds/Authorities • Confirmed information and intelligence gathering (confirm, confirm, confirm)		
Tactical Options	• Appropriate use of ERT when TRU is not on ground • Reviewed and approved appropriate TRU plans • IAP, MAP, AAP • Arrest plan • Installation of probe		
Crisis Negotiations	• Identified cultural or linguistic need for negotiators • TPI – opportunities considered and documented • Mental Health Professional		

CIC:		Date:	
Post Incident Review Conducted by:			
Aboriginal Issues Management	• Effectively managed Aboriginal issues • Demonstrated knowledge of OPP Aboriginal Framework and recognizes opportunities for its application • Demonstrated knowledge of OPP ART Program and recognizes opportunities for its application • Adjusted tactics/strategies as required and appropriate • Consulted with OPP Aboriginal Liaison Operations		
Command Post	• Location? • Members • Appropriate use of scribe – reviewed notes and initialled each page, et • What boards were posted? (Mission, Site Diagram, Major Events, Suspect/subject)		
Media	• Required? • Approval of message		
EAP	• Required?		
SIU	• Required?		

CRITICAL INCIDENT COMMANDER
2014 MAINTENANCE TRAINING FORM

RANK	NAME	LOCATION	BADGE #

MANDATORY MAINTENANCE TRAINING	DATE	COMMENTS/DETAILS ON TRAINING COMPLETED
Four days annually with TRU, practicing different tactical options, one of which must involve hostage rescue		1. 2. 3. 4.
Explosive forced entry (EFE) training		
CBRNE Training		
Full integrated response training exercise		
Annual Critical Incident Command seminar		
Week of TRU Level 3 (hostage rescue/EFE) training as soon as practicable		
If not yet completed, First Nations awareness training as soon as practicable		
RECOMMENDED MAINTENANCE TRAINING	**DATE**	**COMMENTS/DETAILS ON TRAINING COMPLETED**
Crisis negotiation seminars/lectures/training		
Joint training exercises that integrate OPP with other law enforcement partners and/or CANSOFCOM		
Training with a Tactics & Rescue Unit not normally deployed with operationally (e.g. from another Region)		
OTHER TRAINING/SEMINARS	**DATE**	**COMMENTS/DETAILS ON TRAINING COMPLETED**
CIC CALLOUTS	**DATE**	**COMMENTS ON INCIDENT**

		TYPE/TACTICS UTILIZED

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA FOR CIC

- TAKES CHARGE OF AN INCIDENT/ESTABLISHES POSITIVE COMMAND PRESENCE
- ESTABLISHES A COMMAND POST
- UTILZES A SCRIBE
- ENSURES PROPER COMMUNICATIONS ARE IN PLACE
- UTILIZES PRINCIPLES OF SMEAC AND ICEN
- APPROVES MAP, IAP, AAP
- ENSURES LEGAL AUTHORITIES/GROUNDS EXIST FOR ARREST AND/OR ENTRY
- CONSULTS WITH ERT, TRU, CN, CRIME, UCRT, EDU, DETACHMENT, MEDIA, PLT, ACI COORDINATOR, MCIC, MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL, ETC
- CONDUCTS BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS
- AUTHORIZES THE DEPLOYMENT OF APPROPRIATE RESOURCES
- AUTHORIZES APPROPRIATE TACTICAL OPTIONS
- EFFECTIVELY DEALS WITH FIRST NATIONS ISSUES
- ENSURES COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND PROCEDURES
- ARTICULATES ACTIONS TAKEN
- CONSIDERS FOI, EAP, TRAUMA SUPPORT, ETC
- SIU NOTIFICATIONS/CONSIDERATIONS AS APPROPRIATE

ELECTRONICALLY REVIEWED/APPROVED BY (NAME/TITLE):	DATE

2014-Select-
ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE
INCIDENT COMMAND REPORT

Notes:

- This form shall only be completed for incidents involving the utilization of an Incident Commander.
- This form is to be completed by an assigned Scribe, under the direction of the Incident Commander.
- The Scribe shall e-mail blank sections of the report to appropriate users for completion and reply. The Scribe will compile all replies into the report for approval by the Incident Commander. It will be filed for view in the appropriate sub-folder.
- Incident Commander includes Incident Command, Critical Incident Command, Aboriginal Critical Incident Commander and Public Order Unit Commanders.

Incident Command Classification: Incident Command

Incident Command Report Number from Register:

Nature of Incident: IC Airplane Crash

Date/Time of Incident: /

OPP Jurisdiction: ☐ Yes ☐ No and;

If No, what jurisdiction , and is there an MOU with OPP? ☐ Yes. ☐ No.

OPP - RMS Incident (Niche Event) Number:

Other Agency Report Number:

Incident Commander:

Overall Synopsis:

Operational Debrief Conducted?: ☐ Yes ☐ No

Reviewed by Critical Incident Review Committee?: ☐ Yes ☐ No

Critical Incident Stress Response utilized?: ☐ Yes ☐ No

Scribe Completing this form:

Contact phone number:

E-mail address:

Sent to Units on date: , Diary Date within two weeks:

Incident Command Report Number:

Critical Incident Command – Incident Review
(replaces Lessons Learned)

CIC File # **RMS#** **CIC:**

Incident Date: **Incident Location:**

Units Deployed: CIC, Scribe, ERT, TRU, CN, K9, MSU, CIST, DC, D/CMDR., CRIME, MEDIA, UCRT, OTHER.

Mission Statement:

MAP:

IAP:

AAP:

Lessons Learned / Recommendations:

APPENDICES

List participant agencies, groups, units, teams, etc that *will not* be appending a report:

Entries By Participating Units *who will* be appending a report (Incident Command Report #).

Aviation Services:	DOE's:
Canine	DOE's:
Crisis Negotiation:	DOE's:
ERT:	DOE's:
TRU:	DOE's:
USRU:	DOE's:
Other:	DOE's:

** Please do not modify this form. Any suggestion can be forwarded to the Manager, Emergency Response, Field Support Bureau.

INCIDENT COMMANDER'S Notes

Incident _____

RMS # _____ Date: _____

Incident Commander: _____

Scribe: _____

SITUATION (Incident Synopsis): _____

What has occurred:

GROUNDS FOR USE OF FORCE: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

OFFENCE:

- ☐ Point Firearm
- ☐ Careless Use of a Firearm
- ☐ Murder
- ☐ Hostage Taking
- ☐ Robbery
- ☐ Warrant Execution
- ☐ Discharge Firearm
- ☐ Assault
- ☐ Attempt Murder
- ☐ Kidnapping
- ☐ Break & Enter
- ☐ Other _____

MISSION

MISSION STATEMENT: (authority of the Incident Commander)

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____ _____

Prepared by **Approved by Incident Commander**

EXECUTION: _____

Plan to be used in accomplishing the mission:

INCIDENT PLANNING FORM

(S.M.E.A.C. FORMAT)

INSTRUCTIONS:

Check off appropriate areas and/or write a short narrative in the space provided. Use additional pages when necessary.

INCIDENT COMMANDER:	
SITUATION:	
GROUNDS FOR USE OF FORCE:	

OFFENCE:

- ☐ Point Firearm
- ☐ Careless Use of a Firearm
- ☐ Murder
- ☐ Hostage Taking
- ☐ Robbery
- ☐ Warrant Execution
- ☐ Discharge Firearm
- ☐ Assault
- ☐ Attempt Murder
- ☐ Kidnapping
- ☐ Break & Enter
- ☐ Other_____

INCIDENT SYNOPSIS:

SUSPECT DESCRIPTION

INCIDENT #:	SUSPECT#:

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ Criminal ☐ Suicidal ☐ Mental

☐ Criminal ☐ Suicidal

SURNAME:		FIRST NAME:	
ALIAS:		D.O.B. (dd/mm/yy):	
AGE (YEARS):		SEX (M/F)?: M	
HEIGHT:	WEIGHT:	HAIR:	EYES:

ETHNIC GROUP/RACE:	LANGUAGES:
PHOTO: ☐ YES ☐ NO	

CLOTHING	STYLE	COLOUR
HAT		
SHIRT		
JACKET		
PANTS		
FOOTWEAR		
OTHER (describe)		

PHYSICAL:	
(marks, scars, tattoos)	

Other Comments: (see "Suspect Behaviour Log")

SUSPECT DESCRIPTION

Background

CRIMINAL HISTORY:	
C.N.I.:	

MEDICAL HISTORY: **Eg. Psychological, Physiological**	
MEDICAL HOSPITAL:	**PHYSICIAN:**

MENTAL STATE:	**CALM**	**ANGRY**	**VIOLENT**	**OTHER (describe)**
Prior to Police Arrival	☐	☐	☐	☐
After Police Arrival	☐	☐	☐	☐

PRESENT PHYSICAL CONDITION:

☐ **Wounded** ☐ **Tired** ☐ **Intoxicated** ☐ **Hungry**

☐ **Other (describe)**

HISTORY OF ABUSE:			**DESCRIPTION...**
DRUGS:	☐ **YES**	☐ **NO**	
ALCOHOL:	☐ **YES**	☐ **NO**	
SOLVENT:	☐ **YES**	☐ **NO**	
OTHER:	☐ **YES**	☐ **NO**	

SUSPECT DESCRIPTION

Background continued

EMPLOYMENT:	
SKILLS:	

GROUP AFFILIATION:	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY:	

DEMANDS MADE:	

MILITARY BACKGROUND:	☐ **No**	☐ **Yes (describe)**	
HUNTING BACKGROUND:	☐ **No**	☐ **Yes (describe)**	
KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL AREA:	☐ **Minimal**	☐ **Basic**	☐ **Extensive**

RELATIONSHIP(s) TO HOSTAGE(s):	
☐ **Blood Relative**	
☐ **Marriage**	
☐ **Common Law**	
☐ **Other**	

WEAPONS

TYPE:	QUANTITY:
AMMUNITION:	EXPLOSIVES:
WEAPONS EXPERIENCE: (explain)	
EXPLOSIVES EXPERIENCE: (explain)	
OTHER EQUIPMENT OF INTEREST: (eg. police monitor, gas mask, etc)	

VICTIM DESCRIPTION

NUMBER OF VICTIMS: (If multiple victims, use additional page)

VICTIM #:			
SURNAME:		FIRST NAME:	
AGE (years):		SEX (M/F)?: M	
HEIGHT:	WEIGHT:	HAIR:	EYES:

ETHNIC GROUP/RACE:	LANGUAGES:
PHOTO: ☐ YES ☐ NO	

CLOTHING	STYLE	COLOUR
HAT		
SHIRT		
JACKET		
PANTS		
FOOTWEAR		
OTHER (describe)		

PHYSICAL:	
(marks, scars, tattoos)	

VICTIM DESCRIPTION

Background

MEDICAL HISTORY: **Eg. Psychological, Physiological**	
MEDICATIONS:	**PHYSICIAN:**

HISTORY OF ABUSE:			**DESCRIPTION...**
DRUGS:	☐ **YES**	☐ **NO**	
ALCOHOL:	☐ **YES**	☐ **NO**	
SOLVENT:	☐ **YES**	☐ **NO**	
OTHER:	☐ **YES**	☐ **NO**	

IF HOSTAGE INCIDENT, complete the following:

MENTAL STATE:	**CALM**	**STRESS LEVEL**	**STOCKHOLMED**	**OTHER (describe)**
Prior to Police Arrival				
After Police Arrival				

☐ **Restrained** ☐ **Hooded** ☐ **Other (describe)**

LOCATION (isolated?) etc.:

GUARDED (how?):

PARTICIPATING IN INCIDENT (ie Stockholming): ☐ **Yes** ☐ **No**
(describe)

HISTORY WITH SUSPECT:

Site Survey

PHOTOGRAPHS	☐ Yes	☐ No	AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS	☐ Yes	☐ No
ROAD MAP	☐ Yes	☐ No	TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP	☐ Yes	☐ No
FLOOR PLAN	☐ Yes	☐ No	SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM	☐ Yes	☐ No
ELEVATION VIEWS	☐ Yes	☐ No	BLUEPRINTS/STRUCTURE	☐ Yes	☐ No
			INTERIOR PHOTOGRAPHS	☐ Yes	☐ No

LOCATION	
BUILDING NAME:	
COMPLETE ADDRESS:	
TELEPHONE:	
GENERAL DESCRIPTION:	
SITE COMMANDER:	TELEPHONE:
ADDRESS:	
DESCRIPTION OF BUILDING	
TYPE OF BUILDING:	
NUMBER OF FLOORS:	TOTAL SQUARE FEET:
NUMBER AND TYPE OF ROOMS	
TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION:	
NUMBER AND TYPE OF ENTRANCES/EXITS:	
NUMBER OF EMERGENCY EXITS:	
ELEVATORS ☐ Construction	☐ Passenger ☐ Freight
MAKE:	MODEL:
SIZE:	EMERGENCY SHUT OFF POINT:
FIRE ESCAPES/DOORS:	

Site Survey Continued

BUILDING GROUNDS
AVENUES OR APPROACH AND ESCAPE:
SURROUNDING TERRAIN:
LIGHTED AREAS:
LANDING ZONES: (Description, including distance from facility and avenue of approach)

Site Survey Continued

SECURITY
EXTERIOR DOORS: (Type, which way to open and close, type location of locks)
WALLS, FENCES & GATES:
ALARMS/SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS:
SECURITY PERSONNEL: (Company, number of, location of control)
LOCATION OF MASTER KEYS:
LIGHTING: (Interior and Exterior)
OTHER:

Site Survey Continued

INTERIOR LAYOUT:
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND FLOOR PLAN: (include dimensions)
LOCATION OF FLOOR PLANS AND BLUEPRINTS:
INTERIOR CONSTRUCTION:
Walls:
Composition:
How do they open?:
Location of hinges; exposed or concealed?:
Location of doorknobs:
Dimensions:
WINDOWS: (description, how locked, how opened)
CRAWL SPACES, AIR DUCTS, ETC
STAIRWAYS:
HALLWAYS:

Site Survey Continued

UTILITIES
TELEPHONES:
Type of service:
Location of wire closet:
ELECTRICITY:
Type:
Location of circuit breaker room:
VENTILATING, HEATING, AIR CONDITIONING:
Location of controls:
Name of repair:
Maintenance company:
SEWAGE:
Tunnels utilized nearby:

Site Survey Continued

Rough Sketch: **(should include approximate distance of Command Post to TOC, TOC to ground personnel, Outer Perimeter, Major Topography, buildings, hydro lines, local towers or other pertinent information)**

VEHICLES

VEHICLE # 1	**MAKE:**	**MODEL:**
COLOUR:	**LICENCE NO.**	
CONDITION/STATE (e.g. disabled etc.)		
ADDITIONAL VEHICLES		
VEHICLE # 2	**MAKE:**	**MODEL:**
COLOUR:	**LICENCE NO.**	
CONDITION/STATE (e.g. disabled etc.)		
VEHICLE # 3	**MAKE:**	**MODEL:**
COLOUR:	**LICENCE NO.**	
CONDITION/STATE (e.g. disabled etc.)		
VEHICLE # 4	**MAKE:**	**MODEL:**
COLOUR:	**LICENCE NO.**	
CONDITION/STATE (e.g. disabled etc.)		

MISSION

MISSION STATEMENT: (authority of the Incident Commander)

Prepared by

Approved by
Incident Commander

Resource Team

OBJECTIVE:	
ASSIGNED TO: (supervisor)	**CALL SIGN:**
REQUIRED NUMBER OF PERSONNEL:	
PHASE LINE YELLOW:	
PHASE LINE GREEN:	
TASK	
TASKS	
ASSIGNED TO: (member)	
CALL SIGN:	
REQUIRED EQUIPMENT:	
RESPONSIBILITY:	

EXECUTION

TASK
TASKS:
ASSIGNED TO: (member)
CALL SIGN:
REQUIRED EQUIPMENT:
RESPONSIBILITY:
TASKS:
ASSIGNED TO: (member)
CALL SIGN:
REQUIRED EQUIPMENT:
RESPONSIBILITY:
TASKS:
ASSIGNED TO:
CALL SIGN:
REQUIRED EQUIPMENT:
RESPONSIBILITY:

RESOURCE CHECKLIST

OPP RESOURCES			
CANINE	☐	TRAFFIC UNIT	☐
ERT	☐	CRIME UNIT	☐
TRU	☐	MARINE UNIT	☐
HELICOPTER	☐	AUXILIARY	☐
TECHNICAL SUPPORT	☐	CRISIS NEGOTIATOR	☐
EDU	☐	PEER SUPPORT	☐
OUTSIDE RESOURCES			
FIRE DEPARTMEN	☐	HYDRO	☐
*AMBULANCE	☐	BELL	☐
SAR ORGANIZATION	☐	CASARA	☐
MTO HEAVY EQUIPMENT	☐	SERVICE CLUBS	☐
MILITARY/RCC	☐	MNR	☐

** Fill in resources as required. Expand or reduce the structure as the incident changes.

SPECIAL TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS			
☐	Helicopter	☐	Marine Units
☐	Aircraft	☐	Motorcycles
☐	Snowmobiles	☐	All Terrain Vehicles
PRISONER EVALUATION			
ASSIGNED TO:		VEHICLE #:	

RESOURCE CHECKLIST CONTINUED

MEALS:	**ACCOMODATIONS:**
REST PERIODS:	**RELIEF:**
ROTATION ROSTER:	
VEHICLE SERVICING:	
EQUIPMENT INVENTORY: (Radio's, firearms, etc.)	

COMMAND/COMMUNICATIONS

INCIDENT COMMANDER:	
COMMAND POST LOCATION:	
TELEPHONE:	**CALL SIGN:**
BRIEFING LOCATION:	
STAGING AREA:	
AFTER INCIDENT	
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:	
MEDIA STATEMENT:	
DEMOBILIZATION:	
INCIDENT ASSESSMENT:	
TRANSITION TO CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION:	

INCIDENT ASSESSMENT

POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL PROBLEM (what happened)	PROBABLE CAUSES (why did it happen)	PREVENTATIVE ACTION (how do we prevent it)	CONTINGENT ACTION (what if it happens again)	TRIGGER (what action prompts the contingent action)
Ex. Auxiliary lighting unit	Generator runs out of fuel	Logistic office assigns member to maintain fuel supply	Have container of fuel near the unit	Lighting failure reported to Command Post

PLANNING

SITUATION	**Activity** **Suspects** **Intelligence** **Location** **Current Police Involvement**
MISSION	**A clear concise statement of Objectives to work towards**
EXECUTION OF THE PLAN	- **summary of the general plan to be used in accomplishing the mission** - **identify the units and their assigned tasks in the incident resolution** - **co-ordinating instructions (timings, routes, priority of work etc.)**
ADMINISTRATION AND EQUIPMENT	- **weapons to be utilized** - **clothing to be worn** - **special equipment to be utilized** - **transportation** - **handling of prisoners** - **medical plan** - **meals, relief** - **any other admin./logistical concerns**
COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION	**A/ Controls – C.P., T.O.C. site, location of Incident Commander and sub-unit leaders** **B/ Communication – is TAC established, what frequency will inner perimeter work on, who will monitor the radio network(s)** **C/ Call signs, pro-words, code words**

SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

SUSPECT	- name - date of birth - physical description - occupation - education - hobbies
	- family history - mental state (psychological profile) - suicidal threat information - medical history - criminal record - drug/alcohol abuse - military experience - weapons, ammo.
SCENE	- anyone in immediate danger - is the scene contained? - communication to all officers - location of containment officers - firearms discipline - surrender route established
	SCENE DIAGRAM - bird's eye view of area – include roads, neighbourhood houses, suspect's house, natural cover e.g. bush, creeks, position of containment officers - diagram of the house – all exterior walls and floor plan available
RESOURCES	negotiator's canine technical support investigator's TRU/ERT Outer perimeter control media co-ordinator medical assistance fire department hydro/P.U.C. scribe admin/logistics

Scribe Program
Standard Operating Procedure Manual
Emergency Response Programs
Field Support Bureau

INTRODUCTION

This manual provides procedures for the Scribe Program, further to policy as set out in Police Orders, Chapter 5, Major Incident Command.

The Scribe Program consists of two streams, the Critical Incident Scribe (CIS) stream and the Emergency Management Note-taker (EMN) stream.

Revisions/Updates

Commander, FSB

The Commander, Field Support Bureau (FSB) is the accountable executive for the Scribe Program Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Manual.

As per Police Orders 5.5.3, the Commander FSB is responsible for maintaining the Scribe Program SOP Manual and will audit the content for relevancy on an annual basis. The Commander FSB is also responsible to ensure any amendments are communicated to the organization for immediate implementation.

ROLE

Definition:

A Scribe is an employee specifically trained to perform this function.

A Critical Incident Scribe reports directly to the Critical Incident Commander (CIC)/Incident Commander (IC) or Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Coordinator and records CIC/IC notes or an EOC Event Log on their exclusive behalf.

An Emergency Management Note-taker (EMN) reports directly to an Incident Commander (IC) or Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Coordinator and records IC notes or an EOC Event Log on their exclusive behalf.

An EMN/CIS is expected to:

- record the notes of the Critical Incident Commander (CIC) or Incident Commander (IC), not their own, in a format acceptable to the CIC/IC, i.e. hand written or electronic;
- remain with and report directly to the CIC or IC;
- provide an accurate, legible and chronological written record of: all orders, instructions and information issued by and received by the CIC or IC; all decisions made by the CIC or IC; all other information as directed by the CIC or IC;
- maintain a record of tasks (things to do) and update the CIC or IC accordingly;
- not relinquish the CIC/IC notes to any person unless directed by the CIC or IC to do so;
- deliver the CIC/IC notes to the CIC or IC at the conclusion of the event.

Other EMN/CIS duties may include:

- completing other command post documentation as directed by the CIC/IC;
- providing care and control of assembled notes during the event;
- logging any information turned over to the CIC or IC, e.g. faxes, maps, forms;
- being prepared to mobilize at any time;

- attending regular Command Post briefings/debriefings/meetings.

***** see EOC SOP manual for roles and responsibilities of EMN/CIS while working in an EOC**

TYPES OF CALLS

A Critical Incident Scribe may be utilized for any of the following types of incidents:

- hostage taking;
- barricaded person;
- suicidal person;
- high risk warrant;
- public order incident (Command Post for all hard tac and soft tac POU deployments)
- UCRT deployments involving CBRNE and USAR;
- EDU deployments;
- natural disasters;
- plane/train/automobile accidents;
- searches;
- hazardous substance instances;
- EOC activations
- major events;
- or any other situation where a CIC is deployed.

An Emergency Management Note-taker may be utilized for any of the following type of incidents:

- natural disasters,
- plane/train/automobile accidents;

- searches;
- hazardous substance instances;
- major events;
- EOC activations;
- or any other situation where an IC is deployed.

SELECTION

Candidate

Pre-qualification

A Critical Incident Scribe/Emergency Management Note-taker shall:

- be a volunteer;
- have a minimum three years of service;
- make a minimum commitment of three years to be a Critical Incident Scribe/Emergency Management Note-taker;
- have neat and legible handwriting;
- be willing to be on call;
- be willing to be away from home, family and work, sometimes in remote areas, for an indeterminate period of time;
- be willing to work under various conditions – outside of normal working hours;
- be willing to respond anywhere within regional/provincial boundaries;
- able to respond with little notice;
- be flexible;
- be computer literate;

- be very organized and have ability to log and control relevant documentation,
- be capable of recording information quickly, accurately, concisely and legibly;
- be self-motivated – good use of down time to complete tasks such as updating suspect information, resource information or information boards;
- be able to maintain confidentiality;
- be able to function under stress;
- be professional.

Application Process

Emergency Management Note-takers are selected by their respective Region/Bureau based on the above noted criteria. There is no formal selection process for the EMN position. It is recommended that a candidate for the EMN position have an interest in eventually becoming a CIS.

There is a selection process to become a Critical Incident Scribe. CIS will be selected from pool of Emergency Management Note-taker candidates. A member possessing the pre-requisites for a Critical Incident Scribe candidate shall submit—through normal channels to the Provincial Coordinator:

- a resume, including an inventory of experience/qualifications/skills; and
- a covering letter, including a supporting footnote from their detachment commander.

Critical Incident Scribe Selection/ Review Committee

Composition

Where a Critical Incident Scribe vacancy exists, a candidate shall be required to appear for an interview

before a Critical Incident Scribe Selection/Review Committee comprised of: a Critical Incident Commander, the Provincial Scribe Program Coordinator and the Regional ERT Coordinator.

Interview

The interview shall include:

- an oral interview to determine knowledge, skills, and abilities; and
- a written assignment.

Psychological Upon successful selection as an EMN or a CIS, the candidate shall undergo a psychological assessment by the OPP psychologist.

See Appendix 1—Psychological Evaluation Standard

Training ***Basic Course***

An employee deemed suitable to attend the Emergency Management Note-taker course shall be scheduled for an approved five day EMN course by the Provincial Coordinator.

A Critical Incident Scribe candidate successful in a Regional selection process shall be scheduled for an approved five-day Scribe course by the Provincial Co-ordinator. The candidate must already have completed the five day EMN course.

Appointment Upon the successful completion of the Emergency Management Note-take course a candidate shall be assigned as an EMN in their respective region/bureau.

Upon successful completion of the Critical Incident Scribe course a candidate shall be assigned as a CIS in their respective region.

Apprenticing The Regional ERT Coordinator, in co-operation with Regional Command, may require that a new EMN/CIS

candidate awaiting appointment in the region, prior to attending the EMN/CIS course:

- observe at operational calls.

Mentoring

Upon appointment an EMN/CIS shall be assigned to be mentored at operational calls.

- Mentoring will be completed with an experienced Critical Incident Scribe;
- On the first call, the novice EMN/CIS will observe the experienced CIS; (for the EMN this will be at an IC level call, for a CIS this will be at a CIC level call)
- On the second call, the novice EMN/CIS will be coached by the experienced CIS; (for the EMN this will be at an IC level call, for a CIS this will be at a CIC level call)
- There will only ever be one copy of notes recorded;
- IC/CIC will review their notes at the conclusion of the call and provide feedback to the mentoring EMN/CIS;
- After the second call, IC/CIC will decide if the EMN/CIS is ready to attend calls on their own and will advise the Regional ERT Coordinator, who will in turn notify the Provincial Scribe Program Coordinator.
- If the IC/CIC determines that the EMN/CIS requires further mentoring, additional calls with an experienced CIS will be arranged by the Regional ERT Coordinator.

Assignment

Upon demonstrated competence, the candidate will be designated as an Emergency Management Note-taker or a Critical Incident Scribe by the Bureau Commander of Field Support Bureau or their designate.

TERMINATION

A member may be removed from being an EMN/CIS under the following circumstances:

- failure to achieve the maintenance training requirements within the preceding six months, and after being provided with a further six-month make-up period; or
- failure to achieve the refresher training requirements, and after being provided with a six-month make-up period; (refresher training only pertains to Critical Incident Scribes) or
- failure to meet the operational requirements of the position.

Critical Incident Scribe Selection/ Review Committee

Where the conduct/behaviour of an EMN/CIS is in question, the Critical Incident Scribe Selection/Review Committee may be convened by the Provincial Coordinator to consider:

- suspending the member from operational EMN/CIS duties until maintenance training requirements are achieved;
- requiring the member to attend a refresher course;
- requiring the member to undergo an additional mentoring period; or
- recommendation to FSB Command and Regional Command for the removal of the member from the Scribe program.

RESPONSIBILITIES

Scribe Program Regional Coordinator

A Scribe Program Regional Coordinator will be assigned to oversee the program regionally by the Regional Commander or their designate. It is recommended by

Field Support Bureau for program consistency and streamlining that this position be the responsibility of the ERT Regional Coordinator (Staff Sgt or Sgt)

The Scribe Program Regional Coordinator shall:

- support the overall EMN/CIS objectives within the region;
- operationally/administratively support the Scribe Program Provincial Coordinator;
- ensure that the EMN/CIS positions are properly staffed and deployed at an incident;
- track the availability of regional EMN/CIS;
- maintain a current list of contact numbers;
- ensure the GHQ Duty Office/regional duty officer/PCC have current EMN/CIS member contact numbers;
- oversee EMN/CIS within the region;
- liaise with the Regional IC/CICs regarding suitability of new EMN/CIS to attend calls on their own after a mentoring process;
- liaise with the Provincial Coordinator and report on regional EMN/CIS operations as required;
- liaise with the Provincial Coordinator to ensure that EMN/CIS regional team members comply with SOP Manual;
- Assist the Provincial Coordinator with organizing and ensuring attendance at mandatory training events;

- ensure that the Provincial Co-ordinator is advised forthwith of any issue that could impact on the EMN/CIS program within the OPP including:
  - training deficiencies;
- disseminate educational/operational information to the EMN/CIS regional team;
- ensure that equipment/supplies are maintained in a state of readiness;
- ensure Employee Assistance Program (EAP) services are made available to EMN/CIS when required.

*****Supervision, support and maintenance training for the EMNs are the responsibility of the respective Regions.**

Provincial Coordinator

The Provincial Coordinator, appointed by the Commander, FSB, shall:

- be a member of the Selection/Review Committee;
- test/evaluate/make recommendations for EMN/CIS best practices/equipment;
- assist in the development/maintenance/delivery of EMN/CIS CTS and courses;
- monitor/assess all aspects of the EMN/CIS delivery;
- maintain current EMN/CIS operational policies/procedures and position descriptors;
- collect/analyze/disseminate appropriate information to all members of the EMN/CIS Program and FSB co-ordinators;
- prepare CIS program budget submissions;

- contribute to the FSB annual report.

Scribe Program Training Coordinator

The Scribe Program Training Coordinator, appointed by the Provincial Police Academy, shall:

- maintain EMN/CIS CTS and other training materials;
- develop/assess EMN/CIS courses;
- coordinate training courses in partnership with the Provincial Coordinator;
- monitor yearly maintenance training to ensure compliance;
- develop/assist in delivery/evaluation of the EMN, CIS Basic and CIS Refresher Courses

FSB Commander

- designation or de-designation as recommended by the Review Committee

TRAINING

Initial

An EMN shall successfully complete a recognized five day EMN training course.

A CIS shall successfully complete EMN training in addition to a recognized five-day CIS training course.

Maintenance

An EMN shall annually participate in one Incident Command level maintenance training component including:

- a practical scenario involving other policing functions;
- table top exercise;
- EOC exercise;

- Any other training deemed suitable by the Training Coordinator.

A CIS shall annually participate in two Critical Incident level components of maintenance training including:

- a practical scenario involving other emergency response functions, including CIC or ICs;
- an observational scenario involving other emergency response functions, including CIC or ICs;
- professional development training including any of the following:
  - negotiator scenarios;
  - communications skills;
  - cultural awareness;
  - CIS updates/review; and
- Any other training deemed appropriate by the Scribe Program Training Coordinator.

Refresher

A CIS shall attend a CIS Refresher workshop every four years.

******* Training for the EMNs are a Regional responsibility.**

CHANGING TEAM

Shift Duration

Although there is no set time length for an EMN/CIS shift, consideration for a shift change should be made every 12 hours.

- This change will occur simultaneously to the change of command of CICs/ICs. The relief scribe will be arranged by the relief CIC/IC.
- At this time, the EMN/CIS will deliver the CIC/IC notes to the relieved CIC/IC. It is up to the discretion of the CIC/IC being relieved

whether they leave their notes with the CIC/IC coming on duty.

TRANSPORTATION

- EMN/CIS will not drive personal vehicles to incidents
- EMN/CIS will not drive marked cruisers to incidents
- CIC/IC upon contacting their EMN/CIS to attend an event will ensure that safe and appropriate transportation is provided for the EMN/CIS to and from the Incident.

INCIDENT CONCLUSION

Incident Debriefing

At the conclusion of each incident the EMN/CIS shall participate in a debriefing with all emergency functions. Subject to direction from the IC/CIC, the EMN/CIS will be responsible for taking ancillary notes documenting:

- The lessons learned by each unit.
- The assessment of the effectiveness of the actions taken/decisions made;
- The assessment of the state of readiness of personnel/equipment; and
- The assessment of the successful strategies/techniques, observed deficiencies, and recommended corrective actions.
- Task list for follow-up items
- Damage report

Reports

The following reports are to be completed by an EMN/CIS :

Incident Command Report

The EMN/CIS shall ensure that form ER033— Major Incident Report is submitted with all appropriate reports appended to the Critical Incident Commander, within two weeks. The Critical Incident Commander will ensure that the completed MIR is submitted to the Director of Operations, Field Support Bureau, via the EMN/CIS within 30 days.

Training Report

A Semi-annual Training Report shall be submitted as follows:

- the EMN/CIS submits the Semi-annual Training Report to the Regional Scribe Program Coordinator by June 30th and December 31st of each year;
- the Regional Scribe Program Coordinator reviews all Semi-annual Training Reports, and forwards them to the Provincial Co-ordinator by July 15th and January 15th of each year; and
- the Provincial Co-ordinator reviews and compiles all Semi-annual Training Reports, and provides copies to the Training Co-ordinator.

APPENDIX 1: EQUIPMENT & SUPPORTS

The CN Provincial Co-ordinator shall ensure that each CIS is provided with kit as follows:

	Quantity
• Pens – black	4
• Rigid clipboard	1
• Highlighters – assorted colours	4
• Markers for boards – assorted colours	2 packs
• Markers for white boards – assorted colours	2 packs
• Celluloid tape	2
• IC Log Book	5
• OPP phone directory	1
• Regional phone directory	1
• Vital Services Directory	1
• Stapler	1
• Flashlight to clamp onto clothing to assist with note taking in the dark	1
• Knapsack	1
• Body Armour	1
• Shirts (minus flash) with Scribe identifier	2 Short 2 Long
• Pants (minus stripe)	2
• Boots	1
• Winter jacket	1
• Winter hat	1
• Long underwear	1
• Gloves	1
• Sunscreen	1
• Bug spray	1
• Duffle Bag	1

*****there is no clothing or equipment issued by FSB to an EMN.**

APPENDIX 2: PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION STANDARD

PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION

Purpose

The purpose of using the psychological evaluation in the selection of an EMN/CIS is to answer the following questions:

- What is the type and level of risk involved in accepting an applicant as an EMN/CIS?
- To what degree does a candidate's personality fit the selection criteria profile?

Tests Administered

The EMN/CIS candidate shall complete the following psychological measures to assess their suitability:

*****[redacted]******

Appendix 7 - OPP Multiple Fatality Strategy

Introduction

An incident involving a large scale emergency or disaster can result in numerous deaths. The OPP Multiple Fatality Strategy may be referred to in order to assist with the response to such events. However, as a result of numerous deaths, regional resources may be quickly overwhelmed and outside assistance required.

According to the Office of the Chief Coroner of Ontario's Draft Provincial Multiple Fatality Plan (PMFP (Draft)):

> *"A **multiple fatality** incident is defined as an event or incident in which several persons perish and which is beyond the capacity of local resources to deal with the investigation, reporting, recovery, identification, examination and disposition of the human remains involved."*[1]

The differences between an incident in which one person has died and multiple people have died are the scope of resources required both internally and externally, notifications, and the length of time a scene is held to be processed. Care must be taken to ensure that bodies be removed by trained personnel only. Evidence used to identify the dead and establish the cause of death must be properly collected.

The primary concerns of a mass fatality incident response are recovery, identification of human remains and assistance to affected families. Protection and preservation of evidence is crucial in the event that the site is considered a crime scene. In addition, the safety of response personnel must be a priority.

The Office of the Chief Coroner has the ultimate authority to intervene and investigate a multiple fatality event where the deaths are sudden and unexpected. In this instance the PMFP (Draft) may be enacted. The Office of the Chief Coroner would be responsible for coordinating human resources and supplies required at the scene to identify victims, establish cause of death, secure evidence, and process remains. The Provincial Emergency Operations Centre may also be activated to assist in coordination.

Where the mass fatality incident has occurred at a workplace, the provisions of the *Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA)* will apply. Section 51 of the OHSA requires the employer to immediately notify the Ministry of Labour (MOL) by telephone when a person is killed or critically injured from any cause in a workplace. An MOL inspector will be dispatched to the scene to conduct an investigation. Under the OHSA, disturbance of a scene is prohibited in order to preserve evidence (s. 51(1)), except where it is necessary for saving life or relieving human suffering; maintaining a public utility service or a public transportation system; or preventing unnecessary damage to equipment or other property (s. 52(2)).

In the event of a transportation disaster, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is responsible for coordinating the investigation of all major incidents involving mass fatalities which occur as a result of an aircraft, railway, marine shipping, or pipeline occurrence. Each occurrence is assessed by staff of the TSB to determine if an investigation is warranted, in accordance with the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act (S.C. 1989, c. 3).

[1] Office of the Chief Coroner, *Provincial Multiple Fatality Plan (Draft)* (Province of Ontario, October 2011), 7.

Purpose

The purpose of the OPP Multiple Fatality Strategy is to describe and identify roles and practices in mitigation, preparedness, response to and recovery from mass fatality incidents.

The OPP Multiple Fatality Strategy provides for proper coordination of mass fatality incident response activities. It identifies the means and methods for the sensitive, respectful, orderly care and handling of human remains, other victims, families and communities in multi-death disaster situations.

This strategy deals specifically with incidents involving non-natural deaths, which should be treated as a criminal event and managed accordingly. The function of the OPP at such an event would be the control and security of the site as well as to provide investigative assistance to the other agencies that are involved.

The following should be considered:

- Establishing a joint command consisting of police, fire, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), Coroner's Office, other Ministries (e.g. Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Heath, Ministry of the Environment) as required, etc.,
- Using OPP Forensic Identification Services (FIS) to assist with the identification and processing of the deceased,
- Establishing a triage area to coordinate medical assistance for all injured persons, and
- Determining a location for a temporary morgue in consultation with the Office of the Chief Coroner.

Sequence of Events during a Mass Fatality Occurrence

The following flow chart outlines the sequence of events and response activities that occur in a mass fatality event:



Assumptions

The Province of Ontario is vulnerable to a number of risks, such as tornadoes, floods, hazardous materials incidents, mass transportation accidents, and acts of terrorism. Any of these occurrences could result in multiple death response requirements that would place significant strain on OPP Regional capabilities.

This strategy deals specifically with incidents involving non-natural deaths, which should be treated as a criminal event until determined otherwise. Therefore, in most instances, the OPP Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) will be responsible for the criminal investigation and for the management of the crime scene and will initiate the *Rapid Response to Major Criminal Incident (RRMCI).*

The immediate focus in events of this nature will be the rescue of living individuals through search and rescue operations. However, while life-preserving rescue measures and medical care take precedence, care must be taken to ensure that as many human remains (bodies and body parts) as possible, as well as other evidence, personal effects, etc., are left untouched.

As soon as preservation of life and immediate evidence issues have been address, the scene must be contained while criminal investigators assess the need for judicial authorizations and assistance orders to continue processing the scene.

Concept of Operations

The concept of operations is intended to provide overall guidance to responders on the areas of responsibility and proper response to a multiple fatality incident.

According to the PMFP (Draft):

> *It is likely that all multiple fatality incidents occurring within Ontario will fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Chief Coroner. The legislated role, therefore, of the coroner(s) at the site(s) of multiple fatality incidents, is paramount to the effective investigation, reporting, recovery, identification, examination and disposition of human remains.*
>
> *The Office of the Chief Coroner will utilize potential experts, and will assume leadership, integration and facilitating roles. The Office of the Chief Coroner and the Ontario Forensic Pathology Service will be fully integrated and provide services in a seamless fashion for the multiple fatality incident.*[2]

Under the Coroners Act, Section 16, a coroner may,

a) *examine or take possession of any dead body, or both; and*

b) *enter and inspect any place where a dead body is and any place from which the coroner has reasonable grounds for believing the body was removed. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.37, s. 16 (1); 2009, c. 15, s. 8.*

Further, Sec. 11 of the Coroners Act provides that, in cases that may become subject to a coroner's investigation, no person who has reason to believe that a person died in any of the circumstances mentioned in section 10 shall not interfere with or alter the body or its condition in any way until the coroner so directs by a warrant. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.37, s. 11. Therefore, in those

[2] Provincial Multiple Fatality Plan (Draft), 12.

cases, any movement or recovery of a dead body needs to be done in consultation with, and under the direction of the Coroner.

The police service of jurisdiction will be responsible for all site security and investigation including the following:

- Establishing scene security,
- Setting up a security perimeter and establishing staffed ingress/egress points,
- Briefing and debriefing personnel when entering or leaving the staging area,
- Removing unauthorized personnel from the scene,
- Assisting the Coroner in their investigations as the Coroner deems necessary,
- Acquiring, assembling and coordinating all necessary personnel, the materials required to support those personnel and the functions that will be required of them,
- Providing advice and up to date information to the Incident Commander regarding policing concerns, identifications or requirements of personnel,
- Participating as a member of the identification processing group, reporting to the Coroner as to the findings of group members and giving opinions as to whether the remains have been sufficiently identified to release them to the next of kin, and
- Applying special skills of officers within the identification processing group where required during the investigation.

A Major Incident Commander shall be assigned to manage the incident, in accordance with *Police Orders, Chapter 5, Major Incident Command.* In addition, a CIB Inspector will be present in the Command Post to oversee the investigative aspects of the incident. The following additional services may be required for mobilization within the OPP:

- Forensic Identification Services
- Technical Traffic Accident Reconstruction Services
- Canine Unit (cadaver, explosive, and search services)
- Urban Search and Rescue, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive Response Team (UCRT)
- Underwater Search and Recovery Unit (USRU)
- Aviation Services
- Emergency Response Team

OPP Notification Procedure for Multiple Fatalities



Roles and Responsibilities

Function	Lead Responsibility	Relevant Policy / Legislation
Initial Response • Establishment of Inner and Outer Perimeter • Scene Assessment	First Responders (Police, Fire, EMS)	• Police Orders, Sudden Death/Unidentified Body/Remains, Section 2.11 • OPP Field Guide, First Officer at the Scene • OPP Field Guide, Crime Scene Checklist
Notification to Provincial Emergency Response Center (PEOC)	OPP GHQ Duty Office	
Notification to Coroner	Provincial Communications Centre	• Coroners Act, R.S.O. 1990, C.37
Incident Command	Police *(Due to potential criminal investigation. However, another first response agency (e.g. fire service) may take lead dependent on the nature of the incident)*	• Police Orders, Major Incident Command, Section 5.1 • Major Incident Command Standard Operating Procedure
Search and Rescue of Living Victims	First Responders (Police, Fire, EMS)	• Police Orders, Emergency Response Team, Section 5.4 • Police Orders, USAR CBRNE Response Team (UCRT), Section 5.13
Scene Security	Police	• OPP Field Guide, Crime Scene Checklist • OPP Field Guide, Crime Scene Security Detail
Site Preservation / Collection & Control of Evidence	Police (Forensic Identification Services)	• Police Orders, Evidence/Property Collection, Preservation, Control, Section 2.39
Criminal Investigation	Police	• Police Orders, Criminal Investigation Management/Procedures, Section 2.7
Human Remains Recovery, Collection & Body Storage	Ontario Forensic Pathology Service	• Coroners Act, R.S.O. 1990, C.37 • OPP Field Guide, Deceased Person Security Detail • Provincial Multiple Fatalities Plan (Draft)
Transportation of Remains	Office of the Chief Coroner (Function has been contracted out to a private service provider)	• Provincial Multiple Fatalities Plan (Draft)
Morgue Operations	Ontario Forensic Pathology Service	• Provincial Multiple Fatalities Plan (Draft)
Family Assistance	Office of the Chief Coroner	• Provincial Multiple Fatalities Plan

Function	Lead Responsibility	Relevant Policy / Legislation
• Establishment of Family Assistance Centres		(Draft) • Police Orders, Victims Services, Chapter 3
Disaster Victim Identification	Office of the Chief Coroner	• Provincial Multiple Fatalities Plan (Draft)

Initial Response

Initial response activities of the Ontario Provincial Police, in coordination with the Office of the Chief Coroner, involve securing the site, initial scene evaluation, and the establishment and coordination of all other phases of the recovery effort. Every site should be treated as a crime scene until it has been determined as otherwise.

Scene Assessment

The initial scene evaluation will determine needs and dangers such as:

- Identification of possible chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or primary and secondary incendiary hazards,
- Equipment required ensuring the safety of responders,
- The number of fatalities, and the condition of human remains,
- Accessibility of the scene and equipment necessary to begin recovery operations,
- Determine location(s) for family assistance centre. Consideration should include the need to possibly house family members,
- Determine the location for Psychosocial Response and Recovery for responders,
- The need to call in additional resources.

Scene Security

Security at the scene of mass fatality disasters is critical to the success of all operations. The scene must be clearly delineated and rules of access must be established and strictly enforced to ensure the following:

- Maintain site integrity via establishment of secure perimeter,
- Maintain chain of custody of evidentiary items,
- Prevent scene workers from being disturbed,
- Control unauthorized volunteers who may rush to the scene in an attempt to help,
- Maintain the dignity and privacy of families, and
- Prevent public / media from witnessing/ the condition of remains.

Credentialing / Access Control:

The establishment of an on-site rapid credentialing and personnel identification tag process is required to prevent unauthorized access to the site and designated secure facilities. Depending on the nature of the incident, there may also be requests from residents and business owners to gain access to premises within the affected area.

The OPP Crime Scene Register should be used to track those emergency response personnel, response support personnel, recovery support personnel, residents, and business owners to be granted access into the affected area.

At a large-scale incident where many people may require access to the scene, it may be difficult to coordinate access quickly and efficiently. Best practices include:

- Establishment of a reception centre to validate credentials and coordinate access for non-emergency response personnel;
- Use of letters of access (Figure 1) and/or vehicle placards (Figure 2) to identify unmarked vehicles and civilian personnel (i.e. subject matter experts, residents, business owners, etc.). Unique placard/letter of access numbers should be identified in the register; *and/or*
- Use of photo ID camera/printer for the immediate creation of identification tags (Figure 3), colour coded to identify area of access (e.g. red=inner perimeter, yellow=outer perimeter). ID Tags are to be visible whenever the person is on site.

Note: Templates for identification documents are located on the Field Support Bureau – Major Incident Command Intranet site.

Figure 1 – Sample Letter of Access

	Ontario Provincial Police	NO: [Unique #]

[Name of Incident]
[Purpose/ Destination]

To Whom It May Concern:

The holder of this Letter of Access has been granted access to the area noted below for the following reason(s):

- ❑ Emergency Response **(Level 1)**
- ❑ Response Support **(Level 2)**
- ❑ Recovery Support **(Level 3 – *Access to the inner perimeter must be approved by the Incident Commander*)**
- ❑ Resident or Business Owner **(Level 4 - *Access must be approved by the Incident Commander)***

Please contact the person below if you have any questions, or to report misconduct or the loss or theft of this Letter of Access or the companion Vehicle Placard (if applicable).

[Person's Full Name]	Zone:
[Organization (if applicable)]	

Notes:

Authorized By:	Signature:
Position/Title:	E-Mail
Office Phone:	Cell Phone:

Figure 2 - Sample Placard



Figure 3 – Sample ID Tag



Checkpoints / Traffic Management:

To ensure that only authorized personnel are allowed into the affected areas, the following checkpoints should be established:

Outer Perimeter Checkpoint

- This is a checkpoint where traffic management is a priority and risk remains relatively low.
- Typically a cursory review of the individual and his or her vehicle is conducted.
- Vehicle Placards can be leveraged to form multiple lanes of traffic segmented by priority (no placard vs. placard, by Tier level, etc.) as the roadway permits.
- Individuals can be directed to a second officer located at the Outer Perimeter Checkpoint or to the command post for a further, more detailed review as needed

Inner Perimeter Checkpoint

- This is a checkpoint where a more detailed (or scrutinized) review of a person's identity details and documents is appropriate and where risk remains high or higher
- An inspection of IDs and Letters of Access, as well as inspection of the person's record in the issuing registration system, is appropriate

Spot Check

- This is a roaming checkpoint where a more detailed (or scrutinized) review of a person's identity details and documents is appropriate and where risk remains high
- This typically occurs due to the person's actions or geographic location within the emergency zone
- This also typically occurs at a muster point where the person is or will be assuming or being asked to fulfill certain job roles, assignments or responsibilities
- An inspection of IDs and Letters of Access, as well as inspection of the person's record in the issuing registration system, is appropriate

Tiered Access based on Function:

Type	**Access Level / Required Credentials**	
	Outer Perimeter	**Inner Perimeter**
Level 1 – Emergency Response *Police/Fire/Emergency Medical Services, as required by the incident*	Uniform / Marked Vehicle – unrestricted access	Uniform / Marked Vehicle – unrestricted access
Level 2 – Response Support *Public works, municipal utilities, subject matter experts, etc.*	- Vehicle placard and/or - Visual inspection of photo ID / Employer ID, as required	- **Restricted access as authorized by Incident Commander** - Vehicle placard and/or - Visual inspection of photo ID / Employer ID

Type	Access Level / Required Credentials	
	Outer Perimeter	Inner Perimeter
Level 3 – Recovery Support *Relief workers, animal rescue, business operators considered critical to recovery efforts, other personnel approved at the discretion of local authorities*	- Pre-authorization in issuing registration system - Vehicle placard / Letter of Access and/or - Visual inspection of photo ID	- **Restricted access as authorized by Incident Commander** - Pre-authorization in issuing registration system - Vehicle placard / Letter of Access and/or - Visual inspection of photo ID
Level 4 – Residents & Business Owners *Identified through municipal tax rolls, business associations, landlord, tenant/condo associations, etc.*	- **Restricted access as authorized by the Incident Commander** - Pre-authorization in issuing registration system - Vehicle placard / Letter of Access and/or - Visual inspection of photo ID	- **No access until area is deemed safe for entry** - Pre-authorization in issuing registration system - Vehicle placard / Letter of Access and/or - Visual inspection of photo ID

Incident Command

Under the PMFP (Draft), it is assumed that during the initial phase of a multiple fatality event, the response will be coordinated by a single Incident Commander irrespective of the number of agencies and jurisdictions involved. It is further assumed that, as every multiple fatality event has the potential to be criminal in nature, the Incident Commander should be a senior police officer, trained in the Incident Management System. However, after the initial response and depending on the nature of the incident, Incident Command may transfer to another entity (e.g. fire services).[3]

Within the OPP, Major Incident Command falls under the Field Support Bureau and is carried out in accordance with *Police Orders, Section 5.1 - Major Incident Command* and the *OPP Major Incident Command (MIC) Standard Operating Procedure Manual.*

The duties of an Incident Commander are as follows:

- to take command/control of the major incident, and
- to retain command/control until the situation is resolved/relieved.

Unified Command Coordination

A number of different organizations and agencies may be represented at the command post, depending on the nature of the incident. During the initial response, a single Incident Commander will be designated, as appropriate to the incident. This will allow for a coordinated approach to scene logistics, including issues such as health and wellbeing of survivors, management of first responders, scene preservation, scene control, security, scene safety, evidence retention and crowd control.

Each agency shall then designate an inter-agency liaison officer to ensure coordinated incident site management and adequate communication is achieved through frequent exchange of

[3] Provincial Multiple Fatality Plan (Draft), 63.

information, especially with respect to the hazards and status of the operational activities. Unified command and coordination will be established according to accepted Incident Management System protocols. Members of the unified command are responsible to work together in order to ensure the following:

- Determining overall incident objectives,
- Selection of strategies,
- Ensuring that joint planning for tactical activities will be accomplished,
- Ensuring that integrated tactical operations are conducted, and
- Making maximum use of all assigned resources.

Family Assistance

The Family Assistance Centre is one of the most sensitive operations in a mass fatality event. A Family Assistance Centre must be established and should be physically separated from the disaster scene. The activities surrounding the setup and operation of the Family Assistance Centre will be coordinated by the Office of the Fire Marshall and Emergency Management (OFMEM) and municipal social services, in consultation with the Office of the Chief Coroner.

The area selected should be secured, in order to give privacy and dignity to the families. Regular briefings by the Coroner or staff will help keep the families informed. One factor of a mass fatality incident involves the notification of next-of-kin. Grieving relatives, especially those at the disaster site, may need crisis counselling by faith based representatives, social workers or other professionals. Meeting with the families on an individual basis early on makes it possible to start the process of collecting ante mortem records for use in the morgue operations.

Police will work in conjunction with the Family Assistance Team Leader to ensure the specific responsibilities are met. Best practices from other large-scale multiple fatality incidents include:

- Establishment of a 1-800 telephone number for inquiries from family members and the media;
- Assigning police investigators to the Family Assistance Centre to liaise with family members directly; and
- Engaging the services of *Victim Crisis Assistance and Referral Services (VCARS),* where appropriate. VCARS is a community response program providing immediate help to victims of crime or disaster 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The VCARS team provides short-term, on-site assistance to victims and can also refer them to community services for longer-term support.

Security services will be provided as appropriate. This may be assigned to a third party security company or by the responding police service as per the PMFP (Draft).

Responsibilities of officers include:

- Management of traffic flow for parking,
- Monitoring access to the facility, ensuring only legitimate visitors are granted access,
- On-site security to maintain the safety and well-being of those within the facility, and
- Ante-mortem data acquisition will be completed by local police services at the direction of the Chief Coroner.

Recovery

The Chief Coroner is responsible for overseeing the activities of the Multiple Fatality Oversight Group (MFOG) which is comprised of designated teams and a team leader to oversee the investigation, reporting, recovery, identification, examination and disposition of human remains.

Remains

As per the PMFP (Draft), and under direction of the Chief Coroner, search and recovery involves locating and removing bodies, body parts, and personal effects. The Human Remains Recovery and Evidence Collection Teams are responsible for recovery of the bodies at the disaster site, as well as collection and preservation of evidence at the site.

The Human Remains Recovery team should be led by a forensic pathologist or designate to ensure minimal damage to remains and minimal loss of evidence. The Evidence Collection team should be led by an experienced Forensic Identification Officer to ensure proper collection of evidence ensuring both integrity and continuity of the evidence.

During the search and recovery the following should be observed:

- Document everything found at the disaster site, as it may help in the investigation and in the morgue operations,
- No remains shall be moved, or touched by workers except for primary triage purposes until direction and approval have been given by the Coroner, unless necessary for responder safety or to prevent further damage to the remains,
- Bodies may be contaminated both internally and externally. Contaminated bodies shall not be decontaminated until authorized by the Coroner; decontamination will be conducted in a manner to preserve evidence,
- Some incidents may involve a suspected or confirmed infectious disease. In such cases every worker involved in the response must have the appropriate training and personal protective equipment required to implement routine precautions, as well as any additional precautions as identified,
- Remains or body parts will be handled as per established forensic protocols,
- Unattached personal effects found on or near the body will be placed in a container and recorded for recovery, and
- Valuables such as wallets or jewellery that are attached to the body or found near the remains should be left attached or contained, recorded and secured.

Transportation of Remains

The Office of the Chief Coroner has contracted with a private service provider for the transportation of remains in the event of a multiple fatality incident. This service provider has both storage and cooling capacity in its facility and would be a provider of choice. Depending on the location of the incident, other body transfer services, including local funeral homes, may be requested to assist in this function.

Considerations include:

- In the event that deceased victims are contaminated, expert advice will be sought before they are removed from the scene;

- The transfer of remains to the morgue should be handled discretely using appropriate, unmarked vehicles such as refrigerated trucks;
- Transport of remains and documentation should be coordinated by the Office of the Chief Coroner; and
- None of the remains should be moved from the site to the mortuary until the Coroner has given permission to do so.

Morgue Operations

In the case of a multiple fatality incident where it is not possible to transport human remains to the Provincial Forensic Pathology Unit, a temporary mortuary may be required. The decision to use a temporary mortuary will be made at the time of the incident by the Office of the Chief Coroner and will be dependent on the nature of the incident (size, location, accessibility, etc.), in consultation with the impacted municipality and/or First Nation.

Due to the requirement of continuity of evidence, the OPP will be responsible to supervise the movement of the remains from the scene to the human remains collection area and body storage area, where the number of deceased exceeds the capacity of the mortuary.

The Office of the Chief Coroner, in collaboration with the OPP, will develop a mechanism and process to itemize, catalogue and otherwise safeguard all associated and unassociated items, including cash and valuables. Timing of the return of personal effects to families and/or disposal of items will be determined by Office of the Chief Coroner.

All records and supporting documents pertaining to the recovery, identification, and disposition of remains and personal effects will be archived and retained for future reference in accordance with current policies of the Office of the Chief Coroner and as required by legislation. (Note: Records related to DNA testing conducted by Centre for Forensic Sciences (CFS) will remain with CFS).

Lead and Supporting Agencies – Contact Information / Roles and Responsibilities

The following lists will be of assistance in determining the investigating agencies and response partners that should be notified dependent upon the nature, scope, and magnitude of the type of incident:

All of the following contact information is also available through the OPP Provincial Communications Centres (PCCs)

Primary / Lead Agencies

Office of the Chief Coroner (Ontario Provincial dispatch: 855-299-4100)

As the Lead Agency, the Office of the Chief Coroner will:

- Administer the Coroners Act R.S.O. 1990, Chapter C.37 (Coroners Act) and the regulations,
- Utilize potential experts, and will assume leadership, integration and facilitating roles,
- Establish a liaison or representation with the Ontario Provincial Police,
- Activate the Provincial Multiple Fatality Plan,
- Initiate activation and provide a lead role at the Family Assistance Centre,

- Be responsible for recovery and evacuation of remains, body identification, disposition of human remains and preservation or embalming,
- Through the Family Assistance Centre the Coroner's Office is responsible for notification of next of kin or representative, documentation on each victim and the preparation and file death certificates,
- Identify the morgue site(s) and/or temporary morgue facility,
- Establish a staging area, and
- Will work in conjunction with others regarding the release of information. This may be coordinated through the Provincial Operations Centre and the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services Communications Branch.

Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)
TSB: 1-800-387-3557 or +1 819 953 3741
(http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/)

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is an independent agency that advances transportation safety by investigating occurrences in the marine, pipeline, rail and air modes of transportation. The *Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act* provides the legal framework that governs TSB activities.

TSB is responsible for:

- conducting independent investigations, including public inquiries when necessary, into selected transportation occurrences in order to make findings as to their causes and contributing factors;
- identifying safety deficiencies, as evidenced by transportation occurrences;
- making recommendations designed to eliminate or reduce any such safety deficiencies; and reporting publicly on our investigations and on the findings in relation thereto;
- coordinating the investigation of all occurrences involving an accident or incident associated with the operation of a marine vessel, aircraft, railway rolling stock or commodity pipeline;
- providing information on a continuing basis concerning the investigation of an incident; and
- providing any information useful to the identification process, such as passenger manifests and crew information.

Note: In the event of an air disaster, it may also be necessary to liaise with the Airport Authority for the airport where incident occurred.

Supporting Agencies

Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management (OFMEM)
Provincial Emergency Operations Centre: 1-866-314-0472 - Contacted by OPP GHQ Duty Office

Under the *Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act*, Emergency Management Ontario, as the overall provincial emergency management coordinator, is responsible for the promotion, development, implementation and maintenance of effective provincial emergency management programs throughout Ontario, and for the coordination of these programs with the federal government.

OFMEM will:

- maintain the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre on a 24/7 basis;
- coordinate provincial emergency response, when required;
- provide advice and assistance to municipalities and ministries in all areas of emergency management; and maintains several provincial-level emergency response, continuity of operations and coordinating plans;
- deploy a field officer to the site of the incident to assist in coordinating provincial emergency response assistance, where required; and
- request specialized or large-scale assistance from the federal government through Emergency Management Ontario, where required.

Joint Task Force Central – Canadian Armed Forces (JTFC)
Watch Office: 416-631-5322

JTFC is responsible for leading continental operations throughout the Province of Ontario, including its territorial waterways. It has the ability to provide resources such as scene security, air transportation, facilities for temporary morgue, secure area for evidence collection, combat cameras, and psychological services.

The Commander JTFC commands the Canadian Armed Forces response to any request for military intervention to provide emergency assistance or support in critical incidents throughout the JTFC area of responsibility. To form mission-appropriate task forces, Commander JTFC has the authority to task any and all resources held in the Province of Ontario by the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Joint Task Force Central (JTFC) is available on request. Best practice includes early notification of the incident in order to allow the unit to prepare to respond if deemed necessary. Anyone can contact JTFC but most often request for assistance is made through the PEOC if required to allow for a smooth transition of response.

Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre Canadian Forces Base Trenton (JRCC)
Contact: 800 267-7270 / Alternate: 613 965-3870 / Simplex Frequency: 148.765 Mhz, CTCSS Tone 107.2 Hz

Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) / Canadian Mission Control Centre (CMCC) is committed to being a leader in emergency response and alerting systems for Search and Rescue providing the country and international community with excellence in Search and Rescue response in preventing loss of life and injury by:

- Providing early alerting,
- Maintaining and promoting the highest standard in SARSAT monitoring systems,
- Supporting Air distress,
- Marine Distress,
- Supporting Humanitarian calls for help,
- Providing access to medevac in all of Canada's sovereign territory,
- Managing our resources effectively, and
- Working collaboratively with our colleagues in both the national and internationally communities.

Emergency Medical Services

Under the direction of the Incident Commander or designate, Emergency Medical Services will be responsible for the following:

- Coordinating response procedures with the other emergency services,
- Providing emergency medical response as required, and
- Identifying deceased patients as part of the triage process.

Non-Government Volunteer Agencies

Red Cross, St John Ambulance, Salvation Army, and Victim Services are organizations that are commonly called upon to assist during an emergency. They can be a great asset in assisting in the recovery from an emergency. Under the direction of the Incident Commander or designate, non-government Volunteer Agencies may be responsible for the following:

- Victim services,
- Counselling services,
- Meal/accommodation services,
- Organizing relief fund, and
- Other volunteer services as required.

Ontario Funeral Services Association (OFSA)
(www.ofsa.org)

Under the direction of the Coroner, the Funeral Services Association through local funeral service providers can:

- Provide needed supplies, equipment, vehicles, and personnel, as needed.
- Assist in identifying other necessary resources, and
- Assist with temporary storage of remains, handling of remains, interaction with family members, and facilitating the appropriate hand over of the remains to family.

Rail Operators

- Canadian National Railway (CN) – Emergency Contact Number: 800-465-9239
- Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) – Emergency Contact Number: CPR Police Communications Centre: 800-716-9132
- Ontario Northland Railway – Rail Traffic Control Emergency Contact Number: 705-544-2292 x 119
- Go Transit – Go Transit Enforcement Dispatch: 905-803-0642
- Via Rail – Operation Control Centre: 888-393-6424

Road

The responsibility for road collision response and investigation is with the OPP or Police Service of jurisdiction.

Hazardous Materials

- Ministry of the Environment Spills Action Centre – 1-800-268-6060 or 416-325-3000
- OPP UCRT – Request made through GHQ Duty Office: 705-329-6950

APPENDIX D

A Framework for Police Preparedness for Indigenous Critical Incidents[55]

[55] OPP00004566

A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICE PREPAREDNESS FOR INDIGENOUS CRITICAL INCIDENTS

INDIGENOUS POLICING BUREAU, TRAFFIC SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT COMMAND

REVISED DECEMBER 2018

INTRODUCTION

Critical Policy

The Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) is committed to safeguarding the individual rights enshrined within federal and provincial laws, inclusive of those specifically respecting the rights of Aboriginal persons of Canada as set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms The OPP recognizes that conflicts may arise as Indigenous communities and the various levels of government work to resolve outstanding issues associated with matters such as land claims, self determination and Indigenous or treaty rights, which may include activities such as hunting, fishing and extraction on ancestral or traditional territories

Preamble

The Framework for Police Preparedness for Indigenous Critical Incidents (the Framework) provides a guideline for police response to conflict and has applicability to both Indigenous and non Indigenous issue related conflict The Framework outlines a flexible response to each stage of the conflict cycle; pre, during and post Its focus on negotiation and mediation applies to police related matters during a conflict The Framework is recognized as a best practice for police response to an Indigenous critical incident (ICI)

Critical incidents are often avoidable The benefits of the Framework are maximized if put to use before an issue becomes a critical incident Identifying, establishing and maintaining open and transparent relationships with all stakeholders are vital to maximize public safety

It is the role of the OPP and its employees to make every effort prior to a critical incident to understand the issues and to protect the rights of all involved parties throughout the cycle of conflict The policing objective is to preserve the peace, prevent offences and enforce the law in a manner that respects the rights of all involved parties

Purpose

The purpose of the document is to

- promote an operationally sound, informed and flexible approach to resolving conflict and managing crises in a consistent manner;
- offer a framework that demonstrates accommodation and mutual respect of differences, positions and interests of involved Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities and the OPP; and
- promote and develop strategies that minimize the use of force to the fullest extent possible.

Definitions

Aboriginal/ Aboriginal People

For the purposes of this document: a collective group recognized under the Canadian constitution (section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982). The group includes Indians (commonly referred to as First Nations people or First Nations), Mêtis and Inuit. The term First Nation may also be used to replace Band or Indian Band in the name of a community (as defined by the federal Indian Act). The term First Nation Territory, when used, may refer to a reserve or to ancestral or traditional territory (as defined by the federal Indian Act).

Indigenous People

Indigenous peoples are inheritors and practitioners of unique cultures and ways of relating to people and the environment. They have retained social, cultural, economic and political characteristics that are distinct from those of the dominant societies in which they live.

Critical Incident

As defined in Police Orders, Chapter 5, Major Incident Command

Major Incident

As defined in Police Orders, Chapter 5, Major Incident Command.

Indigenous Critical Incident (ICI)

As defined in Police Orders, Chapter 5, Major Incident Command.

Role of the OPP

The OPP recognizes and respects the fundamental freedoms of opinion, expression and peaceful assembly enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A safe and secure environment for all participants and communities

exercising these constitutionally protected rights is always a significant consideration

Section 4(2) of the Police Services Act (PSA) states

Adequate and effective police services must include, at a minimum, all of the following police services

- *crime prevention;*
- *law enforcement;*
- *assistance to victims of crime;*
- *public order maintenance; and*
- *emergency response 1997, c. 8, s. 3.*

In addition, OPP employees have a statutory and common law duty to preserve the peace (PSA s. 42(1)(a)) The principles of peacekeeping are aimed at minimizing violence, keeping and restoring public order, maintaining neutrality, facilitating rights and establishing trusting relationships

The OPP shall investigate and take appropriate action with respect to civil disobedience and other unlawful acts The OPP shall use discretion and a carefully measured approach, employing only the level of force necessary to

- ensure the safety of all citizens;
- enforce the law;
- enforce court orders/warrants;
- maintain/restore peace; and
- to provide order and security.

Uniqueness of Indigenous Occupation and Protests

Indigenous occupations, protests and demonstrations are often complex in nature and qualitatively different from single issue labour or political disputes. The OPP shall make every effort to foster awareness of historical and cultural factors that may contribute to the uniqueness and impact of Indigenous issues. These factors shall be considered when determining what police resources may be required to peacefully resolve such incidents.

Distinguishing factors may include, but are not limited to:

- historically difficult relations between police and Indigenous peoples and communities;
- division on issues within Indigenous communities;
- remoteness of sites and traditional territories;
- involvement of different parties, e.g. government, media or non-Indigenous third parties, making it difficult to communicate and negotiate policing issues with protesters/occupiers/demonstrators;
- strength of resolve and commitment to issues, causing protesters/occupiers/ demonstrators to push back any attempt of force by police;
- duration of incidents spanning days, weeks or longer periods;
- intervention of federal and/or provincial governments with public policy and legal issues that are outside the authority of policing; and
- potential for solidarity response that may be national or international in scope.

Provincial Highway Blockade Strategy

When a demonstration occurs on or near a provincial highway, further information pertaining to the Provincial Highway Blockade Strategy can be obtained by contacting the Commander, Field Support Bureau (FSB).

ROLES AND RESOURCES

Regional and Detachment Commander

Regional and detachment commanders shall

- remain alert and sensitive to Indigenous critical incidents during any stage of the cycle pre, during or post; and
- provide report backs and updates regarding all Indigenous critical incidents and engage required resources through the chain of command.

Commander, FSB

The Commander, FSB shall oversee the major critical incident commander role.

Commander, Indigenous Policing Bureau

The Commander, Indigenous Policing Bureau shall:

- ensure training on the application of the Framework;
- remain current on Indigenous issues impacting Indigenous peoples and communities;
- assist in facilitating communications during any Indigenous-related dispute, conflict or Indigenous critical incident;
- be responsible for the creation and distribution of the annual framework report;
- provide informed advice to OPP Executive and major critical incident commanders regarding issues impacting Indigenous peoples and communities; and
- develop and maintain a network of contacts and partnerships to enhance communication and foster positive, trusting relationships within:
  - the OPP;
  - other police services including First Nation Police Services; and
  - Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities and leadership.

Manager, Corporate Communications

The Manager, Corporate Communications is responsible for working closely with the Indigenous Policing Bureau and, as a provincial resource, shall

- provide communication advice and expertise, as appropriate, during all Indigenous critical incidents;
- support and assist with provision of communication products and services; and
- foster communication opportunities to increase public and internal OPP awareness and understanding, and to enhance accountability and transparency during conflicts and critical incidents.

Major Critical Incident Commander

The available major critical incident commander or assigned critical incident commander is responsible for providing expertise in managing and resolving Indigenous critical incidents and shall:

- take command and control of the incident; and
- activate the OPP Integrated Response.

Provincial Liaison Team (PLT)

The Provincial Liaison Team is responsible for:

- providing specialized support and assistance to establish and maintain open and transparent lines of communication with all stakeholders who may be affected, directly or indirectly by a critical incident or an ICI;
- providing specialized support to build relationships of trust, mutual understanding and respect between police and all stakeholders; and
- undertaking its responsibilities in keeping with the procedures and best practices documented in the PLT Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).

FRAMEWORK APPLICATION

Conflict Cycle

Conflicts cycle through recognized incident stages: pre-critical incident, critical incident and post-critical incident. This section provides an overview of signs,

behaviours and cues that may be present at each stage and suggests resolution techniques to avoid, de-escalate or appropriately manage the situation. It is strongly recommended that the Framework be applied early in the pre-critical stage and continue throughout the post-critical stage.

Pre-Critical Incident Stage

What to look for

- real or perceived inequities in privilege or power within the community or between the community and society;
- an initiative or event being planned that could lead to conflict;
- high probability that an ongoing initiative or event could lead to conflict or crisis;
- words and images used to describe an initiative or event that could generate negative emotions, dissension, disagreement, or conflict; and/or
- involved persons stating that if an initiative or event is not dealt with sensitively, a conflict or crisis will ensue.

What may be done

- be informed about issues of concern by participating in discussions with Indigenous peoples and communities, police services, other levels of leadership, etc.;
- remain informed of positions and impact of non-Indigenous stakeholders;
- consider the policing implications of the local issues identified;
- develop and display respect for all concerned by listening;
- always be honest: overt and consistent honesty is the best way to earn trust;
- build positive trusting relationships with members of all communities, First Nations police services and other agencies;
- be open, talk to all parties;
- contact elected and traditional leaders of the community if an issue arises that may precipitate a dispute or conflict;
- consult with community leaders on potentially conflicting issues using existing opportunities for dialogue;
- encourage people to come together around issues and activities where agreement exists;
- engage Provincial Liaison Team for guidance and support;
- make appropriate notifications through established chain of command;
- notify the major critical incident commander of circumstances that could indicate a pre-critical incident through the established chain of command;
- pre-identify community and agency representatives who can serve as resource persons or mediators; and
- review the local emergency plan to ensure it adequately addresses potential conflict situations, e.g. plan outlines diversion routes, identifies likely blockade locations.

Critical Incident Stage

At this stage involved persons may have become increasingly frustrated that their issues have not been appropriately addressed. A range of possibilities exist as to how the critical incident may evolve—from a passive demonstration to one where all stakeholders may be significantly affected, e.g. blockade of transportation route.

What to look for

- involved persons expressing a perception that their issues of concern are not being satisfactorily addressed;
- comments about the incident increasing in frequency or intensity, indicating greater likelihood of crisis;
- positions being communicated becoming entrenched and polarized;

- involved persons becoming increasingly vocal, forceful and threatening;
- demands being made known directly to police or through the media;
- conciliatory efforts not effective given the stage of the incident;
- increasing media coverage of the incident with potential to further divide positions; and
- persons or agencies not directly involved in the critical incident taking public positions concerning the dispute.

What shall be done

- The Commander, FSB must consider assigning an available major critical incident commander or appropriate critical incident commander, in accordance with Police Orders, Chapter 5 - Major Incident Command, to be the lead incident commander for the duration of the critical incident. In such circumstances, the major critical incident commander or critical incident commander shall be responsible for overall command and control of the Integrated Response;
- ensure all parties to the critical incident have the opportunity to contribute to strategies for resolution. OPP employees will rely on established relationships for effective communication between themselves and persons involved in the critical incident as well as other members of the community;
- provide options that are transparent to the parties in conflict to promote a safe resolution. OPP employees shall state their position and interests clearly so as to be understood by all. This can potentially defuse a critical incident and lead to a safe resolution; and
- key messages may be developed at any stage of a critical incident to support consistent, clear messaging. Communication strategies and key messaging are included in Incident Command and Media Relations training.

What may be done

- establish the policing interest as it relates to the dispute at hand, e.g.
  - explain that the police intend to maintain an orderly flow of traffic while allowing participants to lawfully demonstrate; and
  - where possible attempt to re-route traffic in order to avoid confrontation and minimize impact.
- emphasize that negotiations will be used at every opportunity;
- acknowledge the existence of underlying factors within the critical incident;
- communicate to disputants that all demonstrators and other members of the public will be treated with dignity and respect - consider the values, traditions and interests of the affected communities;
- seek out common ground between all stakeholders and aspects of the dispute where agreement exits - take every opportunity to facilitate productive communication;
- establish with disputants a means by which information and progress will be communicated to media;
- consider the impact of decisions on the safety of police officers, demonstrators and other members of the public;
- respond to conflict with minimal use of force;
- explain that, if needed and possible, a cooling off period and its length will be jointly agreed to; and/or
- ensure OPP personnel are kept informed.

Post-Critical Incident Stage

What to look for

- emotional and physical exhaustion of participants;
- differing perceptions of the incident by those involved; and

- stakeholders wanting to reflect on what has occurred, discuss the lessons learned and identify peace-building actions.

What may be done

- operational debriefings to review and assess operations and seek lessons learned; and
- development and implementation of a strategy to restore relationships with both the Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities:
  - strategy should consider general objectives, responsibilities, potential activities to restore relationships and be adapted in practice to specific circumstances as necessary; and
  - resources, such as the Provincial Liaison Team, may be brought in to support development, implementation and assessment of the strategy.

APPENDIX 1: RELEVANT LEGISLATION

Constitution Act, 1982

Enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c. 11, which came into force on April 17, 1982.

Constitution Act, 1982, PART I - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 25 and section 2:

Aboriginal rights and freedoms not affected by Charter

25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including

(*a*) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and

(*b*) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.

Fundamental freedoms

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:

(*a*) freedom of conscience and religion;

(*b*) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;

(*c*) freedom of peaceful assembly; and

(*d*) freedom of association.

Constitution Act, 1982, PART II - Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, section 35(1),(2),(3),(4):

Recognition of existing aboriginal and treaty rights

35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.

Definition of "aboriginal peoples of Canada"

(2) In this Act, *"aboriginal peoples of Canada"* includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.

Land claims agreements

(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) *"treaty rights"* includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.

Aboriginal and treaty rights are guaranteed equally to both sexes

(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.

APPENDIX E
List of Hendon Reports and Person of Interest Profiles

HENDON STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

CONTROL NUMBER	REPORT DATE	FILE NAME
OPP00001600	January 13th, 2022	2022-01-13 – POIB – PROJECT HENDON 008-2022 – STRATEGIC OVERVIEW_FINAL
OPP00001028	January 20th, 2022	2022-01-20 – POIB – PROJECT HENDON – PROTEST CONVOY
OPP00001612	January 26th, 2022	2022-01-27 - POIB - SA BULLETIN - Freedom Convoy 2022_PRO A
OPP00001644		2022-01-26 - POIB - E22084931 - OFFICER SAFETY BULLETIN - Weapons
OPP00003457	February 4th, 2022	2022-02-04_Operational Intelligence Assessment
OPP00001765	February 8th, 2022	2022-FEB-08_Strategic Assessment – Operation BearHug2.0_Draft
OPP00003729	February 9th, 2022	2022-FEB-09_Operational Intelligence Assesment
OPP00002179	February 11th, 2022	2022-FEB-11_Operational Intelligence Assessment - Operation BearHug2.0_Draft
OPP00001819	February 14th, 2022	2022-FEB-14_Operational Intelligence Assessment - Operation BearHug2.0_Draft
OPP00003562	February 17th, 2022	2022-FEB-14_Operational Intelligence Assessment - Operation BearHug2.0_Draft
OPP00001640	February 25th, 2022	2022-02-25 – POIB – PROJECT HENDON 054-2022 – STRATEGIC OVERVIEW_FINAL
OPP00001641	February 26th, 2022	2022-02-26 – POIB – PROJECT HENDON 055-2022 – STRATEGIC OVERVIEW_FINAL

HENDON SITUATION REPORTS ("SITREP")

CONTROL NUMBER	REPORT DATE	FILE NAME
OPP00001603	January 22nd, 2022	2022-01-22 – HENDON SITREP 016-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old * *See note below.*
OPP00001604		2022-01-22 PM – HENDON SITREP 017-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022_FINAL /

		Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001605	January 23rd, 2022	2022-01-23 AM – HENDON SITREP 018-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001606		2022-01-23 PM – HENDON SITREP 019-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001607	January 24th, 2022	2022-01-24 AM – HENDON SITREP 020-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001608		2022-01-24 PM – HENDON SITREP 021-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001609	January 25th, 2022	2022-01-25 – HENDON SITREP 022-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001610	January 26th, 2022	2022-01-26 – HENDON SITREP 023-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001611	January 27th, 2022	2022-01-27 – HENDON SITREP 025-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00000815	January 28th, 2022	REVISED – 2022-01-28 – HENDON SITREP 026-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001614	January 29th, 2022	2022-01-29 – HENDON SITREP 027-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022_Shared / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001615	January 30th, 2022	2022-01-30 – HENDON SITREP 028-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001616	January 31st, 2022	2022-01-31 – HENDON SITREP 029-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old

OPP00001617	February 1st, 2022	2022-02-01 – HENDON SITREP 030-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001618	February 2nd, 2022	2022-02-02 – HENDON SITREP 031-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001619	February 3rd, 2022	2022-02-03 – HENDON SITREP 032-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022_FINAL / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001620	February 4th, 2022	2022-02-04 – HENDON SITREP 033-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001621	February 5th, 2022	2022-02-05 – HENDON SITREP 034-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001622	February 6th, 2022	2022-02-06 – HENDON SITREP 035-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001623	February 7th, 2022	2022-02-07 – HENDON SITREP 036-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001624	February 8th, 2022	2022-02-08 – HENDON SITREP 037-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001625	February 9th, 2022	2022-02-09 – HENDON SITREP 038-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022_FINAL / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001626	February 10th, 2022	2022-02-10 – POIB – HENDON SITREP 039-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022_Final
OPP00001627	February 11th, 2022	2022-02-11 – POIB – HENDON SITREP 040-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022
OPP00001628	February 12th, 2022	2022-02-12 – POIB – HENDON SITREP 041-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022
OPP00001629	February 13th, 2022	2022-02-13 – POIB – HENDON SITREP 042-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022
OPP00001630	February 14th, 2022	2022-02-14 – POIB – HENDON SITREP 043-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY

OPP00001631	February 15th, 2022	2022-02-15 – POIB – HENDON SITREP 044-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022
OPP00001632	February 16th, 2022	2022-02-16 – HENDON SITREP 045-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022_FINAL / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001601	February 17th, 2022,	2022-01-17 – POIB – HENDON SITREP 045-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022**
OPP00001633	February 18th, 2022	2022-02-18 – HENDON SITREP 047-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001634	February 19th, 2022	2022-02-19 – HENDON SITREP 048-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001635	February 20th, 2022	2022-02-20 – HENDON SITREP 049-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001636	February 21st, 2022	2022-02-21 – HENDON SITREP 050-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001637	February 22nd, 2022	2022-02-22 – HENDON SITREP 051-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old
OPP00001638	February 23rd, 2022	2022-02-23 – POIB – HENDON SITREP 052-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022_Redacted
OPP00001639	February 24th, 2022	2022-02-24 – HENDON SITREP 053-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022 / Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old

Notes:

** A number of different reports have the same unified title "Potential of Violent Threats – COVID-19 Vaccine Children 5 to 11 yr old" in the Party Database*, *as that was the name of the originating document, and that document name was applied when the documents were provided to the Party Database. Please refer to the relevant control number.*

***The February 17th, 2022 SITREP has a typographical error in the date contained in the title: "2022-01-17 – POIB – HENDON SITREP 045-2022 FREEDOM CONVOY 2022".*

Control Number	Party	Primary Date/Time	Unified Title
OPP00000769	OPP	07/28/2022 19:40	[redacted]
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OPP00000972	OPP		
OPP00000973	OPP		
OPP00001020	OPP		
OPP00001311	OPP		
OPP00001312	OPP		
OPP00001724	OPP	07/26/2022 11:57	
OPP00001021	OPP		
OPP00001022	OPP	01/30/2022 12:05	
OPP00001351	OPP	01/30/2022 12:05	
OPP00001413	OPP	01/30/2022 12:05	
OPP00003502	OPP	07/21/2022 12:16	
OPP00003505	OPP	07/25/2022 14:48	
OPP00003510	OPP	01/30/2022 13:26	
OPP00003512	OPP	07/27/2022 10:42	
OPP00003516	OPP	07/25/2022 14:50	
OPP00003519	OPP	07/27/2022 15:13	
OPP00004408	OPP	02/01/2022 14:35	Person of Interest - [redacted]

OPP00004409	OPP	02/01/2022 14:35	[redacted]
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OPP00003486	OPP	07/21/2022 12:13	
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OPP00003489	OPP	07/21/2022 12:05	
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OPP00003513	OPP	02/10/2022 8:59	
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OPP00003517	OPP	07/25/2022 14:51	
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OPP00003522	OPP	07/25/2022 14:52	

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OPP00004396 OPP 01/31/2022 12:37 OPS Person of Interest

APPENDIX F
OPP Provincial Highway Blockade Strategy[56]

[56] OPP00004569

PREFACE

While the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) acknowledges and respects the right to peaceful and lawful expressions of dissent, where such a protest involves the blockade of a highway, that right must be balanced against the right of all Ontarians to free and uninhibited passage within the Province of Ontario.

The blockading of a highway may have a variety of impacts, depending on a number of factors, including:

- The time of day,
- The time of year (i.e. long weekends etc.),
- The normal speed of traffic along the roadway,
- The volume of traffic along the roadway,
- The presence of any visual distractions to motorists,
- The resulting impact of traffic congestion to contiguous highways, secondary routes, or infrastructure (Is the backup impacting residential areas, school zones, major intersections, border crossings, etc.),
- Load and travel restrictions on alternative routes,
- Alternative route availability (are there easily accessible alternative routes),
- Access and egress routes,
- Roadway conditions,
- Weather conditions (i.e.: extreme heat or cold),
- Lighting conditions,
- The anticipated duration of the blockade,
- The presence, mood, and tolerance of non-participants,
- Significance of the roadway to support economic trade and viability
- Access to the roadway by emergency response and maintenance vehicles, including but not limited to: Police, Fire, EMS, Public works, and Ministry of Transportation, and/or
- The importance of the highway to support/maintain infrastructure (is the highway critical for accessing or maintaining other key infrastructure, such as hydro transformers, bridges, etc.),

All of these factors must be considered when determining the most appropriate response to a highway blockade.

Any OPP response to a highway blockade involving Aboriginal Critical Incidents shall be conducted in accordance with the Framework for Police Preparedness for Aboriginal Critical Incidents.

Authority to remove a highway blockade:

Where there is an immediate or imminent threat to public safety and security

Where the blockade poses an immediate or imminent threat to public safety and security, and there is no means or time to mitigate that threat, the Incident Commander may authorize the removal of the blockade through the safest and most expedient means available.

Where there is no imminent threat to public safety and security

Where the blockade poses no immediate or imminent threat to public safety and security, however, is causing substantial impacts to non-participants, the Incident Commander should liaise with the participants, through the Provincial Liaison Team (PLT), and commence a process of mediation, coupled with a measured response.

PLT should be engaged as soon as possible, and attempt to minimize the impacts of the blockade on non-participants.

The decision to remove a highway blockade that does not pose an immediate or imminent threat to public safety and security however is creating a substantial disruption to non-participants and/or has the potential to impact public safety and security shall be made by the Deputy of Field Operations, or the Deputy of Traffic Safety and Operational Support (if the situation impacts the Highway Safety Division).

Where authorization to remove a highway blockade exists, the Incident Commander shall develop an operational plan in consultation with the local Detachment taking into consideration the safety and security of all persons involved, including participants, non-participants and all emergency service providers.

Police Operational Response

Response Principles:

Police response in this situation is designed in accordance with the following principles:

- The need to mitigate the situation through a conciliatory, resolution based approach is recognized;

- The development and maintenance of appropriate communications with involved group or organization through the use of PLT;
- Continuous communication/liaison with involved participants and motoring public, while recognizing a need for a measured police response;
- Paramount is the necessity to protect life and property, and the maintenance of order on the highway. To that end, where justified, and no other alternatives are present, the use of criminal and/or other statute law to effect orderly traffic flow; and
- Should the use of force be required, a measured response will be utilized.

Operational Response

The PHBS is based on previous police responses to protests, including slow moving vehicles and blockades. It builds on previous experiences and recognizes the need for flexibility in response. The operational response should be thought in terms of an escalation in police response that is minimal and proportional to any increase in resistance by the protestors. Events associated with highway blockades shall be addressed at the lowest competent level in an effort to affect a peaceful resolution adhering to the principals of a measured response.

Officers managing a highway protest must be flexible and astute to recognize when there is a need for de-escalation in police response.

In brief, the following are the steps, which will be taken in response to any indication of organized traffic slowdowns or blockades:

- A supervisor from the respective detachment is dispatched;
- The attending Supervisor will make an assessment of the impact on public safety, traffic order, and duration while considering emergency vehicle routes, threat to public safety and available detours;
- The Emergency Detour Routes (EDR) will be reviewed and implemented, if applicable;
- The respective Detachment Commander and Provincial Communications Centre (PCC) will be notified;
- Regional Duty Officer (RDO) is to be notified. (RDO will ensure notifications are made to Regional Commander, Director of Operations, Crime Manager, and Traffic Manager);
- A PLT officer shall be assigned to make contact with the protest group;

- Intelligence gathering shall commence locally and be coordinated through the Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau (POIB);
- The securing of evidence to support future prosecutions should be considered;
- Corporate Communications will be engaged through the local media officer to establish key messaging; and
- If the protest is believed to be a long-term blockade, or public safety is a concern, consideration will be given to appropriate closures.

Concept of Operations

Blockade Intelligence:

This plan is based on past experience, which indicates blockades may take several forms, namely:

- Short/long term rolling blockades, limited to one area;
- Short/long term rolling blockades, occurring simultaneously in several different locations;
- Short term full stoppage blockades occurring in one area;
- Long-term full stoppage blockades occurring in several different locations; and
- A combination of any of the above.

Operations:

1) In the event of reported protest activity, via the media, or motorist call-ins, the PCC supervisor will dispatch the closest patrol units (minimum of two officers) to attend. If the report is confirmed as a protest, the PCC supervisor will establish from the attending officer, the type of protest, speed if applicable, and direction of travel, number of participants, anticipated duration and impact on traffic order or public safety.
2) The PCC supervisor will then dispatch a patrol supervisor to the scene, and notify the respective detachment commander and Duty Officer.
3) The on-scene patrol supervisor shall consider requesting the necessary human resources to manage the situation depending on public safety and /or impact on traffic. The closure of ramps, lanes, or establishing police

presence to the rear of a rolling blockade to prevent other motorists from trying to drive through shall be considered.

4) The respective detachment commander will consult with Region to determine an appropriate course of action, namely:

   a) If the blockade is transient in nature, has ended of its own volition, or as a result of police action, consideration should be given to the securing of any evidence for future prosecution, or

   b) If the blockade is a full, long-term traffic stoppage, or there are simultaneous blockades, consideration should be given to partial, rolling, or complete highway closure, dependent on an assessment of the threat to public safety or potential impacts on traffic flow.

5) The on-scene PLT will liaise with the protest participants and leadership. Through effective communication, the PLT officers, will work towards minimizing the impacts of the protest.

6) Public and officer safety issues will be dealt with expeditiously to avoid deterioration of the situation. If it is determined that the removal of the blockade is necessary a measured response will be utilized.

7) In the event of the above, and in accordance with the approved Operations Plan, the Incident Commander will ensure the following resources are considered, as necessary (but not limited to):

   - Crime Unit,
   - Prisoner Transport,
   - Media Officer,
   - Scribe,
   - Emergency Response Teams,
   - EMS,
   - Logistics,
   - Forensic Identification Services,
   - Aviation Services,
   - Provincial Liaison Team, and/or
   - Ministry of Transportation Resources.

Other Resources to Consider for Response to Highway Blockade Events

- Framework for Police Preparedness for Aboriginal Critical Incidents,
- Police Officer's Guide to Public Demonstrations,
- Provincial Communications Centre Standard Operating Procedure Manual,
- Regional/Divisional (REOC/DEOC) Emergency Operation Centre Operational Plans.

Conclusion

This Provincial Highway Blockade Strategy allows for flexibility in responding to traffic blockades under a variety of circumstances, and should be viewed as a guideline, which can be altered to accommodate the situation. The key principle is to use the minimum police intervention required to restore the situation to a peaceful state. This plan is intended to support detachment operational plans when responding to highway blockade events.

The use of this Provincial Highway Blockade Strategy is to promote consistency in OPP response to highway blockades, throughout the province.